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Abstract 
This thesis consists of revised versions of five published papers on the 
development of neoclassical distribution theory, in the English-speaking world 
together with an introduction and conclusion, which draw together the themes 
of the papers. The thesis covers the origins of neo-classical distribution theory 
in the English-speaking world in the work of Jevons and Marshall, through to 
the second generation of Wicksteed, Clark and Pigou, and finally on to the 
1930s and the new perspectives of Hicks and Robinson. 
Drawing on archival sources and primary and secondary texts, these 
essays review the major statements on distribution theory made by key figures 
in the Jevonian and Marshallian marginalist traditions. The essays shed new 
light on the origins of neoclassical distribution theory and provide insights into 
the methodology of nascent neoclassical distribution theory. A drive towards a 
universal, all-embracing marginal productivity theory of the distribution of 
income characterises the work of Clark and Wicksteed, but not so Marshall. A 
formalist mode of analysis, which was to become the hallmark of neoclassical 
economics in the second half of the twentieth century, is also evident in key 
works of the period. However, the role of empirical evidence in theory 
generation and appraisal remains an undeveloped component of late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century neoclassical theory—Marshall again provides an 
exception to the general rule. 
There is a common adherence, among the key figures examined, to the 
joint proposition that competitive market wage outcomes are ‘fair’, but that low ii 
incomes (fair or not) are unjust when they fail to meet minimum needs 
standards. State remedial action (tax and expenditure policies) is required to 
remove such injustices. Robinson’s theory of exploitation provided an important 
extension to the neoclassical normative framework. She highlighted the extent 
to which labour may be exploited due to imperfections in both product and 
labour markets. iii 
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1.  Overview 
1.1  Background 
In 1895, Marshall proposed the following question for debate at the London 
Political Economy Club: ‘What account of the causes governing general wages 
are we to substitute for the so-called Wages Fund Doctrine’ (Groenewegen 
1995a, p. 463).
1 Marshall’s framing of the question neatly captures the 
uncertain state of distribution theory in the mid-1890s. In asserting that an 
alternative account must be substituted for the wages fund doctrine, Marshall is 
clearly indicating that it could no longer lay claim to a pre-eminent position in 
the economic canon. However, the demise of the wages fund doctrine must have 
been of recent origin; otherwise, the question, as posed, would not have been of 
sufficient interest to members of the Club. The attractiveness of Marshall’s 
question would also be much reduced if a clear, uncontested alternative existed. 
The fact, of course, was that it did not. In 1895, distribution theory was in a 
state of flux. 
The increasing importance of Marxian thought in the final two decades 
of the nineteenth century, of course, contributed to a sense of instability in 
distribution theory. Building on a largely classical foundation, Marx advanced 
an exploitation-based theory of profit to which was appended the law of a 
tendency for the profit rate to decline over time (Howard and King 1985, 1989-
1992). Marx’s works provided fertile ground for academic debates from the 
early 1880s. These debates increasingly coalesced with more broadly based 
deliberations linked to the socialist revival and the beginnings of Fabianism 
 2 
(McBriar 1962). The 1880s also witnessed major public debates on the 
economics and radical policy prescriptions of Henry George.
2 
However, Marshall had little regard for Marx’s work and had previously 
dismissed George’s economics and reform program (Stigler 1969). The 
developments in political economy theory that were of greater interest to him 
were the then emerging marginal productivity-based accounts of the distribution 
of income.
3 Two decades after the publication of Jevons’s classic work, The 
Theory of Political Economy (1871), an explosion of marginalist accounts of the 
distribution of income was taking place in the English-speaking world.
4 
The Theory of Political Economy (1871) is best known as a work which 
introduces a marginalist utility theory of value and exchange rather than one 
concerned with distribution theory. Nevertheless, it is important to record that 
The Theory of Political Economy includes a marginal productivity theory of 
interest, a break with the classical wages fund doctrine, a significant revision to 
Ricardian rent theory (based around fragments of a marginal productivity theory 
of wages) and a marginalist-subjectivist theory of labour supply. Jevons’s 
preface to the second edition of The Theory of Political Economy, published in 
1879, also alludes to an all-embracing marginal productivity theory of 
distribution. However, the bridgehead from a marginalist utility and exchange 
theory to a fully articulated marginalist theory of the distribution of income 
remained incomplete. Jevons did not develop his own suggestions for a co-
ordinated marginalist theory of distribution. His theory of wages represented an 
amalgam of different strands of the old (elements of classical wage theory) and 
the new (Jevonian marginalism). 
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It was not until the early 1890s that a major paradigm shift in 
neoclassical distribution theory occurred. One important element that 
distinguished the marginalist accounts of the distribution of income of the 1890s 
from their classical predecessors was the recognition that the marginalist 
framework could be applied equally, and simultaneously, across all factors of 
production. This tendency towards a general, or universal, marginalist theory of 
distribution was stronger among some authors, namely, among Wicksteed, 
Clark and Wicksell, than others. Marshall himself retained a sceptical position 
on the possibilities of an all-embracing marginalist law of distribution. His 
careful analysis of the firm, of the many demand-side and supply-side 
determinants of wages, and the important role of custom and institutions in the 
labour market is testament to this. 
For Wicksteed, Clark and Wicksell (the ‘universalists’), distribution 
theory should not be comprised of a series of loosely connected sub-theories of 
rent, wages, interest and profit. Rather, they argued that marginalist principles, 
applied with equal force to all factors of production. Wicksteed’s 1894 work An 
Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of Distribution (hereafter the Essay), 
provides the highpoint of this universalist stream in neoclassical distribution 
theory. For it is in this brief and little-read volume that we see the first major 
attempt, Walras’s protestations notwithstanding, to present a universalist model 
of the distribution of income in strict mathematical form.
5 
In the Essay, Wicksteed adopts the now familiar production function 
framework and derives the proposition that each factor’s (K) share in the total 
product (P) is given by dP/dK.K. In other words, the rate of payment for each 
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factor is their relevant marginal product with the total value of payment being 
set equal to the rate of payment times the quantity of the factor used. A tortuous 
mathematical proof of the proposition that payment according to the marginalist 
formulation would exhaust the product followed. 
An understanding of nascent neoclassical distribution theory not only 
requires an examination of the extent to which a universalist theory and a 
formalist design, built principally around a mathematical structure, were 
adopted by a number of its key progenitors, but also involves consideration of 
how notions of justice and fairness come into play in the neoclassical 
framework. A positive theory of distribution provides conjectures on what 
determines distributional outcomes. Normative statements refer to whether 
relevant wages outcomes are fair or just. There exists a high degree of tension, 
in many of the early statements of neoclassical distribution theory, between the 
perceived ‘fairness’ of the marginalist equation that each factor receives a return 
based on its marginal efficiency (generally so in competitive markets), and the 
‘injustice’ of low wages and poverty. 
The influence of the physical sciences on the development of 
neoclassical thought has been emphasised in recent work (e.g., Mirowski 1989, 
1994); the relationship between ethics and the development of the neoclassical 
research program remains less developed. Marshall, Clark and Wicksteed all 
protect a notion of fairness in remuneration according to the value of the 
marginal product while allowing for the dual possibility of underpayment 
according to these principles in non-competitive markets and underpayment 
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according to need. These latter two injustices support a role for state action for 
their amelioration. 
The theme of the underpayment of workers in non-competitive markets 
was one that was taken up, some years later, by Pigou and Robinson in their 
neoclassical theories of exploitation. Pigou’s theory of exploitation was 
presented in his 1920 book, The Economics of Welfare, while Joan Robinson’s 
theory was given a prominent position in The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition, published in 1933. The two approaches to exploitation are often 
linked together under the umbrella title of the ‘Pigou-Robinson’ theory of 
exploitation, but, in fact, they draw on quite different neoclassical foundations. 
Indeed, they are worlds apart. The unique feature of Robinson’s approach was 
the application of her new marginalist, deterministic imperfect competition 
model of firm behaviour and markets to the analysis of the exploitation of 
labour. 
1.2  Aims, Themes and Structure 
In this thesis, I examine the development of neoclassical distribution theory in 
the English-speaking world from its origins, in the work of Jevons and 
Marshall, through to the second generation of Wicksteed, Clark and, somewhat 
later, Pigou, and finally on to the 1930s and the new perspectives of Hicks and 
Robinson.
6 The focus of the thesis is on theories of the distribution of income 
emanating from the two varieties of English marginalism, namely, Jevonian and 
Marshallian marginalism. We have much less to say on the Austrian 
marginalists and the general equilibrium economics of Walras and Pareto. The 
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thesis, however, includes an essay on Hicks—a figure whose work traversed all 
three marginalist traditions.
7 
The main body of the thesis comprises five sole-authored papers 
published between 1997 and 2004 (Flatau 1997a, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2004). 
The five papers, listed in the order in which they appear in the text (itself based 
on the chronology of the subject matter), are as follows: 
 
Chapter 2  Flatau, P.R. (2004), Jevons’s One Great Disciple: Wicksteed and 
the Jevonian Revolution in the Second Generation, History of 
Economics Review, 40, 69-107. 
Chapter 3  Flatau, P.R. (1997a), Fair Wages and Just Outcomes. Marshall 
and Pigou on the Labour Market and Redistribution, History of 
Economics Review, 26, 109-124. 
Chapter 4  Flatau, P.R. (2001b), The Methodology of Early Neoclassical 
Distribution Theory: Universalism, the Deductive Method, and 
Ethics, History of Economics Review, 34, 33- 55. 
Chapter 5  Flatau, P.R. (2002), Hicks’s The Theory of Wages: Its Place in 
the History of Neoclassical Distribution Theory, History of 
Economics Review, 36, 44-65. 
Chapter 6  Flatau, P.R. (2001a), Some Reflections on the ‘Pigou-Robinson’ 
Theory of Exploitation, History of Economics Review, 33, 1-16. 
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The papers are reproduced here in their original published form save for 
corrections and revisions based on comments from the examiners of the thesis. 
An unpublished note on Jevons’s theory of wages is included as an Appendix to 
the paper on Wicksteed (chapter 2). A consolidated bibliography is provided 
and a consistent referencing style applied throughout the thesis. 
Each essay represents a self-contained contribution to our knowledge of 
the history of a particular issue, figure or major work in the development of 
neoclassical distribution theory. However, the essays can also be read together 
as an attempt to understand the nature and structure of neoclassical distribution 
theory in its formative stages in the English-speaking world. 
The five papers are bound together by their consideration of four main 
themes. First, the thesis sheds new light on the formative influences 
contributing to the development of neoclassical distribution theory. Extensive 
use has been made of unpublished archival sources to understand the origins of, 
and to contextualise, the development of key statements in neoclassical 
distribution theory. This is particularly the case with respect to Wicksteed’s 
theory of ‘the co-ordination of the laws of distribution’ and Robinson’s theory 
of exploitation. 
A detailed analysis of the seminal influences driving the development of 
key theories is also presented. In like vein, the thesis examines how key works 
such as Hicks’s The Theory of Wages, Robinson’s The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition and Wicksteed’s Essay  have contributed to the subsequent 
trajectory of neoclassical distribution theory and, at a more general level, to 
developments in labour economics and macroeconomics. 
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Second, the five essays provide a description and critical assessment of 
the methodological frameworks adopted by key figures on the distribution of 
income in the early 1890s. The drive among certain second-generation 
marginalists (Clark and Wicksteed in the English-speaking world), towards a 
universal marginal productivity theory of the distribution of income represents a 
major theme of the essays. I also examine the extent to which key authors 
adhere to a formalist agenda, particularly in respect to the use and prioritisation 
of mathematics. 
Third, the thesis considers, in some depth, the ethical frameworks and 
normative positions adopted in the key statements of neoclassical distribution 
theory in its formative period. Is the distribution of income fair? Is it just? On 
what criteria are we to make such judgements? What are the appropriate policy 
responses to unfair or unjust distributional outcomes? There exists, across the 
spectrum of authors surveyed, an adherence to the proposition that competitive 
wage outcomes are ‘fair’ (except when individual workers bargain against 
monopoly employers), but that they can also be ‘unjust’. This occurs when 
wages established in a competitive market are too low against accepted 
minimum needs standards. In this event, state remedial action is required. 
Joan Robinson was, of course, to provide an important extension to this 
normative neoclassical framework. She developed an analysis of labour 
exploitation, utilising a neoclassical apparatus, driven by product and factor 
market imperfections. 
The final theme that runs through the essays is that of continuity and 
discontinuity in neoclassical thought, and in particular, continuity and 
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discontinuity in the Jevonian and Marshallian marginalist traditions. In the first 
paper (chapter 2), I consider how Wicksteed developed, extended and took in 
new directions, Jevonian marginalism, while other papers consider the workings 
out of the Marshallian system in Pigou, Robinson and Hicks. 
1.3  Chapter 2: Wicksteed (and Jevons) 
The first paper is Jevons’s One Great Disciple: Wicksteed and the Jevonian 
Revolution in the Second Generation. This paper provides a critical appraisal of 
Wicksteed’s role in the propagation of Jevonian marginalism and in the 
development of distribution theory into the second generation. 
Wicksteed explicitly identified himself with the economics of Jevons 
and took it upon himself to explain, to a wider audience, and then, further 
extend, the Jevonian framework. The paper is, therefore, concerned, in large 
part, with the question of the continuity (and discontinuity) of a specific 
neoclassical tradition (Jevonian marginalism). 
At one level, Wicksteed’s contributions read as an application of the 
Jevonian framework to a range of new issues. This is particularly the case with 
respect to Wicksteed’s early works; his critique of Marx’s Das Kapital and The 
Alphabet of Economic Science. Jevons’s marginal productivity theory of interest 
also played a very important part in the development of Wicksteed’s marginalist 
theory of distribution. From another perspective, however, Wicksteed can be 
viewed as having significantly extended the Jevonian framework, and, in at 
least one respect, steered it on a new and different path. Wicksteed’s major 
extension to Jevonian marginalism was, of course, his generalisation of the 
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marginal productivity doctrine to all factors of production. However, Wicksteed 
adopted a much narrower methodological stance than that of Jevons. He 
assumed an almost casual interest in the role of data and statistical analyses in 
theory generation and appraisal. At the same time, Wicksteed over-emphasised 
the role of a priori, self-evidential, theorising built on first-hand observations 
and commonsense foundations. 
The link between Jevons and Wicksteed provides a key point of focus of 
the essay. However, the paper also makes a significant contribution to our 
knowledge of Wicksteed’s economic studies by drawing on a range of hitherto 
unpublished and underutilised archival sources to provide a greater 
understanding of the origins and development of Wicksteed’s theory of 
distribution. It also considers the ambiguity evident in Wicksteed’s position on 
socialism and the relationship between Wicksteed’s economic and non-
economic works. Wicksteed published more outside the field of economics than 
he did within it. It is of some interest to explore the nature of the relationship (if 
indeed there exists any) between Wicksteed’s economic and non-economic 
studies. 
An (unpublished) Appendix complements the Wicksteed paper by 
providing an outline of Jevons’s own theory of distribution. The Appendix 
focuses on Jevons’s theory of wages. It considers a view, which is 
commonplace, that Jevons revolutionised value and exchange theory, but left 
intact much of the classical treatment of distribution theory. The appendix 
argues that Jevons’s theory of distribution indeed contains a strong mixture of 
the “old” (elements of classical theory) and the “new” (Jevonian neoclassical 
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theory). Jevons railed against Ricardian wage theory and the wages fund 
doctrine, but accepted, in very large part, existing demand- and supply-type 
explanations of ‘natural wage’ outcomes. He also adopted Smithian arguments 
concerning the benefits of the division of labour and argued forcibly against 
trade unions taking action to affect natural wage outcomes. 
On the other hand, The Theory of Political Economy includes a fully 
developed a marginalist-subjectivist theory of labour supply and fragments of a 
mathematical marginal productivity theory of wages. Moreover, Jevons fully 
applied the law of indifference to labour market outcomes. Finally, I argue that, 
in the second edition of The Theory of Political Economy, Jevons was moving 
towards a universal theory of distribution, which was subsequently to be the 
hallmark of second-generation neoclassical distribution theory. 
1.4  Chapter 3: Marshall and Pigou on Fair Wages and Just 
Outcomes 
Fair Wages and Just Outcomes: Marshall and Pigou on the Labour Market and 
Redistribution (Flatau 1997a) explores Marshall’s and Pigou’s normative 
positions on wage outcomes—focussing on the issue of ‘fair wages’ and the 
exploitation of labour—and the role they saw the state playing in offsetting 
perceived injustices in wage and labour market outcomes. 
Interwoven with a discussion of these issues is an analysis of the extent 
to which Pigou’s work represents a faithful rendition and extension of the 
Marshallian system. Our examination of the question of continuity in 
Marshallian thought mirrors that contained in chapter 2 with respect to the 
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Jevonian marginalist tradition. In particular, we discuss the question of whether 
Pigou’s analysis of wage outcomes and policy actions in The Economics of 
Welfare represents a break from Marshall. In particular, does the Pigovian 
theory of exploitation contained in The Economics of Welfare represent a 
restatement of Marshallian fair wages analysis or does Pigou introduce a new 
critical dimension to normative neoclassical distribution theory? 
The paper goes on to discuss the treatment of low wage outcomes by 
Pigou and Marshall. The outcomes from a free competitive market represent fair 
outcomes for both Marshall and Pigou, though both preserve an important role 
for trade unions to offset the bargaining power of the employer. However, low 
wages, however fair, are unjust when they fail to meet minimum needs 
standards. In this case, both Marshall and Pigou argue against a ‘living wage’ 
policy—a mandated national minimum wage based on some specified needs 
standard—to meet the problem of low wages. Such a policy, they argue, harms 
the very people it is designed to assist. Instead, Marshall and Pigou call for a 
minimum ‘living conditions’ policy backed by state spending actions; Pigou far 
more so than Marshall. 
1.5  Chapter 4: the Methodology of Neoclassical Distribution 
Theory 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of the methodology of neoclassical 
distribution theory in its formative stages. It focuses on the four key figures of 
Marshall, Wicksteed, Wicksell and Clark. In The Scope and Method of Political 
Economy, published contemporaneously with the major works on the 
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distribution of income of all four theorists, J.N. Keynes distinguished between 
an ethical, relativist, and inductivist approach to economics, aligned to the 
German historical school, and a positive, universalist, abstract, deductivist 
methodological position. The essay classifies and assesses the actual 
methodological practices of Clark, Wicksteed, Marshall and Wicksell against 
Keynes’s taxonomy. 
The paper argues that the dominant methodological position adopted by 
Clark, Wicksteed, Marshall and Wicksell lies much closer to Keynes’s positive, 
universalist, abstract methodological stance than to the ethical, relativist, 
inductivist approach. However, important differences exist within the group of 
four. In particular, the paper argues that Marshall is one step removed from the 
other theorists in respect to all of the dimensions specified in Keynes’s 
methodological taxonomy. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that 
neoclassical distribution theory, in its formative period, does not present as 
methodologically monist in nature. 
Three of the four authors surveyed, Clark, Wicksteed and Wicksell, 
adopt an avowedly universalist approach in their statements on distribution 
theory. The distribution of income can be described in terms of a marginal 
productivity model applicable across all factors of production and relevant at all 
times. Marshall is clearly the odd one out in this respect in that he emphasises 
the limits within which the laws of economics apply. Marshall also points to the 
need for careful empirical research to account for changing institutional settings 
and to corroborate or refute the laws of economics put forward. 
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Both Wicksteed and Wicksell adopt a mathematical, formalist mode of 
modelling in their respective key works, though in the case of Wicksell, the 
limits of mathematics in the field of economics are clearly recognised (Wicksell 
[1925]1969). Clark does not use a mathematical apparatus, but attempts to use 
diagrammatic and simple algebraic arguments as best he could. Again, Marshall 
presents as the exception. Marshall had an established reputation as a 
mathematical economist in the early phases of his academic career. However, in 
his later work, Marshall made few direct references to the mathematics 
underlying his theories and relegated such material to appendixes in the 
Principles of Economics. While Marshall used mathematics as a tool in the 
development of his economic theories, his general view of mathematics was 
summed up in his letter to Bowley: ‘A good mathematical theorem dealing with 
economic hypotheses was very unlikely to be good economics’ (Whitaker 1996, 
volume 3, p. 130). 
In the final sections of chapter 4, we return to themes developed in the 
Pigou and Marshall paper on fair wages and just outcomes considering the way 
in which ‘morals’ merge with the positive in neoclassical distribution theory. I 
argue that Wicksteed, Clark, Wicksell and Marshall all conform to later patterns 
of discourse in neoclassical distribution theory by quarantining and giving 
priority to the positive. However, in spite of a stress on the positive, a crossing 
over into the normative terrain is evident. The principal argument presented 
with respect to Marshall and Pigou (in chapter 3) and Wicksteed (chapter 2)—
the ‘fairness’ of the marginalist prescription that each factor receives a return 
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based on its marginal efficiency and the ‘injustice’ of low wages and poverty—
is found to also apply with respect to Clark. 
Interestingly, given his reputation to the contrary, Clark argues that, 
when individual workers bargain against employers, the potential exists for an 
equilibrium wage outcome below the natural rate; hence, the necessity for (non-
monopolistic) union action and arbitration. Clark’s (admittedly weak) support 
for union action in respect to wages is similar to that of Marshall and Pigou. 
However, it stands in sharp contrast with Jevons’s strident message on the same 
subject: unions are never to ‘interfere’ with the market in respect to wages (see 
the Appendix to chapter two for further details). This, together with the stress 
on government intervention through social policy actions to offset the injustices 
of low pay and poverty provides a basis for the tag, applied to a number of first 
and second-generation neoclassical theorists, of a ‘tendency towards socialism’. 
1.6  Chapter 5: Hicks’s The Theory of Wages 
Chapter 5 reproduces with revisions, the paper Hicks’s The Theory of Wages: 
Its Place in the History of Neoclassical Distribution Theory (Flatau 2002). The 
paper was motivated by a concern with the place that should be accorded The 
Theory of Wages in the neoclassical canon. At the time of its publication, Hicks 
suggested that The Theory of Wages represented a ‘restatement of the theory of 
wages’, going on to assert that it represented the most comprehensive statement 
of a positive theory of wages in English for over thirty or forty years (Hicks 
1932a, p. v). However, in the preface to its reprinting in 1963 he said of it that it 
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was a ‘juvenile work, which (almost at once) I felt myself to have outgrown’ 
(Hicks 1963, pp. 310-311). 
The fact that Hicks felt that he had outgrown The Theory of Wages does 
not, of itself, negate the possible importance of the book to the development of 
neoclassical distribution theory, merely that, for him, it was superseded by his 
subsequent contributions. Hence, the paper seeks to answer two important 
questions. First, did The Theory of Wages add significantly to extant 
neoclassical distribution theory; how important was the work to the subsequent 
trajectory of neoclassical distribution theory? Second, what was the importance 
of The Theory of Wages to the future development of Hicks’s thinking? 
The paper argues that Hicks’s The Theory of Wages introduced a 
number of significant contributions to neoclassical distribution theory and 
provided an important grounding for the very significant developments that 
were to follow in Value and Capital (Hicks 1939a). The major contributions of 
the book included a resetting of marginal productivity theory, the introduction 
of the elasticity of substitution tool, contributions to the product exhaustion 
theorem, the development of a theory of wages in the context of strike action, 
and the provision of a macro-level determination of relative factor shares. 
Hicks’s examination of the workings of the labour market has a resonance in 
modern new Keynesian economics, while his macroeconomics analysis towards 
the end of the book (itself superseded by Keynes’s General Theory) is 
suggestive of later developments in real business cycle. Hicks’s contribution to 
the theory of wage determination in the presence of collective bargaining had a 
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significant impact on the evolution of neoclassical analyses of unions and 
strikes in the 1950s and 1960s. 
1.7  Chapter 6: Robinson and the Theory of Exploitation 
The final essay returns to the theme of the exploitation of labour and examines 
the ways in which Joan Robinson, in The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 
extended our understanding of labour exploitation from its Pigovian origins. 
Rather than being presented as separate models of exploitation within a broad 
neoclassical tradition, Pigou’s and Robinson’s treatments of exploitation are 
often meshed together such that the term ‘Pigovian exploitation’ is utilised by 
some to describe an amalgam composed of Pigou’s definition of exploitation 
and Robinson’s theoretical framework based around the concepts of 
monopolistic exploitation and monopsonistic exploitation. 
The paper makes clear, however, the wide gulf between the two works, 
which arises because of the radically different modelling frameworks adopted 
by Pigou and Robinson. Pigou’s treatment of exploitation is built on his first 
major work Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, published in 1905, 
which reflects both Marshallian wage theory and a bargaining model of wage 
outcomes strongly influenced by Edgeworth. Robinson’s model of exploitation, 
however, is grounded in a deterministic, marginalist theory of firm behaviour in 
the presence of imperfect competition in product and factor markets. 
On a broader methodological front, Robinson’s mode of presentation 
deviates markedly from the Pigovian and Marshallian ideal. Robinson’s The 
Economics of Imperfect Competition lies within the modern ‘analytical’ 
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formalist neoclassical tradition, where conclusions are derived in a deductive 
fashion from a set of prior assumptions and where technique is brought to the 
fore. 
In addition to a comparative critique of the two halves of the ‘Pigou-
Robinson’ theory of exploitation, chapter 6 provides new insights into the 
development of The Economics of Imperfect Competition drawn from archival 
sources (principally the Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn collections at Kings 
College and the Austin Robinson collection at the Marshall Library). It 
considers and dismisses, in this context, the suggestion made by Harcourt (and 
others) that the principal result of The Economics of Imperfect Competition was 
to ‘throw doubt on the marginal productivity theory of distribution, destroying 
the equality of the real wage with the marginal product .... is hindsight history’ 
(see Harcourt 1995, p. 1230). 
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Notes 
 
1 Marshall had earlier provided an account of the wages fund doctrine in his Principles 
of Economics (Marshall 1890a). It was reproduced, with amendment, in all subsequent 
editions, finding its final resting place as Appendix J of the Principles of Economics 
(Marshall 1961). The appendix built on an earlier, less technical, summary of wages 
theories provided as an appendix to his paper to the Industrial Remuneration 
Conference of 1885 (see Marshall 1885, 1961, Guillebaud 1961, pp. 598-614). The 
wages fund doctrine took many turns over the course of its development. However, at 
its foundation, the doctrine involved the thesis that wages are paid from a pre-
accumulated stock of capital. The wages fund doctrine was the subject of increasing 
criticism from the late 1860s onwards. Contributors to the debate included many of the 
most prominent economists of the period such as Longe, Leslie, Mill, Fleeming Jenkin, 
Cairnes, Jevons, Walker and Marshall. In academic circles, the wages fund doctrine 
had few remaining adherents by the mid-1890s. See O’Brien (2004) and Vint (1994) 
for a critical discussion of the history of the wages fund doctrine. 
2 For a discussion of the contributions of Henry George see George ([1880]1906), 
Newton (1971), Yeager (1984), Lissner and Lissner (1991), Gaffney and Harrison 
(1994), Blaug (1992, 2000), Giacalone and Cobb (2001), Wenzer (2002) and 
Wasserman (2003). 
3 Labour market issues had always been of great interest to Marshall. In the 1870s, we 
have his statements of the position of the working class (see Marshall [1873]1925, 
[1873]1996, [1874]1963), his unpublished mathematical papers, which contain an early 
mathematical statement of marginal productivity theory drawing on the work of von 
Thünen (Whitaker 1975), and The Economics of Industry, first published in 1879 
(Marshall and Marshall 1885). Marshall’s published statements on wages through the 20 
                                                                                                                                  
1880s included his lectures in 1884 on Henry George’s Progress and Poverty (Stigler 
1969), his paper on wages policy for the Industrial Remuneration Conference (Marshall 
1885), his preface to Price’s Industrial Peace (Marshall 1887) and his 1888 theoretical 
contribution on wages and profits published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(Marshall 1888). Marshall’s key contribution was, of course, the Principles of 
Economics published in 1890. Mention can also be made of his Elements of Economics 
of Industry first published in 1892. Marshall’s contributions to the development of 
neoclassical distribution theory are discussed in a large number of works including 
Arena and Quéré (2003), Collard (1981, 1990), De Vroey (2000), Elliott (1990), Fry 
(1976), Groenewegen (1995a, 1995b, 1996), Matthews (1990), Petridis (1973,1990), 
Samuels (1999) and Whitaker (1974, 1990). 
4 The key relevant works include Marshall (1888, 1890a, 1890b), Clark (1888a, 1888b, 
1890, 1891a), Wicksteed (1889, [1894]1992) and Wicksell ([1893]1954). Other major 
contributions include Hobson (1891), Webb (1888) and Wood (1888-89). 
5 Wicksell’s Value, Capital and Rent was published in 1893; one year earlier than 
Wicksteed’s 1894 book. His treatment of distributional issues is less mathematically 
oriented than Wicksteed’s, but, nevertheless, contains explict mathematical statements 
on the distribution of income. Indeed, Stigler (1941, p. 293) claims that ‘Wicksell’s 
mode of presentation in the Über Wert [Value, Capital and Rent] unfortunately 
obscures the fact that he is presenting the first complete mathematical formulation of 
the marginal productivity theory of distribution’. 
6 We might have added to this list by drawing on the work of Edgeworth in the 
English-speaking world, and Walras, Böhm-Bawerk and Pareto from European 
traditions. Their contributions are not ignored in the thesis, but are woven into the 
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essays at various points. Edgeworth is referenced as a prelude to Pigou (both in terms 
of bargaining theory and in terms of broader utilitarian treatments in welfare theory) 
and again in terms of Hicks (for the same reasons). Walras and Pareto are both given 
extended coverage throughout the papers in terms of their contributions to general 
equilibrium theory and their role in the development of the distribution theory of Hicks. 
Both enter again in terms of the analysis of the methodology of neoclassical 
distribution theory and in the Wicksteed-Walras-Barone-Pareto debate surrounding 
Wicksteed’s Essay. 
7 Short summaries of the key traditions in marginalism are provided by Groenewegen, 
Horwitz and Walker in Samuels, Biddle and Davis (2003). 
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2.  Jevons’s One Great Disciple: Wicksteed and the Jevonian 
Revolution in the Second Generation
∗ 
 
History of Economics Review, Summer 2004; Number 40, pp. 69-107. 
(with revisions). 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Phillip Wicksteed began his serious study of political economy towards the end 
of 1882 inspired by Henry George’s Progress and Poverty.
1 At the time, he was 
sceptical of extant political economy theory believing that ‘some great fallacy 
or fallacies lay at the heart of the science’ (Wicksteed 1882a).
2 But, George’s 
Progress and Poverty gave Wicksteed ‘the light I vainly sought for myself’ 
(Wicksteed 1882a).
3 Within a year of reading Progress and Poverty, however, 
Wicksteed had largely abandoned Henry George’s economics.
4 He did so in 
favour of another revolutionary thinker, W.S. Jevons, whose work and that of 
others of the marginalist revolution, he had, by his own admission, been 
previously completely ignorant (Wicksteed 1883b, p. 390).
5 
For Wicksteed, Jevons’s marginalist framework opened up new ways of 
thinking about economics and provided a method that could be applied to all 
economic problems. From mid-1883, Wicksteed devoted himself to the task of 
explaining, applying and extending the Jevonian framework. In this endeavour, 
he was very much on his own. So much so, that among both his contemporaries 
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and later historians of economic thought he was viewed as Jevons’s ‘one great 
disciple’ (Hutchison 1953, p. 95).
6 
The primary aim of this paper is to evaluate Wicksteed’s role in the 
propagation of Jevonian marginalism into the second generation against the 
backdrop of Wicksteed’s explicit identification with the economics of Jevons 
and his avowed aim to explain and extend the Jevonian framework.
7 It is, 
therefore, concerned primarily with the theme of continuity and discontinuity. I 
shall focus primarily, but not solely, on Wicksteed’s theory of distribution, 
which is arguably his most important contribution to economic theory. The 
question I shall seek to answer is: should Wicksteed’s contributions be read as a 
simple extension of Jevons’s work or did Wicksteed take the Jevonian 
revolution on new and different paths? If so, on what course did Wicksteed steer 
Jevonian economics? 
While the Jevons-Wicksteed link provides the focal point of the study, I 
shall also take the opportunity to address a number of additional themes. Most 
importantly, I shall refer to archival sources that shed light on the development 
of Wicksteed’s theories and which have not previously been tapped. I shall also 
consider the question of the ambiguity in Wicksteed’s position on socialism, 
and the relationship between Wicksteed’s economic and non-economic works. 
Wicksteed’s adoption of the Jevonian framework is no more evident 
than in his first published works, namely, his critique of Marx’s Das Kapital 
and  The Alphabet of Economic Science (hereafter the Alphabet), where the 
focus of Wicksteed’s attention is strictly on Jevonian utility, exchange and value 
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themes. Wicksteed was to make important contributions to the development of 
the Jevonian form of marginalism through his detailed exposition of how the 
fundamental Jevonian theorems of exchange in mathematical form connect to 
the everyday experiences of life. As Wicksteed says in the Alphabet: ‘my object 
is to bring Economics down from the clouds’ (Wicksteed 1888a, p. x). I shall 
argue, however, that Wicksteed’s explicit identification with Jevons in these 
(and later) works masked certain methodological differences between 
Wicksteed and Jevons and that these differences had significant implications for 
the framing of Wicksteed’s economic theory. 
Wicksteed followed Jevons in viewing economics as a mathematical 
science. However, I shall argue in the paper that Wicksteed held a conception of 
economics as a mathematical science, which was far narrower than Jevons’s 
richer reading, based as it was on a stronger grounding in the methodology and 
philosophy of science. Wicksteed’s almost casual lack of interest in the role of 
data and statistical analyses in theory generation and appraisal stands in sharp 
contrast with Jevons’s strong empiricist leanings set out in his Principles of 
Science and reinforced in The Theory of Political Economy (hereafter TPE). In 
this context, I shall make reference to Wicksteed’s frequent use of explicit 
mathematical functions to represent economic phenomena. In this respect, he 
was very much a leader in his and in following generations. The important 
feature of Wicksteed’s practice, for our purposes, however, is that Wicksteed 
adopted functional forms, which produced economic patterns that conformed to 
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his prior beliefs. Whether these functional forms could be shown to be 
consistent with the data did not appear to be of concern to Wicksteed. 
The crucial point here is that Wicksteed over-emphasised the role of a 
priori, self-evidential theorising built on first-hand observation and 
commonsense foundations. The use of commonsense foundations is, of course, 
most evident in Wicksteed’s two-volume book The Common Sense of Political 
Economy  (referred to as the Common Sense) published in 1910 but is also 
apparent in all of Wicksteed’s work. In Common Sense, marginalist theorems on 
distributional questions, as well as on production, utility and exchange issues, 
are generated and validated based on common sense foundations. In placing an 
emphasis on a commonsense grounding, Wicksteed had, of course, an ulterior 
motive in that he hoped to broaden the level of popular support for the doctrines 
he espoused. 
Finally, Wicksteed differed from Jevons on methodological grounds in 
that he adopted a hyper-universalist methodological stance―all economic 
phenomena can be understood in terms of a universal marginalist framework.
8 
Although Jevons gave the appearance of being strongly universalist in his 
economics, White (1994a) has shown that he was in fact more qualified in his 
espousal of universalism in that he placed clear restrictions on the appropriate 
domain of economics. 
Wicksteed is perhaps most famous for his contributions to distribution 
theory. Here, I shall argue that the direct link from Jevons to Wicksteed is, in 
fact, stronger than many commentators have suggested. Jevons is sometimes 
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portrayed as remaining within a classical tradition in terms of distribution 
theory and yet Wicksteed’s marginal productivity-based theory of distribution 
clearly had its genesis in Jevons’s treatment of rent, capital and interest in the 
TPE. The marginal productivity theory of distribution is typically viewed as a 
second-generation development in terms of the marginal revolution. And there 
is some truth in this. However, Wicksteed’s contribution to the development of 
neoclassical distribution theory owed a great deal to the foundation laid by 
Jevons’s nascent marginal productivity doctrines in his theory of capital and 
interest in TPE. Wicksteed’s marginal productivity-based theory of distribution 
was developed in the tract An Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of 
Distribution (‘Essay’) and published for a specialist audience in 1894 (see 
Wicksteed [1894]1932 and [1894]1992). It contained (arguably), together with 
Wicksell’s Value, Capital and Rent, the first detailed complete mathematical 
statement of a marginal productivity distribution theory applied across all 
factors of production.
9 As compared with his first economic works (the 1884 
critique of Marx’s Das Kapital and his 1888 Alphabet), Wicksteed in the Essay 
was much less explicit in pointing to the Jevonian connection and it is important 
we understand the role Jevons’s theory of capital and interest played in the 
development of Wicksteed’s theory. In so doing, we should be in a better 
position to judge how Wicksteed’s marginal productivity distribution theory 
built on Jevonian foundations and determine what was novel in Wicksteed’s 
theory. 
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Our examination of Wicksteed’s role as Jevons’s successor requires us 
to consider one further relevant issue. How important are Wicksteed’s non-
economic interests and sources of inspiration in the development of Wicksteed’s 
economic works relative to the influence of Jevons? Wicksteed published more 
outside the field of economics than he did within it. His catalogue of works 
extends from popular religious, political and sociological papers to the fields of 
modernist theology and medieval literary studies. His Dante and Aquinas 
studies, in particular, represent major contributions to medieval scholarship. 
Contributions to these areas of scholarship occurred before, during, and after 
Wicksteed’s own stated conversion to Jevonian economics in early 1883 and his 
first published economic work in 1884 (Wicksteed [1884]1933). 
The connections between Wicksteed’s economic works and his non-
economic studies and influences present a potentially rich source of inquiry for 
the historian of economic thought. Indeed, it is relatively easy to find, in 
Wicksteed’s more popular religious and sociological works of the 1880s and 
1890s, extravagant claims of the integration of the religious, the sociological 
and the economic in one grand, all-embracing methodological framework and 
doctrine. Evidence to support a position that Wicksteed’s religious, 
philosophical, and ethical beliefs determined, in a precise manner, the 
parameters of his theory of distribution, however, simply cannot be found in the 
relevant economic texts themselves. And it certainly cannot be argued, more 
dramatically, that Wicksteed’s religious, philosophical and ethical beliefs are 
fully  integrated  with the economic, notwithstanding the undeveloped 
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protestations of Wicksteed to the contrary.
10 It is more probable that 
Wicksteed’s philosophical, religious, and political background, positions and 
beliefs, predisposed him towards the Jevonian marginalist framework but even 
this conjecture is difficult to corroborate. 
The paper focuses on the crucial ten-year period from 1884 and the 
publication of Wicksteed’s Das Kapital critique to 1894 when the Essay was 
published. Section 2 of the paper provides a sketch of Wicksteed’s work and 
influences to the point of his transition to the serious study of political economy. 
This period does not include any published works in economics but holds some 
interest in assessing the question of the importance of non-economic influences 
on Wicksteed’s conversion to the Jevonian program and on the later 
development of his economic theories. Section 3 of the paper deals with 
Wicksteed’s entry into the economic field and examines his rapid conversion in 
the space of a year first to Henry George and then to Jevons. It also considers 
Wicksteed’s earliest economic publication, his famous piece on Marx and 
exchange with Shaw (Wicksteed [1884]1933). 
In section 4, I refer to the Wicksteed-Pearson correspondence, held in 
the Pearson archives at University College London, and use this correspondence 
as a platform to consider how Wicksteed used mathematics in his first attempts 
to apply Jevons’s economic framework. The Wicksteed-Pearson 
correspondence has not, to my knowledge, been utilised previously in studies of 
Wicksteed. I examine aspects of Wicksteed’s The Alphabet of Economic 
Science (Wicksteed 1888a) in section 5. The Alphabet represents Wicksteed’s 
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first detailed economic study. Section 6 considers the development of 
Wicksteed’s theory of distribution through to the Essay, examining carefully the 
Jevons-Wicksteed link, while the following section undertakes a parallel 
analysis of Wicksteed’s non-economic studies of the same period. Section 8 
then examines his Common Sense of Political Economy and surveys 
contemporaneous material from his non-economic studies to test the hypothesis 
of a close integration of the two sets of studies. 
The unpublished appendix to this chapter provides an overview of 
Jevons’s own theory of distribution and, in particular, his theory of wages. 
2.2  Early Life and Influences 
Wicksteed was born in 1844 into a Unitarian Church family.
11 He attended 
University College London from 1861, the year Jevons (also a Unitarian) 
graduated. Whether or not Wicksteed knew Jevons personally during his time at 
University College London or later is not clear. At no point does Wicksteed 
ever mention the fact that he personally knew Jevons.
12 Moreover, as discussed 
further below, Wicksteed states, in the first reference to Jevons that I can find in 
his writings, that he first became aware of the Jevonian revolution towards the 
end of 1882 (Wicksteed 1883a, 1883b). In other words, taken at face value, 
Wicksteed became aware of Jevons’s economic theories after Jevon’s death in 
August 1882. 
Wicksteed moved on to Manchester New College in 1864, where he 
prepared for ministry in the Unitarian Church. While at University College 
London, he came under the influence of Edward Beesly, a leader of the 
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Positivist movement in Britain at the time. As we shall shortly see, there are 
plausible connections between Comtean positivism on the one hand and 
Wicksteed’s emphasis on all-embracing economic laws, the rationalist basis of 
science and the role of mathematics. 
He began his first ministry at Taunton in 1867. From that point, he 
began publishing articles and translations of works in Dutch connected with the 
modernist theology movement, working closely with an important figure 
(Abraham Kuenen) in that movement in Holland.
13 In 1874, Wicksteed settled 
in London taking up a position at the Little Portland Street Chapel. He remained 
in London until the turn of the century, when he retired from the Unitarian 
ministry to the country. He maintained, however, his Extension Lecturer 
position, which he had taken up in 1887. This resulted in Wicksteed lecturing 
on a large range of subjects (primarily economics and sociology) in various 
towns around England for the next 30 years. 
Wicksteed’s early theological output (1871 to 1883) is largely concerned 
with an examination of the work of Kuenen and other Dutch leaders of the 
Modernist theological movement, together with his own contributions to New 
Testament scholarship. As one would expect, there is no direct reference in 
these theological works to issues relevant to political economy. But what these 
early works do reveal is an interest in the importance of historical, 
psychological, philosophical and scientific studies in Biblical critical analysis 
and, even more significantly, in the importance of non-Biblical sources of 
inspiration and revelation. Moreover, there is a clear emphasis on the role of 
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reason and critical judgement in moving us to the truth. Such an approach 
contrasts strongly with one based on the literal interpretation of the Bible. 
However, the important point to make is that Wicksteed, in rejecting the literal 
interpretation of the Bible, does not move to a position of uncertainty and 
scepticism. Rather he holds the new position with certainty and appeals to 
reason as the foundation of his knowledge (see, for example, Wicksteed 1881). 
In accepting a non-literalist, modernist stance, Wicksteed reveals a 
strong appetite to take on the ‘new’ in theology, perhaps in an all-accepting 
naïve way, and to reject established orthodoxy. His Unitarian (non-conformist) 
background provided a fertile background for the adoption of new ideas, 
particularly those founded on a rationalist base. These tendencies—the adoption 
of views that were not accepted orthodoxy, the adherence to rationality—are to 
be seen again in Wicksteed’s preparedness to take on the revolutionary and the 
thorough-going rationalism in Jevons when he moved to economics. 
Wicksteed’s first major work on Dante, a series of six sermons 
delivered initially in 1878 at Little Portland Street Chapel, again reveal little by 
way of direct reference to economic and distributional issues (Wicksteed 
[1879]1892). One can draw links between Wicksteed’s analysis of the role of 
justice, free will and desert and his later development of a marginal productivity 
theory of distribution, but little weight can surely rest on these connections. 
Wicksteed suggests, for example, that ‘free will is the supreme gift of God, and 
that by which the creature most closely partakes of the nature of the Creator’ 
(Wicksteed [1879]1892, p. 111). Later he suggests that the ‘award of God rests 
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upon the free choice of man, and registers his merit or demerit … placed as we 
are on earth amidst the mysterious possibilities of good and evil, we are 
endowed with a genuine power of self-directed choice between them.’ This 
emphasis on free will and desert perhaps suggests that Wicksteed was later 
more likely to be receptive to economic ideas that stressed the role of rational 
choice and the balancing of opportunities and was ripe for the utility and 
exchange-based system of Jevons. However, that is as far as one can stretch the 
connection between Wicksteed’s early works and his later adoption of Jevonian 
economics. 
The last published work of interest from Wicksteed’s pre-economic 
phase is his 1875 Inquirer review of Bridges’s translation of the first volume of 
Comte’s System of Positive Polity. Wicksteed’s review is taken up as much 
with side issues (e.g., the poor quality of Martineau’s English language 
condensed version of Comte’s Cours de Philosophy Positive) as it is with a 
review of Comte’s theories. This leaves us without a firm idea of Wicksteed’s 
own philosophical and methodological leanings in the mid-1870s or of how 
Comte may have influenced Wicksteed’s methodological system. There is also 
no detailed discussion of political economy in Wicksteed’s review. 
Nevertheless, there are suggestive elements in the review in regard to possible 
Comtean influences on Wicksteed’s economics. 
It is apparent from Wicksteed’s comments that he approved of Comte’s 
aim to establish sociology on a scientific base. Just as importantly, he writes in 
positive terms of Comte’s attempt to apply scientific sociology ‘to life and 
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society’. As Wicksteed nicely puts it, the goal of Comte’s Philosophy ‘must 
ever be a Polity’ (Wicksteed 1875, p. 328; italics in the original). Exactly which 
elements of Comte’s system influenced Wicksteed is, however, difficult to 
determine. One obvious possible influence is Comte’s adherence to grand all-
embracing laws. Wicksteed’s predilection to also follow such an approach in his 
economic works may well have found its inspiration in Comte. The best 
example of Comte’s universalist stance was his well-known ‘fundamental law’ 
of human progress, in which all knowledge proceeds in three stages: the 
theological or fictitious, the metaphysical or abstract, and the scientific or 
abstract. Not only is there a fundamental law concerning the development of 
knowledge, but Comte also expresses the hope that all phenomena could be 
expressed as particular aspects of a single general law or fact. For Comte, the 
aim of positive philosophy was in fact to reduce the ‘natural invariable laws’ to 
the smallest possible number. The emphasis on unifying theory is paramount in 
Comte’s work, as it was later in Wicksteed’s. 
Wicksteed may also have been influenced by Comte’s emphasis on 
mathematics as the foundation stone of scientific endeavour. Not recognising 
that Comte was in fact, at best, neutral in regard to the role of mathematics in 
sociology (and was antagonistic towards a separate role for political economy), 
this early emphasis on mathematics may well have led him to be predisposed to 
the Jevonian position that ‘Economics to be science at all must be a 
mathematical science’ (Jevons 1888, p.3). (Jevons, it must be emphasised, was 
no supporter of Comte.) Wicksteed was to accept the assertion that economics 
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was a mathematical science whole-heartedly throughout his economic works, 
and it was Jevons’s use of mathematical tools that appealed to him so much. In 
his 1905 Economic Journal review of the posthumous publication of Jevons’s 
The Principles of Economics, Wicksteed suggests that Jevons was right ‘in 
declaring that certain fundamental relations and conceptions in the theory of 
political economy are essentially mathematical, and that the only question is 
whether they are to be treated by sound or unsound mathematics’ (Wicksteed 
1905a, p. 434). 
One revealing aspect of Wicksteed’s review was his rejection of the 
Comtean position that only objective observation had a role to play in scientific 
endeavour and that there was no role for ‘observation interieure’ (Wicksteed 
1875, p. 328). For Wicksteed this was a fallacy. Knowledge gained from self-
observation was crucial in the field of sociology. As I shall argue, Wicksteed 
was to follow this principle in his economic work. 
2.3  Henry George and Wicksteed’s Move into Economics 
The boundary line between Wicksteed’s pre-economic period and his 
enthusiastic take-up of Jevons’s economics can be dated to late 1882. The key 
event appears to be Wicksteed’s reading of George’s Progress and Poverty, and 
subsequent promotion of the ideas and policy program of Henry George in 
England.
14 These early reviews and Wicksteed’s first correspondence with 
George shed light on the status of Wicksteed’s economic knowledge and 
interest in the subject immediately prior to his conversion to Jevonian 
economics. His letter of 29 October 1882 to George begins by noting that he 
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had only just finished reading Progress and Poverty. What Wicksteed’s letter 
displays most is a keen interest in distributional questions, a fact evident in his 
subsequent review of George’s book in The Inquirer (the Unitarian magazine) 
in December 1882. Here Wicksteed admonishes political economy for not 
providing an answer to the question of the source of the maldistribution of 
income that exists in society, and expresses moral outrage at the existing 
distribution of income in England. He ridicules both the wages fund doctrine 
and the Malthusian population doctrine. He refers, in Keynesian overtones, to 
the inability of political economy to explain a state of chronic and long-lasting 
economic depression. Indeed, he specifically refers to the lack of ‘effective 
demand’ as a prime cause of economic depressions. 
Wicksteed argued that it was in George’s theory of rent that the answer 
to the puzzles that afflicted political economy could be found. Progress and 
Poverty represented ‘by far the most important work in its social consequences 
that our generation or century has seen’ (Wicksteed 1882b, p. 839). George’s 
theory of rent had extracted and expanded on the one element of political 
economy that retained some truth (Wicksteed 1882b). 
Within the short space of three months, Wicksteed was standing at the 
forefront of the band of English apologists for George. He put his support for 
George into practice by inviting Arnold Toynbee to deliver a set of lectures on 
Progress and Poverty. Wicksteed’s stated aim was to put George’s theories to 
the public test: to determine whether an ‘eminent economist’ could find some 
radical defect in George’s work. Despite supporting particular aspects of 
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George’s Progress and Poverty, Toynbee adopted a generally negative stance 
on the work. Wicksteed, on the other hand, remained largely loyal to George’s 
program (Wicksteed 1883a, 1883b, 1884a). First, he dismisses the two-pronged 
view advanced by Toynbee that (i) George exaggerates the amount of rent in 
the system and hence the extent to which landlords receive an unfair return and 
(ii) George grossly underestimates the degree to which employers are overpaid. 
Wicksteed suggests that there are, using the competitive market model, strong 
grounds for believing that employers are not generally overpaid.  
‘As the system of credit is perfected, competition amongst 
employers of labour will become more and more perfect, and it is 
difficult to see how the ‘earnings of supervision and direction’, 
or, in other words, the remuneration of employers, can be 
permanently maintained at an exorbitant rate. They must be great 
enough to call forth the requisite supply of business power, and if 
they are at present largely increased by the monopolising power 
of great capitals the progressive perfecting of the credit system 
must tend to reduce them by making it comparatively easy for 
outsiders who possess business talent to cut them down by free 
competition’ (Wicksteed 1883a, p. 276). 
Second, Wicksteed, while noting slips and inconsistencies in George’s 
arguments, defends the general proposition advanced by George that rent 
presses down wages. Finally, Wicksteed retains support for a land tax: 
‘economic rent stands wholly apart from all other revenue as a ….. subject for 
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taxation and for gradual and ultimate absorption in the revenues of the State for 
the benefit of the community which creates it’ (Wicksteed 1883a, p. 244). 
Wicksteed argues for a land nationalisation program because ‘the value of land 
is made by the people and is taken from them without compensation’ 
(Wicksteed 1884a, p. 69). It is useful at this point to summarise Wicksteed’s 
position as support for the nationalisation of land, but not the nationalisation of 
the instruments of production (see also Wicksteed 1895b, p.40). Wicksteed 
remains a difficult person to classify in terms of his socialist leanings. 
By the beginning of 1883, Wicksteed could be said to be fully absorbed 
in promoting Henry George’s Progress and Poverty and the Land Reform 
campaign, in delving into questions relating to the distribution of income and in 
‘swotting up’ on political economy. It is in the latter context that Wicksteed first 
reads Jevons. The first Wicksteed reference to Jevons is in Wicksteed’s April 
review of Toynbee’s lectures (Wicksteed 1883a). Wicksteed subsequently 
writes in the June Inquirer of 1883: 
‘Anyone who desires to make a real contribution to the controversy 
raised by “Progress and Poverty” must begin by realising the 
fact—of which I confess that I was myself totally ignorant nine 
months ago—that quite independently of Mr Henry George the 
science of Economics has undergone a revolution within the last 
ten or fifteen years which makes it worse than useless to restate the 
positions of the old school (even if the restatement be correct and 
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adequate, which is far from being the fact in casu) without 
reference to recent investigations’ (Wicksteed 1883b, p. 390). 
Wicksteed’s reading of Jevons produces profound effects. His interest in 
George, as an economist, comes to a halt (although his support for land reform 
remains very strong). He simply takes up the Jevonian program holus bolus. 
The conversion to Jevons is, however, not unexpected. Jevons is a 
revolutionary. He is fighting against prevailing orthodoxy. He contends that he 
holds the all-embracing truth of political economy and states that truth with 
certainty. Finally, the truth is presented in advanced mathematical form, lending 
itself to high scientific credibility. All these characteristics would appeal to 
Wicksteed. 
Wicksteed’s first application of Jevonian theory was his critique of 
Marx’s  Das Kapital published in the socialist To-Day magazine.
15 It is an 
ambitious paper. Rather than attacking particular features of Marx’s framework, 
Wicksteed argues for its complete dismantling and replacement by its 
substitute, Jevons’s utility-based theory of value. Wicksteed’s Das Kapital 
critique also displays clearly a theme evident in all his subsequent economic 
works: that there exist universal and true principles of economics, which can be 
applied in all circumstances and in all conditions (see, Flatau 2001b). He 
suggests that Jevons’s theory of value is ‘equally applicable to things that can, 
and things that can not, be multiplied by labour, [and]… is equally applicable to 
market and to normal values, …and fits all the complicated phenomena of our 
commercial societies like a glove’ (Wicksteed [1884]1933, p. 722). 
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The essential terms of Wicksteed’s critique can be easily explained. 
When we exchange goods, we are exchanging objects that are different in terms 
of their make-up and quality. But they must have something in common—or 
how could exchange take place? The common denominator, or measure, of 
heterogenous goods, in the marketplace, is utility. The utility value of the 
goods, to the parties to the exchange, determines exchange value. In making 
this argument, Wicksteed rejects Marx’s labour input term as the required 
common measure. But how does labour input enter into the equation? Labour 
input plays the part of a response variable in Wicksteed’s system. Labour goes 
to where it proves most useful in the satisfaction of consumer wants. It is 
through this route that we can begin to understand Marx’s schema—there is a 
coincidence of the units, labour time and exchange value because labour goes 
to goods that are valued in exchange. 
The impact that Wicksteed’s critique had on socialist commentators 
appears to have been very significant. Bernard Shaw was later to remark: ‘A 
Roman Catholic impugning the infallibility of the Pope could have created no 
greater scandal. Sentence of excommunication was pronounced by Justice: the 
Inquirer and other papers well affected to the cause demanded impatiently why 
the heretic remained unanswered’ (Ellis 1930, pp. 69-70). Shaw’s remark is 
revealing in highlighting the fact that Wicksteed was seen, prior to his 
intervention, as clearly in the socialist fold. Wicksteed himself, almost a decade 
later, moved to some point of rapprochement in his review of Fabian Essays in 
Socialism for the Inquirer when he remarked that ‘Socialists of the “Fabian” 
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stamp must be recognised as fellow-workers by the Economists of the new 
school’ (Wicksteed 1890, p. 531). The reason Wicksteed provides for this is 
that: 
‘The “Fabians” have been at work on political economy, and the 
result is the distinct and definitive abandonment of the system of 
Karl Marx. ‘Das Kapital’ is no longer the Socialist’s Bible. ….In 
fact the Fabians appear to be frankly “Jevonian” on the crucial 
point of the theory of value’ (Wicksteed 1890, p. 530). 
2.4  The Pearson-Wicksteed Correspondence 
Having settled on utility as the common property between goods, Wicksteed 
proceeded to flesh out the Jevonian edifice in the period immediately following 
the publication of the To-Day critique. The Alphabet was the product of this 
effort. It is a work that is almost wholly focussed on the utility theory of value 
and is characterised by an attempt to present that theory in the form of a 
mathematical text. Wicksteed provides an exhaustive outline of the basic 
mathematical tools relevant to the study of a marginalist theory of value and 
exchange and proceeds to a detailed exposition of the utility theory of value in 
mathematical form. In doing so, Wicksteed was being true to the designs of 
Jevons to develop economics as a mathematical science. However, there are 
important nuances in Wicksteed’s treatment which we shall emphasise. 
Wicksteed was not a specialist mathematician and yet he took his cue 
from Jevons that economic problems had a quantitative dimension and that the 
application of mathematics to economic problems was not only necessary but 
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also revealed the nature of those problems more clearly than a non-
mathematical treatment could do. The Wicksteed archives at the London School 
of Economics and the Pearson Papers at University College London reveal that 
Wicksteed had a sound understanding of mathematical methods, but that he was 
significantly assisted from before the Alphabet through to the Essay by at least 
three figures. They were his daughter, Rebecca, the University College 
Professor of Applied Mathematics, Karl Pearson, and a mathematical tutor by 
the name of John Bridge. Pearson is famous for his contributions to theoretical 
statistics and for his applied (and often controversial) statistical analyses of 
biological, social, hereditary, evolutionary and eugenic questions. Bridge’s 
contributions are acknowledged in the Alphabet, Wicksteed’s Quarterly Journal 
of Economics piece on Jevons, and in the Essay. Bridge’s significant 
contribution in the Essay, which we will discuss in the following section, is 
particularly evident from the London School of Economics Wicksteed archival 
papers.
16 
The first correspondence between Wicksteed and Pearson in the Pearson 
University College archive is a letter from Wicksteed to Pearson dated May 18 
1885, in which Wicksteed expresses his admiration for William Clifford’s 
Common Sense of the Exact Sciences. Pearson had edited the work from an 
incomplete manuscript left by Clifford. (Wicksteed may well have been 
inspired in small part by Pearson’s edited work to use the ‘common sense’ label 
in his own Common Sense of Political Economy published some 25 years 
later.)
17 He makes the following reference at the end of the letter: ‘when our 
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“May Meetings” are over I shall hope you will give me an hour or two some 
afternoon or evening and look at my curves and give me some advice about 
carrying the matter forward’. The reference clearly suggests that there had been 
some sort of meeting prior to this point. It also suggests that Wicksteed had 
begun serious work on the mathematics of Jevons’s economics by early 1885. 
The Alphabet was published in 1888. 
The next item (a postcard) dated July 3 1885 begins ‘Very many thanks 
for curve. I can see much light in it already and shall see more when I study it.’ 
From a later letter from Wicksteed to Pearson dated 25 October 1885, it is 
probable that the function in question was y= (a – bx)/(x
2 +c
2), as this curve 
was cited in that 25 October letter. No mention is made in the letter of the use 
to which the curve is to be put. However, for positive a, b, and c, the curve has 
a positive y intercept (a/c
2) and a diminishing (in absolute value form) negative 
slope to the x intercept of (a/b). This functional form, of course, conforms to a 
marginal utility function (Wicksteed used ‘marginal utility’ and ‘marginal 
usefulness’ interchangeably throughout the Alphabet) whose value begins at 
some positive number (the y intercept), then falls a long way with the first unit 
consumed, falls less with the next unit and less with the next until eventually 
we reach a position of zero utility (the x intercept). 
Wicksteed suggests in the 25 October letter that the curve y= (a – 
bx)/(x
2 +c
2) had served him well. Well it might! It fits his prior beliefs about the 
shape of the marginal utility function. We have no clues as to the values of the 
function that Wicksteed was working with but Figure 1 below reproduces the 
 43 
function for the case where a=40, b=6 and c=4. As is evident the curve goes 
into the negative region. Some three years later, the Alphabet was published 
with a simpler representation of the marginal utility curve. The representation 
used by Wicksteed in the Alphabet was the marginal utility curve y= a/(x + b) –
1 (sometimes represented as y= (c – x)/(x + b), where c= (a – b)) and a 
corresponding logarithmic total utility curve of the general form y = a ln (x + b) 
– ln b – x.
18 Figure 2 reproduces one of Wicksteed’s Alphabet total utility 
curves, y = 11 ln (x + 1) – x and its corresponding marginal utility curve y = 
11/((x + 1) – 1. 
Figure 1 
Pearson’s Function y= (a – bx)/(x
2 +c
2), for a=40, b=6 and c=4 
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Figure 2a 
Wicksteed’s Alphabet Function, Total Utility, y = 11 ln (x + 1) – x 
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Figure 2b 
Wicksteed’s Alphabet Function, Marginal Utility, y = 11/((x + 1) – 1 
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Pearson appears to have provided Wicksteed with nothing more than an 
equation for a curve and minor assistance with general mathematical problems. 
However, the request from Wicksteed is, nonetheless, revealing. First, it shows 
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Wicksteed departing from Jevons’s practice in the TPE to keep the mathematics 
at the general level and the limitations of moving to exact forms without clear 
statistical evidence to back such an exercise. Second, it shows that Wicksteed is 
after functional forms that conform to his prior beliefs as to the likely economic 
relationships involved. 
What Wicksteed’s use of mathematics amounts to is this. We know the 
economic principle with certainty, we believe that principle corresponds to the 
workings of the differential calculus, let us now illustrate these principles 
diagrammatically, and in a form that best displays our ideas. What does not 
enter Wicksteed’s methodological structure are the following types of questions. 
What statistical evidence is there for the relationships specified? Does the 
evidence corroborate the model? Do people’s actions follow the predictions of 
the model? These are the types of questions that Wicksteed’s mathematical 
confessor, Pearson, one of the foremost statisticians of the 1890s and early 
1900s was became one of the best people to answer. The timing was 
unfortunate. And yet while Pearson’s statistical breakthroughs came after 
Wicksteed’s first contacts with him in the mid-1880s, his Grammar of Science, 
which Wicksteed read in 1892, contains a detailed statement of a scientific 
method based around the testing of scientific models. It is in the Grammar of 
Science that Pearson argues for the importance of probability theory for science 
and it is from this time that Pearson begins to make fundamental advances in 
statistical theory. None of this was to make a mark on Wicksteed in any of his 
future writings. Perhaps the reason why Wicksteed did not consider the role of 
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statistical evidence (and later of the emerging statistical theory) was that when 
one holds with certainty to the view that one’s principles and models are true 
and conform to common sense strictures, then the testing of them seems simply 
a wasteful use of resources. 
In failing to place any emphasis at all on the role of supporting evidence 
(other than that of commonsense), Wicksteed was departing from Jevons’s 
emphasis on the gathering and sifting through of supporting evidence and the 
attempt to move to precise mathematical forms on the basis of the evidence (see 
Peart 1996 pp 183-192 and Schabas 1990 pp 53-79). Jevons himself had 
contributed directly to advances in the methodology of science, undertaken his 
own statistical analyses and experiments (for example, Jevons 1888, p. 207), 
made constant reference, where he could, to relevant statistical evidence and, if 
that evidence was not forthcoming, kept the discussion largely at the general 
level. Jevons’s methodological strictures are set out succinctly in the TPE as 
follows: 
‘Possessing certain facts of observation, we frame an hypothesis 
as to the laws governing those facts; we reason from the 
hypothesis deductively to the results to be expected; and we then 
examine these results in connection with the facts in question; 
coincidence confirms the whole reasoning; conflict obliges us 
either to seek for disturbing causes, or else to abandon our 
hypothesis’ (Jevons 1888, pp. 18-19).
19 
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It would be hard to believe that Jevons would have made nothing of Pearson’s 
statistical work from the 1890s as Wicksteed did. 
Wicksteed simply took too narrow an interpretation of Jevons’s call to 
develop a mathematical science. Notwithstanding these points, it must be 
remembered that the extensive use of specific functional forms in the Alphabet 
(and later in the Essay) to represent utility and marginal utility functions 
represented a major shift from Jevons’s practice of utilising general functions in 
his Principles and had a potentially significant impact on the direction of later 
neoclassical economics. 
Before continuing our review of the development of Wicksteed’s 
economics, we shall deviate briefly and return, once again, to the Pearson-
Wicksteed correspondence. In addition to his statistical contributions, Pearson 
was also a multi-faceted freethinker and writer (on the law, German history and 
philosophy and the women’s rights) and was an important socialist apologist in 
the 1880s. In 1888, he published a selection of essays and lectures that had been 
completed in the previous five years under the title The Ethic of Freethought, 
which ranged over these many areas. One of those essays was ‘The moral basis 
of socialism’, which Pearson indicates, in a footnote to the paper, was written as 
a lecture and was subsequently published as a pamphlet in June 1887. The paper 
provides a defence of socialism and includes a section on Wicksteed’s 1884 To-
Day critique of Das Kapital. Pearson rightly points out that Wicksteed utilises, 
to use Pearson’s own interesting phrase, a ‘jelly theory of utility’, which stands 
in contrast to Marx’s ‘jelly theory of labour’. In other words, he recognises the 
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inherent malleability assumption adopted by Wicksteed (of utility) and Marx 
(labour). Pearson goes on to acknowledge the key point that Wicksteed is 
making, namely that of commensurability of goods in terms of utility, but 
suggests that Wicksteed ultimately accepts a key conclusion of Marx, despite 
their obvious differences over method. The basis of Pearson’s argument is that 
Wicksteed accepts both the coincidence, in the case of ordinary manufactured 
goods, between exchange value and the amount of labour contained in the good, 
and that labour power can be purchased at subsistence levels. On this basis, 
Pearson suggests that Wicksteed accepts the ultimate conclusion (with Marx) 
that, for manufactured goods, the results of surplus labour go to the capitalist. 
Pearson suggests that he is not concerned with questioning the logic of 
Wicksteed’s method if ‘it leads our opponents to a truth we were already on 
other grounds convinced of’ (Pearson 1888, p. 342). 
The preserved correspondence between Wicksteed and Pearson provides 
few clues on the nature and strength of any debate between the two on 
Wicksteed’s article and Pearson’s rejoinder. There is, for example, a reference 
to a faulty translation of Marx’s ‘arbeitskraft’ in Wicksteed’s To-Day article 
(Wicksteed used ‘labour-force’ rather than ‘labour-power’); Wicksteed places 
the blame at Bax’s feet.
20 He suggests that he adopted ‘labour-force’ rather than 
‘labour-power’ ‘against my own judgement’ ‘in deference’ to what Bax told 
him was Marx’s ‘own desire and practice’.
21 At a more general level, 
Wicksteed suggests that he ‘did not see the philosophical and scientific 
objections you [Pearson] put, but felt them instinctively and wish I had obeyed 
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my instincts’.
22 Is Wicksteed here suggesting that he may have focussed too 
much on the differences in method between Marx and Jevons and not enough on 
the underlying points of agreement on substance he may have had with Marx in 
terms of, say, the existence of exploitation? Was he concerned that by acting as 
the destructive critic of Marx, from a position of ‘orthodoxy’ as his critics saw 
it, he was, in fact, working against his own socialist leanings and ideals.
23 Quite 
possibly so, but not for the last time does it appear that a demarcation line is 
drawn between Wicksteed’s ‘economic’ works (the Alphabet, the Essay etc.) on 
the one hand, and his non-economic works and his involvement in various 
movements (for example, the Labour Church) on the other hand. In this second 
world, Wicksteed espouses a stronger political position, one that is more clearly 
focussed on a more equal distribution of income and wealth. Why does 
Wicksteed appear to draw this demarcation line between these two worlds, 
especially given his assertion, at various points, that there exist universal 
methods and laws that apply to all disciplines and to their subject matter? One 
possible reason is that Wicksteed may have felt that the espousal of too radical a 
position in his economic analyses may have undermined the acceptance of his 
work among economists. Wicksteed may have also felt that the inclusion of 
more political material may have detracted from the scientific nature of his 
economic work. But, just as likely, Wicksteed may simply have been absorbed 
in the task of working through Jevons’s framework, and the lack of focus on 
political messages may have simply reflected this other focus. 
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2.5  The Alphabet 
Wicksteed’s To-Day critique was followed in 1888 with the publication of the 
Alphabet of Economic Science. Wicksteed suggests in his introduction that the 
Alphabet is an elementary treatise and remarks of the work that ‘I lay no claim 
to originality of any kind’ (Wicksteed 1888a, p. xii). However, it would be 
wrong to accept Wicksteed’s advice at face value. At its most basic level the 
Alphabet provides an extended exposition of Jevons’s marginalist utility and 
exchange theory and enables the reader without the necessary mathematical 
toolbox the wherewithal to better understand the Jevonian framework. The 
Alphabet, however, goes beyond this objective. First, it shows Wicksteed’s 
determination to connect Jevons’s marginalist framework with day-to-day 
decision-making, a theme that is evident in the To-Day critique and continues 
more obviously in the Common Sense. Second, the Alphabet introduces a 
number of applications and extensions of the Jevonian framework. 
In terms of Wicksteed’s applications and extensions I shall focus on his 
treatment of labour supply decisions. There is an extensive discussion of labour 
supply issues in Wicksteed’s Alphabet despite the fact that the Alphabet does 
not directly address Jevons’s theory of labour, rent and capital contained in 
chapters 5-8 of his TPE.
24 Beyond the space given to labour supply decisions in 
the Alphabet, an emphasis on this issue is warranted for four other reasons. 
First, Wicksteed’s exposition of labour supply decisions is framed in a different 
form than Jevons’s model, and so the model generated contains important 
differences to Jevons’s model. Second, Wicksteed’s discussion reveals his 
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strong interest in both connecting underlying unobservable utility to observable 
standards of measurement (for example, labour effort or labour time) and in 
placing the alternative use of labour time at the centre of a model of labour 
supply. It is not, however, until we get to the Common Sense that Wicksteed 
really pushes the theme of foregone opportunities and so extends the model to 
one centred on leisure (the alternative to work). Third, Wicksteed’s analysis in 
the Alphabet has received no attention in the literature on the development of 
neoclassical labour supply theory and yet it remains an important intermediate 
step between Jevons’s model, Wicksteed’s own extensions in the Common 
Sense and later developments that ran off Hick’s indifference curve model in 
Value and Capital.
25 
The first third of the Alphabet is taken up with an introduction to 
calculus to enable readers without such a background to understand the 
mathematics of the marginalist program. Wicksteed also clears away confusion 
in Jevons’s terminology, and it is in this context that Wicksteed uses, perhaps 
for the first time in economics, the term ‘marginal utility’. Wicksteed suggests 
that Jevons’s use of the term ‘final degree of utility’ 
‘hardly admits of sufficient distinction between “marginal 
effectiveness,” i.e. the rate per unit at which the commodity is 
satisfying desire [if u represents utility and x the commodity, then 
marginal effectiveness is the differential coefficient du/dx], and 
the “marginal effect” [Wicksteed consistently uses the term 
marginal utility for the marginal effect] of a unit of the 
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commodity, i.e. the actual result which it produces when applied 
at the margin [(du/dx)∆x]. I think that this has sometimes 
confused his readers, and I hope that my attempt to preserve the 
distinction will not be found to be vexatious. Note that the curves 
are always curves of quantity-and-marginal-usefulness, but that 
we can read them with more or less accuracy according to the 
smallness of the supposed increment into curves of quantity-and-
marginal-utility for small increments’ (Wicksteed 1888a, p. 46). 
As noted by Blaug (1996, p. 294), Marshall made the same point on the 
mathematical and economic distinction between the concepts marginal 
effectiveness (or marginal usefulness) (du/dx) and marginal utility ((du/dx)∆x) 
in his Principles of Economics. It is also possible to read into Marshall’s review 
of Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy, which appeared in the Academy in 
April 1872, this very same point.
26 Nevertheless, given the later publishing date 
of the Principles, Wicksteed can claim to have at least been the first to fully 
spell out the distinction and should also be acknowledged as the prime source 
for introducing the term ‘marginal utility’ into economics.
 Wicksteed often used 
the terms ‘marginal usefulness’ and ‘marginal utility’ interchangeably without 
always making it clear, when using the term ‘marginal utility’, that he was 
referring to a small change in the independent variable. I shall adopt the same 
approach below. 
After completing his long mathematical introduction, Wicksteed moves 
on to discuss the consumer problem of allocating expenditure between goods. 
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Via both a mathematical exposition and through examples, Wicksteed 
demonstrates the principle that the consumer continues to substitute between 
goods until they reach the point where marginal utilities (for small increments in 
x), are equalised. It is at this point in the Alphabet that Wicksteed introduces an 
extended discussion of the question of how an individual allocates their labour 
time, in a Robinson Crusoe-type economy, between the production of different 
commodities.  
Before outlining Wicksteed’s model, I shall briefly outline the barebones 
of Jevons’s labour supply analysis in the TPE. Jevons’s model is presented in 
diagrammatic form in Figure 3 below. (The Appendix to this chapter provides a 
detailed discussion of Jevons’s theory of labour supply and his other 
contributions to wage and distribution theory.) This model has been presented 
and discussed on a number of occasions by historians of economic thought and 
is rightly given a prominent position in the development of neoclassical labour 
supply theory (for example, Schabas 1990, White 1994a, Peart 1996, Blaug 
1996, Derobert 2001, Spencer 2003a, 2003b). 
Jevons’s model contains three components. The first component of the 
model is the ‘marginal utility’ from goods (on the x-axis) produced from 
labour.
27 The curve p-q in Figure 3 represents the marginal utility curve. The 
second, the marginal disutility (generally) from the labour input that goes into 
the production of goods (the curve a-d). Jevons’s assumes that the marginal 
disutility from work falls to begin with, but then a point is reached from which 
disutility rises (or marginal utility falls as in the diagram). The third assumption, 
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implicit in the diagrammatic model with goods on the horizontal axis, is that of 
a one-to-one relationship between hours and goods (the marginal product of 
labour is constant). Equilibrium labour supply is that number of hours which 
produces m goods. At this point, the marginal utility from goods just equals the 
marginal disutility from the labour that produces the goods. 
Figure 3 Jevons’s Labour Supply Model 
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Jevons’s theory of labour supply was included in the third part of the TPE and 
followed a detailed examination of utility and exchange theory. It is important 
to remember that it was Jevons’s theory of utility and exchange that provided 
the focus of Wicksteed’s Alphabet analysis and not Jevons’s theory of labour or 
production. So, it is perhaps no wonder that commentators on neoclassical 
labour supply theory have missed the labour supply model embedded in 
Wicksteed’s  Alphabet exposition, as Wicksteed does not directly reference 
Jevons’s model in the Alphabet. 
Wicksteed’s labour supply model is introduced in the context of finding 
a standard or common observable measure of unobservable utility (see 
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Wicksteed 1888a, pp. 53-55). His introductory discussion of a common measure 
is important for illustrating the vital importance Wicksteed placed on the range 
of  alternative uses of time (or resources more generally) in understanding 
human action. His discussion moves us closer to the placement of opportunity 
cost at the very centre of a marginalist framework. Wicksteed’s exposition in 
the Common Sense is often taken as one of the first examples of such a method, 
but a careful reading of the Alphabet suggests that the elements of this approach 
were firmly in place much earlier. Wicksteed suggests that: 
‘we may even regard space and time as commodities each with 
its varying marginal usefulness. This year I eagerly accept a 
present of books which will occupy a great deal of space in my 
house, but will save me an occasional journey to the library; for 
the marginal usefulness of my space and of my time are such that 
I find an advantage in losing space and gaining time under given 
conditions of exchange. Next year my space is more 
concentrated and its marginal usefulness is therefore higher; so I 
decline a similar present, preferring the occasional loss of half an 
hour to the permanent cramping of my movements in my own 
study.  
Thus we see that the most absolutely heterogenous satisfactions 
are capable of being practically equated against one another, and 
therefore may be regarded as theoretically reducible to a 
common measure………We might, for instance, take the effort 
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of doing a given amount of work as the standard unit by which to 
estimate the magnitude of satisfaction’ (Wicksteed 1888a, pp. 
52-53). 
Wicksteed begins his common-measure labour supply exposition in the context 
of a single good. To determine the marginal usefulness of a commodity we can 
ask what level of work effort a person is prepared to supply in order to obtain 
successive units of the commodity. To illustrate Wicksteed’s transformation 
algorithm from utility to labour time and show the connections from it to a 
labour supply curve (but not the canonical modern labour supply curve), 
consider coffee consumption per period of time, say cups a day. The first cup of 
coffee produces a certain level of satisfaction—the marginal usefulness of the 
cup to an individual. To transform the marginal usefulness of the first cup into 
an equivalent labour value, determine the number of hours of labour the 
individual would be willing to supply on the market to obtain that first cup of 
coffee. The resulting hours of labour then represent an observable measure of 
the unobservable marginal usefulness of the first cup of coffee for that 
individual. Now move to the second cup of coffee. An assessment is again made 
of its marginal usefulness, followed by a determination of the number of hours 
of labour the individual would be prepared to supply in order to obtain that 
second cup. This process can then be repeated as many times as is necessary 
(until, say, satiation). 
To draw a labour supply curve, we can mark the resulting schedule of 
cups of coffee and hours of labour on a graph. Figure 4 presents such a graph. 
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This is a labour supply curve of sorts in which the y-axis is measured in terms 
of hours of work and the x-axis measures cups of coffee (per period of time).
28 
There are, of course, as many labour supply curves as there are goods that the 
individual has an interest in. 
Figure 4 Wicksteed’s Labour Supply Curve  
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Wicksteed’s representation is different to Jevons’s labour supply model in two 
important respects. 
First, Wicksteed’s model explicitly includes labour time (on the y-axis) 
whereas Jevons’s model incorporates labour time but in an indirect form. In 
Jevons’s model, marginal utility is on the y-axis and commodities on the x-axis. 
Wicksteed’s direct and explicit inclusion of labour time puts him closer to the 
standard neoclassical treatment.  
Second, in sharp contrast with Jevons, Wicksteed’s model makes no 
explicit reference to the disutility from work. Wicksteed certainly prefaces his 
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discussion with a brief mention the issue of the disutility from work (‘400 foot-
tons of work, for instance, would generally be more than twice as irksome as 
200 foot-tons’, Wicksteed 1888a, p. 54), but then proceeds to assume constancy 
in the hedonistic value of labour effort. The painfulness of work is a core 
component of Jevons’s model but not of the standard neoclassical treatment. 
There is, however, one aspect of Wicksteed’s analysis, which differs 
from the subsequent neoclassical treatment. As both Derobert (2001) and 
Spencer (2003a, 2003b) note, the standard neoclassical labour supply analysis 
refers to leisure time and not labour time. The canonical neoclassical labour 
supply curve is, to use Spencer’s phrase, a ‘labour-less’ labour supply curve and 
Wicksteed’s Alphabet analysis does not adopt this approach.
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In the second part of his discussion of individual labour supply, 
Wicksteed extends his analysis by considering the distribution of work effort 
between the production of more than one good (Wicksteed 1888a, pp. 55-61). In 
this exposition, Wicksteed demonstrates the important role played by alternative 
uses of labour time. As such, Wicksteed is moving towards the Common Sense 
of Political Economy position of the absolute central role of foregone 
opportunities or opportunity costs in economic theory. Wicksteed obtains a 
neoclassical solution that hours should be distributed across the production of 
competing goods in such a way that marginal usefulness values are equalised. 
He constructs a neat, simple diagram to represent this principle. Wicksteed’s 
diagram is reproduced in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 
Wicksteed’s All Product Supply of Labour Curve 
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Wicksteed transforms his product-based labour supply curves into 
labour supply curves specifying hours devoted to producing goods on the x-axis 
and the associated marginal usefulness values on the y-axis. Wicksteed then 
sums these marginal usefulness labour supply curves horizontally so that the 
resulting labour supply curve is an all-products labour supply curve (see Figure 
5 above). 
To determine the utility-maximising allocation of labour between 
competing goods, first set the number of hours available for production. In 
Wicksteed’s example, and as specified in Figure 5, he chooses 7 hours. Then 
find the corresponding marginal usefulness point on the all-products labour 
supply curve and draw a line parallel to the x-axis and cutting through each 
good’s individual marginal utility curve. The points of intersection of the 
parallel line with individual product labour supply curves then give the 
 60 
corresponding time allocations to each product. In the example, of the seven 
hours available for work, and as is clear in Figure 5, five would go to product 
one and two to product two. 
One further remark is in order at this point. Wicksteed closes the first 
part of his discussion of the derivation of a labour supply curve with the 
following remark. If a reader were to conduct a thought-experiment of the 
above kind and did not arrive at a curve that conforms to the diminishing 
marginal utility postulate, then ‘his imagination is not sufficiently vivid and 
accurate to enable him to realise approximately what he would be willing to do 
under varying circumstances’ (Wicksteed 1888a, p. 55). Moreover, if a person 
could not, for whatever reason, trace out their marginal labour supply curve for 
a given product, Wicksteed says that ‘there is a given amount, which, as a 
matter of fact, he would be willing to do under any given circumstances. Thus 
the curve really exists, whether he is able to trace it or not’ (Wicksteed 1888a, p. 
55). Wicksteed’s faith in the absolute correctness and primacy of the marginalist 
principles knows no bounds. 
Wicksteed moves from the individual level to the community level in 
the second half of the Alphabet. He suggests that the subject of production 
decisions at the community level lies outside the scope of his present work, but 
nevertheless, undertakes a brief analysis of the issue. Wicksteed again puts the 
principle of the equalisation of marginal utilities at the forefront of his 
exposition, but now adopts the position that market forces will ensure that the 
‘productive forces of the community…like the labour of a self-sufficing 
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industrial unit, will tend to distribute themselves in such a way that a given sum 
of productive force will produce equal utilities at the margin (measured 
externally by equivalents in “gold”) wherever applied’ (Wicksteed 1888a, 
p.111). Using this principle, Wicksteed proceeds to examine the case of the 
application of productive forces across industries and illustrates the argument 
that labour will move between competing industries according to the marginalist 
calculus to achieve a ‘general equilibrium’ position (to use his terminology). 
The Alphabet contains a large number of applications and extensions of 
the Jevonian framework beyond the labour supply example. We shall mention 
two further cases that have a distributional or labour angle. The first concerns 
Wicksteed’s (marginal) utilitarian analysis of the effects of redistribution on our 
understanding of prices and the alignment of prices with marginal utility.  
Wicksteed accepts the argument, and defends it strongly, that 
interpersonal comparisons of welfare cannot be made. In accordance with this 
principle, Wicksteed says that it is strictly incorrect to say that ‘a shilling is 
worth more to a poor man than to a rich one’. But, nevertheless, he argues that, 
in all probability, ‘shillings either are or ought to be worth more to poor men 
than to rich’ (Wicksteed 1888a, p.88). He then goes on to argue that ‘if wealth 
were more equally distributed, therefore, it would be nearer the truth than it now 
is to say that when we supply what we sell best we are supplying what is most 
wanted’ (ibid). Given that prices are the only practical guide as to what really is 
most wanted, a redistribution of wealth would better ensure that a ‘moderate 
conformity existed …between the price a thing would fetch and the intensity of 
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the marginal want of it. This would be an “economic harmony” of inestimable 
importance’ (ibid). 
The final point of interest in Wicksteed’s Alphabet concerns his return to 
the subject matter of the To-Day article. Wicksteed remains unrepentant and is 
more forceful than ever in terms of his attack on Marx’s doctrine (although, 
now he does not name Marx and makes no direct reference to Das Kapital). He 
refers to the ‘delusion’ of those who believe that it is ‘the amount of effort-and-
sacrifice or “labour” needed to produce a commodity which gives that 
commodity its value in exchange’ (Wicksteed 1888a, p. 117, italics in the 
original). The argument presented is as before: ‘One thing is not worth twice as 
much as another because it has twice as much “labour” in it, but producers have 
been willing to put twice as much “labour” into it because they know that when 
produced it will be worth twice as much, because it will be twice as “useful” or 
twice as much desired’ (Wicksteed 1888a, p. 117).
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2.6  Wicksteed’s Essay  
As noted above, Wicksteed had taken Jevons to task in the Alphabet for creating 
possible confusion in the minds of his readers with his careless use of the terms 
‘total utility’ and ‘final degree of utility’ (Wicksteed 1888, p. 46). In a paper 
published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1889, the year following the 
publication of the Alphabet, Wicksteed addressed the question of another source 
of confusion in Jevons’s work, namely, his specification of the dimensions of 
economic quantities in his treatment of capital and interest. The actual source of 
confusion in Jevons’s analysis does not interest us here; what does is that 
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Wicksteed develops a marginal productivity theory of capital and interest 
(‘capital’ for Wicksteed is a commodity; a physical thing) in the pages which 
follow. The theory of capital and interest presented, however, is nothing more 
nor less than that derived from the use of now (for Wicksteed) familiar 
marginalist techniques. The discussion of the marginal productivity doctrine is 
quite mechanical given the focus of the paper on the dimensions of variables 
with very little discussion of the issues involved. 
Wicksteed assumes a short-run production environment with a fixed 
amount of labour being applied to a perfectly divisible capital stock. Defining 
yield from capital as the output produced from the capital stock per period of 
time, we can then draw a yield from capital (or gross productivity of capital) 
curve which shows output produced, per period of time, at different levels of the 
capital stock. The yield from capital curve is assumed to first increase rapidly, 
then increase at a decreasing rate, before finally reaching a limit. (Unlike the 
Alphabet, the precise functional forms of Wicksteed’s curves are not presented.) 
Depreciation must be deducted from the gross productivity curve to derive the 
net productivity curve.  
At this point, Wicksteed calls on the marginalist thesis that the ‘rate of 
hire of anything follows the ordinary laws of final degree of utility, and is 
determined by the rate of productiveness (in satisfaction or commodity) of the 
last increment of the thing hired. That is to say if c is the quantity of capital, and 
f(c) …the net periodical productiveness of c, then f’(c) …will be the rate of hire 
of capital; i.e. the rate of interest’ (Wicksteed 1889, pp. 751-752). 
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Wicksteed italicises the terms ‘hire’ and ‘rate of interest’ to link back to the 
main point of his discussion concerning the dimensions of economic quantities 
(the relevant variable, the interest rate, being the rate at which increments of 
capital increase the per-period return). Notwithstanding the point that his 
interest in the article lies elsewhere, it is important to recognise that Wicksteed 
was here making a statement that was to prove the starting point of the Essay, 
namely, that the marginal utility doctrine, applied to the consumption of goods 
and the exchange value of goods, applies equally to the case of the payment of 
the factors of production (marginal utility then plays the same role as marginal 
productivity). To obtain the value of the period’s interest payments, given the 
interest rate, we must multiply capital by the interest rate. Hence the per-period 
interest payment is f’(c).c. 
Jevons had made it clear in the preface to the second edition of TPE that 
a complete theory of distribution, based on marginalist principles, had yet to be 
written. And this was the task that Wicksteed was to set himself in the Essay. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics article marked the beginning of a phase of 
work on distributional questions which culminated in the Essay. The fact that 
Wicksteed did not name the Essay as the second volume of the Alphabet 
perhaps suggests just how much he thought he may have extended the Jevonian 
framework. We have seen from the Alphabet that Wicksteed had mastered the 
marginalist theory of value and exchange and that he had already presented, in 
his 1889 QJE article, the basics of a marginal productivity based theory of the 
interest rate and interest payments. 
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The  Essay  represents the natural but ambitious progression from the 
work of the Alphabet and skeleton marginal productivity theory of interest: To 
recast the whole of distribution theory in terms of the new marginalist doctrine 
(and not just one or two parts taken separately) and, moreover, to do so in a 
mathematical form. (Steedman 1992 and Stigler 1941 provide an exhaustive 
overview of the Essay and I shall try not to go over the same ground covered 
again here.) On the latter, Wicksteed suggests that use of the ‘specialised logic 
and language of mathematics’ allows the economist to eliminate sources of 
error, and he is true to his word. The Essay represents one of the key early 
works in advanced mathematical economics.  
The starting point for the Essay is that previous expositions of the 
distribution of the product have treated each factor separately, so that there are 
theories of rent, interest, and wages. However, what Wicksteed suggests we 
search for is an approach to the theory of distribution akin to Jevons’s theory of 
exchange value, which relied on universal principles applied across all products. 
He states the aggregate exchange value law in the following terms. The total 
satisfaction of the community is a function of commodities and services (S= 
F(A, B, C,..)). The exchange value of each commodity is equal to the effect on 
satisfaction that the addition of a small increment to the commodity brings 
(dS/dK). The exchange value of the whole stock of the commodity is then given 
by (dS/dK).K. 
In his 1889 Quarterly Journal of Economics article, Wicksteed had 
argued (but only in very brief terms) that the marginalist analysis of value and 
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exchange applied equally to the case of production and earnings. In the Essay, 
he presents this argument in much greater detail. He suggests that the formula 
for aggregate exchange value provides the basis for a general theory of 
distribution. And so he states the general law of distribution as such. Just as the 
exchange value of each commodity or service is determined by the effect on 
total satisfaction which the addition or the withdrawal of a small increment of it 
would have, all other variables remaining constant, so the remuneration of each 
factor is given by effect on the product of a small increment of that factor, all 
other factors remaining constant (Wicksteed [1894]1992, pp. 56-8). If the 
product P is a function of different factors of production (P= F(A, B, C…) then 
we can refer to the marginal significance of the factor as dP/dK and the share of 
the product as (dP/dK).K. Wicksteed therefore asserts that there exists one 
theory of distribution applicable across all the various factors. In the case of the 
theory of distribution, however, as compared to the theory of exchange value, 
he suggests that we have an even more compelling doctrine, for while 
satisfaction is internal to the person and cannot be externally identified, in the 
case of ‘the product’; we do have something external to individuals, something 
that allows for third-party measurement. Of course, there is some hyperbole 
here (and not for the first or last time) because, as noted earlier, Wicksteed was 
at pains in the Alphabet to convert marginal utility values into corresponding 
observable values (witness his discussion on the transformation of marginal 
utility values into labour time values). 
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The statement of the law of distribution in terms of each factor receiving 
a share equal to (dP/dK).K provides the starting point for an elaborate analysis 
in the Essay. Wicksteed set himself three tasks. The first was to show that the 
payment of each factor according to such a law is consistent with experience. 
This he had not done in the 1889 Quarterly Journal of Economics article. The 
second was to determine the relationship between this law and previous doctrine 
(for example, the theory of rent, Walker’s theory of wages, but interestingly 
little is made of Jevons’s work on distribution theory in the TPE). The third and 
most onerous task was to determine, mathematically, that the total product is 
exhausted if each factor is paid according to its marginal significance. 
The first task set was very much in the order of what Wicksteed had 
done previously in minute detail in the Alphabet by giving an account of how 
the law met common sense reference points. However, Wicksteed’s treatment is 
sparse relative to the Alphabet, and an extended treatment is left to his later 
work, the Common Sense. However, as with the marginal utility and exchange 
value analysis of the Alphabet, ‘experience’ does not imply an examination of 
how the law of distribution fits the data. Unlike Jevons, Wicksteed makes very 
little recourse to data. Rather, for Wicksteed, experience means casual 
observation, introspection, and common sense thinking. 
What takes up most space in the Essay is Wicksteed’s examination of 
the second and third tasks. For Wicksteed, the analysis of how the payment of 
each factor according to marginal products exhausts the product is not only 
undertaken to meet obvious internal consistency criteria, but also to overcome a 
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key deficiency in previous theories of distribution, namely, that they were 
residualist in character, by which we mean that one (or more) part(s) of the 
distribution of income being explained (for example, wages), while the 
remaining elements are treated as ‘leftovers’. 
The Wicksteed archives at the London School of Economics indicate 
that much of the background mathematical work that went into the extended 
proof of the product exhaustion thesis presented in the Essay was the result of a 
huge effort undertaken by his mathematical assistant John Bridge, with a clear 
indication that his daughter Rebecca also provided assistance. Preserved in the 
London School of Economics archives are copious notes made by John Bridge, 
from late 1893, providing the cannon fodder for the demonstration of the 
product exhaustion thesis. The Pearson papers also reveal that Pearson provided 
Wicksteed with additional equations for curves in much the same way that he 
had provided equations in the lead-up to the Essay. There is no indication from 
these papers that Wicksteed was aware that Euler’s theorem could be drawn on 
to radically shorten the proof of the product exhaustion thesis, and so Wicksteed 
was left with the arduous mathematical task of proving the exhaustion of the 
product without the aid of a simple theorem.  
Wicksteed’s fear that his mathematics would be proved inadequate are 
expressed in his letter to Pearson of May 12
th 1894 on the publication of the 
Essay: ‘I send you a copy of my essay on Distribution into which I have put a 
great deal of work but more likely than not my ignorance of the real nature of 
the tools with which I am working has led me into wasteful and futile 
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methods—possibly into positive error, but against this I have taken extremely 
careful & I can not but hope adequate precautions’. 
Wicksteed’s  Essay attracted immediate interest from Flux, who 
reviewed the Essay in the Economic Journal in 1894 (the year of its printing), 
and Marshall, who cites Flux’s review and the Essay itself in a footnote in the 
third edition of his Principles published in 1895 (see Guillebaud 1961 p. 567).
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Flux’s review in the Economic Journal (Flux 1894) highlighted the fact that 
Wicksteed’s marginal productivity-based product exhaustion theorem could be 
proved by a simple application of Euler’s theorem. There was little further 
interest in Wicksteed’s Essay in Britain for the remainder of the 1890s.
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The Essay had, arguably, a greater impact across the Channel. Evidence 
for this is provided by Walras’s extraordinary refutation of Wicksteed’s Essay 
in the 1896 edition of the Elements of Pure Economics. Walras’s ‘Wicksteed 
Note’ included the assertion that Wicksteed ignored the contribution of previous 
writers on the subject, principally (though not stated as such) himself, Barone 
and Pareto.
33 The veracity of Wicksteed’s product exhaustion theorem, under 
which the payment of all factors according to their marginal products exhausts 
total production, also provided a source of interest among economic theorists 
through into the 1930s and beyond (see Flux 1894, Wicksell [1902]1969, Hicks 
1932a, Robinson 1933b, 1934a, Stigler 1941, and Steedman 1992). 
2.7  More on Wicksteed’s Non-economic Studies 
Economics clearly absorbed a great deal of Wicksteed’s time up to the 
publication of the Essay. However, during the decade to the publication of the 
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Essay and beyond, Wicksteed continued to publish in fields other than 
economics. In particular, he produced works on the relationship between 
religion and sociology, published a series of literary studies (most importantly 
on Ibsen but also Browning and Wordsworth), and translated a number of 
Dante’s works. 
One clear point of interest in these works is the extent to which a reading 
of Wicksteed’s contemporaneous non-economic texts allows us to gain some 
perspective on his economic works and the degree of integration between the 
two. Do these publications, written for a non-economist audience, provide us 
with clues as to influences on Wicksteed (beyond that of Jevons)? How well do 
these works flesh out Wicksteed’s views on the distribution of income, the 
workings of the market, policy prescriptions and so on? I shall focus on 
Wicksteed’s ‘popular’ sociological/religious works in this regard. In particular, 
I examine these works for the light they throw on Wicksteed’s methodology and 
the tension, evident in many of the early statements of neoclassical distribution 
theory, between the ‘fairness’ of the marginalist equation that each factor 
receives a return based on its marginal efficiency, and the ‘injustice’ of low 
wages and poverty. While the influence of physics on the development of 
neoclassical thought has been emphasised in recent work (for example, 
Mirowski 1989), the relationship between the social sciences, theology and the 
humanities and the development of the neoclassical research program remains 
undeveloped. It is here that Wicksteed’s popular sociological/religious output in 
the economic period holds some interest. 
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We have already stressed the fact that Wicksteed in his economic 
theories adhered to an avowedly universalist stance, arguing that there is one 
relevant doctrine, that of marginalism, which could be applied to all economic 
problems. However, the question remains as to whether Wicksteed took 
universalism one step further. As a Unitarian minister, the obvious starting point 
is whether Wicksteed believed that theology and political economy would be 
best examined from one common perspective so that unity might prevail across 
both areas. A good starting point to examine this question is Wicksteed’s 
address to students of Manchester New College in 1888, entitled The Place of 
Sociology in the Circle of Theological Studies. 
In his Manchester New College address, Wicksteed defines sociology as 
‘the study and analysis of Human Society’ (Wicksteed [1888]1903, p. 285). 
Sociology is then the broad discipline group that encapsulates political 
economy. The first issue addressed by Wicksteed is the question of how 
theology is to view sociology. For Wicksteed, the Christian minister must study 
sociology and must engage with social issues. The Christian minister must 
‘direct his thoughts, words, and works to the establishment of God’s kingdom 
on earth’ (Wicksteed [1888]1903, p.285). In other words, Wicksteed argues, as 
he did throughout all his theological writings, for Christian engagement with 
social issues, for a concern with the here and now rather than simply with the 
promise of things to come. Beyond the general call for Christians to be involved 
in world affairs, Wicksteed advances a view of the integrated nature of theology 
and sociology/economics. In other words, he claims a place for economics ‘as 
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part of the subject matter of theology itself ….Sociology, then, bereft of 
religion, is without a goal, and the blight of perpetual sterility is upon it. 
Theology, bereft of Sociology, is remote from the actual life of men, and is 
smitten with unreality. On the union of these two depends the future of 
humanity’ (Wicksteed [1888]1903, p.299). The paper, however, does not spell 
out the terms of this union between sociology and religion and it remains very 
uncertain that Wicksteed really had a clear program for generating a grand, all-
embracing universal method when he made these statements. There is often a 
sense of the theatrical and elements of hyperbole in Wicksteed’s writing, and 
this is one of many examples of it. 
We are given a stronger clue as to how Wicksteed understood the 
relationship between sociology and religion in his sermon The Battle with 
Materialism given in 1891 (Wicksteed 1891). In The Battle with Materialism, 
Wicksteed argues that the role of religion is not to interfere with the normal 
course of scientific endeavour and prescribe particular methods and truths but to 
‘penetrate and spiritualise science’ (Wicksteed 1891, p. 702). He argues that 
both science and the labour movement are too imbued with a materialistic ethic 
and that both need to integrate moral, ethical, and social justice concerns into 
their thinking and practices. In Wicksteed’s own case, he brought together these 
two perspectives by working within the Jevonian scientific paradigm to generate 
economic truths but placing checks on results where his religious beliefs 
demanded it. And in Wicksteed’s own mystical Unitarian schema, ideal 
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humanity and the ethical is bound up with the very conception of God, so that in 
a real sense the ethical is the religious (see Wicksteed [1892]1903). 
Wicksteed overlaid the economic with the religious in his commentary 
on the fairness of market outcomes and the market-based distribution of income. 
Wicksteed’s non-economic works provide insights into how his deep ethical 
concerns influenced his normative base and his policy prescriptions. One of the 
clearest and earliest statements of how Wicksteed  overlayed his economic 
studies with an ethical approach is his 1884 work Is Christianity Practical? 
published in the same year as his To-Day critique. Is Christianity Practical? is 
concerned with the question of how we are to perceive, from a Christian point 
of view, the role of the market mechanism, the division of labour and the 
fairness of market outcomes. Wicksteed provides biblical support for the 
division of labour and for the social benefits to be derived from free exchange. 
He even cites Paul’s letter to the Corinthians (1st Corinthians ch. 12). As for the 
role of individual action in the market mechanism, Wicksteed suggests that 
while each person appears to be ‘endeavouring to satisfy his own wants ….. if 
we look deeper we see that he has been placed where he is by the unconscious 
influence of great collective social forces which have set him there to satisfy the 
wants of others’ (Wicksteed 1884b, p.21). For Wicksteed, the ‘essence of trade 
and industry …[is to be] found in our mutual supplying of one another’s wants 
by means of the division of labour’ (Wicksteed 1884b, p.22). 
This is both a classic defence of the free market and an assertion that the 
greater good is the satisfaction of the wants of others rather than individual 
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wants. It is important to note, however, that Wicksteed’s advocacy of the free 
market is very much balanced by an extended discussion throughout Is 
Christianity Practical?, of the fact that some workers are at a bargaining 
disadvantage in the market. In such a case, there is a need for a replacement of 
the ‘religion of trade’ by the ‘religion of Jesus’. He argues in this context that 
‘Christianity resents and condemns this, declaring that our purpose, however 
difficult to carry out, ought to be to relieve these people from their terrible 
disadvantage in bargaining, instead of availing ourselves of it to thrust them yet 
further back’ (Wicksteed 1884b, p.25). Wicksteed provides support in these 
circumstances for the implementation of Christian principles in legislative 
programs to overcome the particular difficulties of the disadvantaged. 
Wicksteed was a Unitarian minister but he moved in wide circles insofar 
as his ministry was concerned. His most interesting involvement, for our 
purposes, was with the Labour Church, founded in 1891 by John Trevor a 
former Unitarian minister and friend of Wicksteed. As set out in Trevor’s tract 
An Independent Labour Party (published in 1892, prior to the formation of the 
Independent Labour Party itself in 1893), the Labour Church was based on the 
principle that the broad labour movement was itself a religious movement. The 
religion of the labour movement was neither sectarian nor dogmatic but based 
on what Trevor termed ‘free religion’, by which he meant that each individual 
was free to develop his or her own relations with ‘the Power that brought him 
into being’ (Trevor 1892, p. 2). The Labour Church movement was short-lived 
and was never influential outside the North of England with its strong non-
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conformist tradition. Bevir (1997, p. 50) argues that ‘although British socialism 
owes a debt to Marxism and Fabianism, its leading characteristics derive from 
ethical socialism exemplified by the Labour Churches’ (see also Inglis 1958). 
Wicksteed appears to have played an active role in the Labour Church 
movement, visiting and speaking at meetings, defending the Labour Church in 
Unitarian forums such as the Inquirer journal and contributing to Labour 
Church publications. The first edition of the Labour Prophet, the organ of the 
Labour Church, for example, contains, as its lead article, a short paper by 
Wicksteed: Is the Labour Church a Class Church? 
In this article, Wicksteed takes the position that the ‘workers’ are the 
basic organism of society. Other classes, such as intellectuals, managers and 
professionals, occupy a valid role only if they serve the organism (the workers) 
that supports them. If, however, workers exist for their sake then there is 
slavery’ (Wicksteed 1892a). 
His most extensive written piece on the Labour Church is his Labour 
Prophet tract published in 1892, What Does the Labour Church Stand For? 
(Wicksteed 1892b; see also Wicksteed 1898). Wicksteed suggests that the 
Labour Movement ‘aims at organising society in the interests of the 
unprivileged producer’ (Wicksteed 1892b, p. 4). 
Elsewhere Wicksteed (1908) defines the social ideals of socialism in 
exactly the same form and it is these social ideals (rather than the economic 
doctrines of socialism) that he approves of. He suggests that existing churches 
are not primarily based on achieving this goal of organising society in the 
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interests of the unprivileged producer. Rather they ‘accept the existing 
organisation of society’. At the same time, the ‘only’ weakness of the Labour 
Movement is the ‘absence of a consciously religious and spiritual character’. 
Hence the need for the Labour Church: ‘The rise of the Labour Church is the 
recognition of the fact that the Labour Movement has a spiritual and a religious 
as well as a material and physical aspect’(Wicksteed 1892b, p. 10). 
The importance of these articles and references is that they coincide with 
the publication of Wicksteed’s major work on distribution theory, the Essay. In 
reading them, one is struck by Wicksteed’s adherence to a position of support 
for the labour movement, the potential for injustice (which is so sharp that it can 
be seen as slavery) and the need to ensure a much fairer distribution of income. 
We have previously noted that these were precisely the concerns that Wicksteed 
espoused in the early 1880s, prior to his Jevons conversion. What is interesting, 
however, is that while we see references to justice and equality in his economic 
studies (see, for example, his discussion in the Alphabet, noted above), these 
concerns were not stated with nearly the same force in his economic studies as 
they were in his non-economic studies of the period. This leads us to surmise 
that Wicksteed quarantined his economic studies, excluding strong statements 
with regard to injustice, perhaps in the belief that their inclusion would water 
down the scientific credibility of his economic contributions. 
A large number of direct references to distributional issues can also be 
found in Wicksteed’s ‘non-economic’ works immediately following the 
publication of the Essay in 1894. In the following year, Wicksteed, in his short 
 77 
paper ‘The Advent of the People’, again provides strong support for a more 
equal distribution of wealth.
34 (It must also be remembered that Wicksteed 
continued over a long period of time, in political circles, to support land 
nationalisation campaigns; see Wicksteed 1901.) In so doing, he returns to a 
theme first canvassed in the Alphabet, namely, the effect of a redistribution of 
income and wealth on community welfare. He presents, in The Advent of the 
People, a classic (marginal) utilitarian defence of greater equality. Unlike the 
Alphabet, where the discussion is driven by positive concerns (a redistribution 
of income and wealth would mean that prices of goods would be more closely 
aligned to underlying real marginal utility values and not be distorted by 
inequality of income effects), the interest of the analysis in The Advent of the 
People is more of a strongly normative nature: 
‘a more even distribution of wealth would obviously relieve 
misery so intense that it would be more than a compensation for 
the loss of enjoyment at the other end by which it would have to 
be purchased. By a well-known law that lies at the basis of all 
sound consideration of social phenomena, each successive 
application of wealth to the supply of the wants of the same 
individual becomes less and less effective as a producer of 
satisfaction’ (Wicksteed 1895a, p. 234). 
2.8  The Common Sense and Beyond 
Following the publication of the Essay, Wicksteed left the development of the 
economic framework to one side as he began work on an extended set of studies 
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of Dante and Aquinas translations and studies. He returned a decade later to 
economic concerns in the writing of The Common Sense of Political 
Economy.
35 Here he emphasised once more his view of the universality of 
marginalist doctrine both in terms of the administration of resources and in 
terms of the distribution of income: 
‘The principle laid down by Jevons is not exclusively applicable 
to industrial or commercial affairs, but runs as a universal and 
vital force through the administration of all resources.’ 
(Wicksteed [1910]1933, p. 3) 
‘There can be but one theory of distribution, and that the theory 
of the market’ (p. 6). 
‘the underlying considerations that affect the terms on which 
effort is remunerated are identical with those that determine the 
price of commodities.’(p. 332). 
However, while he maintained the emphasis on the universality of the 
marginalist doctrine he moved away from the mathematical focus of the Essay. 
For one thing, the Common Sense was meant to be a more popular work and to 
be used as a text (indeed it was very popular as such); hence, the removal of 
calculus and functional forms in the Common Sense as compared to the 
Alphabet. For another, Wicksteed appears to have been affected by Walras’s 
attack, Flux’s mathematical critique, and the concerns that the product 
exhaustion theorem had limited scope. 
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The Common Sense has been extensively reviewed by Robbins (1933) in 
the introduction to the well-known 1933 reprint of the work, by Stigler (1941) 
and Hutchison (1953) and more recently by Steedman (1989a, 1999) and Blaug 
(1996) (see also critical contemporary reviews prompted by the Robbins reprint 
by Knight 1934, and Robinson 1933b, 1934b). We shall, therefore, only briefly 
allude to a series of extensions to the Jevonian (and at points Marshallian) 
framework developed in the Common Sense. The most important of these 
extensions is Wicksteed’s thoroughgoing emphasis on opportunity costs as 
central to all decision-making (the doctrine of alternative costs). This meant that 
Wicksteed now could be truly said to be not only the ‘one great disciple’ of 
Jevons, but also the one important representative of the Austrian as opposed to 
the Marshallian school in Britain in the pre-War period. 
The  Common Sense is also notable for a stronger emphasis on the 
importance of relative comparisons (always a key element in the Alphabet) to 
the point where an ordinal rather than cardinal utility framework becomes more 
evident. Wicksteed’s Common Sense is also famous for Wicksteed’s exposition 
of supply as reverse demand, and revisions to the laws of return, which had 
stronger links to Marshall than to Jevons. Wicksteed also returned to themes 
from the Essay, but now without the mathematics in his demonstration of the 
marginal productivity doctrine as applying to all factors of production and his 
discussion of rent theory. I shall here focus on four issues. First, the 
fundamental role ‘common sense’ plays in Wicksteed’s marginalist schema. 
Second, Wicksteed’s criticisms of the classical ‘economic man’ construct. 
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Third, Wicksteed’s restatement of labour supply theory. Fourth, his views on 
the way labour market policy should be structured. 
One of the key principles underlying Wicksteed’s thought is that the 
marginalist principles find their support in plain old common sense. The term 
‘common sense’ can be taken to represent a range of characteristics of 
Wicksteed’s methodological framework. First, and most obviously, that the 
principles of rational choice behaviour that guide factor remuneration are not 
complex in nature but reflect everyday commonsense thinking and actions (the 
common sense principle). Second, common sense plays an integral part in 
Wicksteed’s work in terms of theory corroboration and theory validation: We 
know that the principles of economics are true because they conform to 
common sense reasoning and experience. Third, Wicksteed emphasised utility 
as the common property against which exchange decisions over heterogeneous 
goods takes place. Fourth, just as he refers, in his study of Aristotle’s Physics, to 
Aristotle’s view that a common ‘sense’ guides all sensory experience, so there 
exists, a common (or universal) principle or co-ordinating force guiding all 
forms of economic decisions. For Wicksteed this principle is individual utility-
maximising choice behaviour. 
As a number of commentators have pointed out, Wicksteed in the 
Common Sense attacked the use made of the ‘economic man’ construct in 
classical economics (see in particular Steedman’s 1989a discussion). Wicksteed 
argued that the classical economists’ conception of ‘economic man’ was too 
narrow because it was founded on the premise that the only admissible motive 
 81 
that could be assigned to economic actors was wealth accumulation. Wicksteed 
instead argued for the view that economics should not make an artificial 
distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ motives, that is, between 
wealth and non-wealth motives. All motives should be admissible in an 
economic analysis, including the altruistic. What is important is the distinction 
between economic and non-economic relations rather than the distinction 
between different types of motives (see also Wicksteed 1894d, Wicksteed 1914, 
pp. 8-9). And the distinction between economic and non-economic relations is 
made on the grounds of whether actions and decisions have or do not have a 
connection to the ‘circle of exchange’, as Wicksteed puts it in the Common 
Sense. 
There are two important points to make in relation to Wicksteed’s 
economic man analysis. First, in attacking the ‘economic man’ construct of the 
classical period, we should not fall into the trap of thinking that Wicksteed was 
also at odds with the modern notion of the ‘rational economic actor’. Wicksteed, 
along with Jevons, was, in fact, partly responsible for such a construct in that, in 
keeping with the modern treatment, he focused on optimising or rational choices 
made by individuals (irrespective of, course, of their motives). The older 
‘economic man’ construct is seen as simply being too artificial and leading to 
too narrow a domain for economics. 
The second point is that Wicksteed’s dismissal of the economic man 
concept in the Common Sense reads as being based on ‘scientific’ and not 
‘religious’ grounds. In other words, the ‘economic man’ notion of the classical 
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period, founded on wealth accumulation motives, is not dismissed because it 
runs counter to normative religious precepts that individuals should be driven 
by more noble motives, but rather because it is invalid scientifically. 
Wicksteed’s call in The Battle with Materialism, to ‘penetrate and spiritualise 
science’ may have led us to expect more of an ethical and moral tone in his 
discussion of the concept of the ‘economic man’ in his Common Sense 
discussion. But, as I have previously suggested, there are elements of 
quarantining between Wicksteed’s economic works and his non-economic 
studies and this is one prime example. 
In the Common Sense, Wicksteed returns to the analysis of individual 
labour supply, but with one important change. He retains the Alphabet’s 
marginal usefulness (or marginal significance, to use his new terminology) of 
commodities produced by work effort function, but reintroduces a role for 
Jevons’s irksomeness of work effort function into his model. Having done so, 
however, he immediately reverses the perspective on this function in keeping 
with his Common Sense model of the supply curve as the reverse demand 
function. Now rather than the disutility of work, we have the marginal 
significance of leisure function, which is a positive function. As Wicksteed 
([1910]1933, p. 524) suggests, ‘the man who sells his labour is selling 
something for which he himself has a demand of some kind’. Leisure is defined 
as all things produced outside the ‘circle of exchange’ together with rest. To use 
Spencer’s (2003a) terminology, we have the ‘labour-less’ labour supply curve. 
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Finally, the Common Sense provides little by way of major development 
of the marginalist theory of distribution. The contributions are largely at the 
margins of theory. The most important of these contributions concern the fact 
that Wicksteed introduces a role for imperfections in markets and allows for 
non-economic forces in determining factor remuneration outcomes. As argued 
elsewhere (Flatau 1997a, 2001b), Wicksteed, in common with other key 
neoclassical thinkers of his time (Marshall, Clark, and Pigou), both protects a 
notion of fairness in remuneration according to marginal products, while 
allowing for the dual possibility of underpayment according to these principles 
in non-competitive markets and underpayment according to need. But he does 
not support a living wage policy (popular at the time) to offset these problems, 
but rather government action outside the labour market to improve the lot of 
low-income wage earners. 
While he adopts a similar position to Marshall and Pigou on the living 
wage question and exploitation, a number of important differences between 
Wicksteed and Marshall and Pigou are worth noting. In terms of method, he 
retains a largely abstract mode of presentation in his ‘economic’ works, with 
little emphasis on a description of economic events or analysis of policy 
initiatives. In this respect, he appears very much unlike Marshall, whose 
Principles reveals a strong awareness of the policy issues and economic events 
of the day. For Wicksteed, economic truths are developed largely on the basis of 
extrapolation from general principles that are known to be true, if only via 
introspection. Moreover, as noted by Robbins in his introduction to the 1933 
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reprint of Wicksteed’s The Common Sense of Political Economy, while 
Marshall at times adopts a marginalist framework, such a method of analysis 
does not dominate his work. In contrast, Wicksteed’s analysis is centred wholly 
on the marginalist framework.
36  
Wicksteed’s major economic works were completed between the mid-
1880s and his 1914 Presidential Address to the British Association on the 
marginal theory of value and distribution. The Common Sense was published in 
1910. Other than his six sermons on Dante published in 1879, his major 
publications on Aristotle, Aquinas and Dante were concentrated in the period 
1912 to the end of his life in 1926. The direct overlap between his economic 
works and those on Aristotle Aquinas and Dante is slight, with little by way of 
cross-reference. It is therefore difficult to make any strong statements on 
whether and to what degree the influences of Aristotle, Aquinas and Dante are 
apparent in Wicksteed’s economic works. 
It is, however, worthwhile to draw two points of connection between 
these two bodies of work. The first is that, in the very brief cross-references 
Wicksteed makes between the two bodies of work, he suggests a conjuncture 
between the economic principles he espouses and the principles set out in 
Aristotle. In his Presidential Address of 1914, Wicksteed suggests that 
‘Aristotle’s system of ethics and our reconstructed system of 
economics are twin applications of one identical principle or law, 
and that our conduct in business is but a phase of our conduct in 
life, both being determined by our sense, such as it is, of 
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differential significances and their changing weights as the 
integrals of which they are the differences expand or contract’ 
(Wicksteed 1914, p. 8). 
There also exist interesting direct parallels between Wicksteed’s commentary 
on the Physics and his major economic work, the Common Sense. Wicksteed’s 
(1929) Physics project, it appears (see the preface to the work by Cornford), 
was a long time in the making, being conceived apparently some thirty years 
prior to its publication in the mid-1920s. In the Physics commentary, Wicksteed 
refers to Aristotle’s theory of the ‘common sense’. The common sense 
‘receives, adopts as its own, and assimilates the reports of all the special senses, 
and combines these reports, as well as distinguishing between them’. Wicksteed 
goes on to suggest that the ‘common sense gives us a new kind of oneness, the 
oneness of an associated combination of different orders of sensation’ 
Wicksteed (1929, p. xxxv). It is possible to see Wicksteed’s use of the phrase 
the ‘common sense’ of political economy in the title of his major work as 
indicating a belief on his part that, as with the senses, there is a common 
principle of political economy guiding economic decision-making. 
The second point to make is a more general one. Wicksteed’s economic 
work can be categorised as being clearly consistent with the Roman tradition of 
Aristotle, Aquinas and Dante. His extensive commentary on this tradition itself 
makes such a conclusion even more reasonable. Worland (1984) points to 
Robbins as the key writer who introduces the Aristotelian tradition into 
neoclassical economics. Focusing on Wicksteed’s work suggests a much earlier 
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connection. Robbins himself of course edited Wicksteed’s work and listed 
Wicksteed as a major source of inspiration (See Robbins 1930b and Robbins 
1933). We are led to the obvious conjecture that, notwithstanding the fact that 
Wicksteed’s most important work on the Roman tradition was published after 
his major economic works, the development of his own economic thought was 
influenced by this tradition; but his own reading of the work of Aristotle, 
Aquinas and Dante may have also been influenced by his economic analysis. 
The key elements of this tradition, outlined by Nelson (1991), which are 
consistent with Wicksteed’s economic theories and emphasised in his own 
commentaries on this tradition, are: (1) Individuals exercise free will in the 
determination of their ends and follow reasoned judgement to achieve those 
ends; (2) Ends are chosen on the basis of achieving higher levels of happiness; 
means are chosen rationally so as to achieve best outcomes. (3) Outcomes 
reflect individual choice behaviour. Deserts line up with choices made. (4) 
There are common principles, rules and senses that guide decision-making 
processes. These common principles are accessible to all (and there is an 
essential equality across individuals on this scale) because they represent basic 
commonsense. 
2.9  Conclusions 
Wicksteed presents as a thoroughgoing dogmatist, rationalist and optimist. 
Economic activity is the product of the interactions of people and businesses 
making rational decisions in the light of the information available to them. He 
attacked the notion of the ‘economic man’, not on the grounds of rationality, but 
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because the classical writers who used this construct adopted a too narrow 
conception of what can be accepted as ‘economic’ motives. The principles 
which guide economic activity can be known, are explicable, and can be written 
down and held with a high degree of certainty (hence the dogmatist tag). 
Wicksteed espouses a strong form of universalism. There are not separate laws 
of value and exchange, let alone separate laws of distribution for each factor, 
but one universal law based on the marginalist principle. Theories of wages, 
rent and interest are particulars of the universal principle. 
By what criteria are we to know that the marginalist principle applies 
with such scope and force? We do so through a process of mathematical 
reasoning (in the Essay  and preceding works) and through experience and 
common sense (in all works, but principally in the Common Sense). We do not 
require, it would seem, detailed empirical investigations that may corroborate 
the universal statements that provide the foundation of economic science and 
particular conjectures derived from these statements. In this respect, Wicksteed 
departed from the ideals of Jevons. In addition, he espoused a belief in 
economic justice and fairness that stayed with him throughout his life, leading 
him into long-term support for liberalism, the Labour Church movement and a 
number of progressive causes. 
Wicksteed’s modernist theological leanings and his adherence to a 
positivist program, together with his Unitarian background, provided an 
environment conducive to the development of an integrated world view, an 
emphasis on unity of thought and a ‘scientific method’, the willingness to adopt 
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unpopular, revolutionary positions, and an emphasis on critical reasoning. These 
ingredients meant that he was predisposed to the work of Jevons and they 
clearly had an influence on his later developments in the theory of distribution. 
His adoption of a free will doctrine and the role of directed choice may also 
have led him to a more ready acceptance of the Jevonian program. However, we 
must be careful not to read too much into these connections. It was Jevons’s 
work itself that provided the greatest impetus to Wicksteed’s further 
development of the theory of distribution. 
In terms of his extension of the Jevonian framework, one can mention a 
range of important examples. He provided a very diverse set of illustrations of 
how the Jevonian framework applied across the administration of all resources. 
He took the Jevonian framework clearly down a more Austrian path in his 
analysis of foregone opportunities and through his reverse demand curve model. 
However, his key contribution remains his theory of distribution. The core 
component of Wicksteed’s distribution theory is that it is not a separate branch 
of economics. Nor can we speak of individual theories of distribution related to 
the various factors of production. Rather, there is a universal theory of 
distribution that is based on the principles developed by Jevons with respect to 
the theory of exchange value. Just as the exchange value of each commodity or 
service is determined by the effect on total satisfaction which the addition or the 
withdrawal of a small increment of it would have, all other variables remaining 
constant, so the remuneration to each factor is given by effect on the product of 
a small increment of that factor, all other factors remaining constant (Wicksteed 
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[1894]1992, pp. 56-58). The marginalist principle involved is applicable to all 
factors and is consistent with the experience of life in general (Wicksteed 
[1894]1992, pp. 58-61). Moreover, under the conditions of a ‘freely competing 
community’, the shares to each factor would exhaust the product. 
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Notes 
 
∗ This paper has benefited from comments by John King, Ray Petridis, Ian Steedman, 
and Herb Thompson, reports from two referees and comments from participants at the 
2002 History of Economic Thought Society of Australia conference, where a previous 
version of this paper was given. The paper draws on, at various points, a broader paper 
on tendencies towards universalism in neoclassical distribution theory (see Flatau, 
2001b–chapter 4). I am grateful to the archivists at the Special Collections section of 
Library Services at University College London, the Manuscripts and Archives Section 
of the New York Public Library and the London School of Economics Archives for 
providing access to the papers of Pearson, Henry George and Wicksteed. 
1 Wicksteed was aged 38 and a Unitarian minister of some years standing when he 
entered the political economy field. He had published widely in the emerging and 
controversial field of modernist theology (for example, Wicksteed, 1872, 1874, 1880a, 
1880b, 1881), and was also known for his work on Dante (Wicksteed, ([1879]1892), 
and reviews of Comte for the Inquirer magazine (Wicksteed, 1875). 
2 This quote is from a letter from Wicksteed to George, dated 29 October 1882. 
Wicksteed’s letter to Henry George is held in the Henry George Papers, 1840s-1950, 
Manuscripts and Archives Section, New York Public Library. I would like to thank the 
Manuscripts and Archives Section of the New York Public Library for providing a 
copy of this letter to me. 
3 Wicksteed viewed existing economic doctrine as being unable both to explain the 
causes and nature of commercial depressions and to provide a justification for the 
coexistence of wealth and poverty. Wicksteed expanded on his views of the fallacies of 
existing economic doctrines in his 30 December 1882 Inquirer review of Progress and 91 
                                                                                                                                  
Poverty (Wicksteed 1882b). The review has modern resonance in its critique of 
macroeconomic co-ordination problems and the anomaly (for then existing doctrine) of 
the existence of depressions when there are ‘wants to supply, power to supply them, 
and a prospect of remunerative employment of capital in bringing them together, and 
yet remain divorced’ (Wicksteed 1882b, p. 839). 
4 Wicksteed’s initial enthusiasm for Progress and Poverty was considerable, as 
reflected in his 30 December 1882 Inquirer review where he suggested that Progress 
and Poverty represented ‘by far the most important work in its social consequences that 
our generation or our country has seen’ (Wicksteed 1882b, p. 839). Despite abandoning 
George the economist, Wicksteed remained, throughout, committed to a Georgist-
inspired land reform program (see, for example, Wicksteed 1901). His brother Charles 
Wicksteed was heavily engaged in the Georgist land reform campaign (see Wicksteed 
[1885]1894). 
5 While historians of economic thought have debated the question of whether the 
‘marginal revolution’ was indeed a revolution, Wicksteed’s references to Jevons and 
other marginalist writers clearly indicate that he at least believed that a revolution in 
economics had occurred. 
6 Schabas (1990, p. 169) notes that the reference to Wicksteed as Jevons’s disciple was 
made by both Schumpeter and Stigler. She herself uses the same phrase. In terms of 
Wicksteed’s contemporaries, Nicholson was to remark to J.N. Keynes that 
‘Wicksteed’s Alphabet, I know by experience with good men is repellent, and Jevons is 
worse’ (J.N. Keynes Diaries Add 7839, 21 July 1890, Cambridge University Library). 
This quote suggests that at least some of Wicksteed’s contemporary British economists 
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recognised the close link between Jevons and Wicksteed and were hostile towards the 
economics espoused by both Jevons and Wicksteed. 
7 Of all the major neoclassical writers of the late nineteenth century, Wicksteed can be 
said to have attracted the least interest from economic theorists and historians of 
economic thought. Steedman’s recent explorations (1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1992, 1994) 
and his publication of the collected works of Wicksteed (Steedman 1999), however, 
have contributed to a marked increase in our understanding of Wicksteed’s work and 
the forces that shaped it. Other contributions include Flux (1894), Wicksell 
[1902](1969), Hicks (1932a, 1932b), Robbins (1930, 1933), Robinson (1933b, 1934a), 
Knight (1934), Stigler (1941), Hutchison (1953), Newton (1971), Davidson and 
Meiners (1976), Worland (1984), Makowski and Ostroy (1992) and Blaug (1996). 
Other than Steedman’s contributions, this list consists entirely of internalist readings of 
Wicksteed’s economic texts. By an internalist reading, we mean that the analysis of a 
text takes into account only the text itself and other relevant texts. Reference to 
historical setting, biography and cross-disciplinary influences are scant in such a 
reading. 
8 Another obvious methodological difference between the two is Wicksteed’s continued 
failure to place his work in any sort of historical context. There is little by way of 
citation of other texts throughout all Wicksteed’s work, which stands in sharp contrast 
to Jevons’s practice. 
9 Who should get the credit for first developing a comprehensive mathematical 
treatment of the marginal productivity theory of distribution is, of course, a matter of 
some controversy. Wicksteed’s and Wicksell’s names are those commonly mentioned. 
There were antecedents to Wicksteed and Wicksell including Jevons himself, as we 
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shall argue (and what of Marshall, Walras and Barone?), but it can well be argued that 
no author prior to Wicksell and Wicksteed provided anything like a complete 
mathematical statement of a marginal productivity theory. In section 5, we briefly 
review Walras’s attack on the Essay in his famous note to the third edition of the 
Elements. Wicksell’s book Value, Capital and Rent was published, quite independently 
of Wicksteed, in 1893 (but not translated into English until 1954) and there is simply 
no evidence that either knew about the other’s work at the time. 
10 Steedman’s (1994) treatment of Wicksteed’s views of the integration of the religious, 
the sociological and the economic in one all-embracing theory appears to me to take 
Wicksteed’s stated views of the integration of economics, theology and sociology 
perhaps too much at face value. 
11 Details of Wicksteed’s life can be found in Herford (1931), which has been 
reproduced as volume 5 in Steedman’s (1999) five-volume edited collection. It is 
difficult (wrong) to pin down Unitarianism to one set of beliefs. Indeed as Wicksteed 
[1892]1903, p. 93) himself suggested, ‘Unitarian has come to cover a very wide area, 
and to stand rather for a loosely-defined set of principles and methods and an attitude 
of mind in approaching religious problems than for adhesion to a dogma of theology’. 
His own brand of Unitarianism can be summed up negatively as a non-
fundamentalist/evangelistic view of Christianity. He believed there were multiple 
sources of avenues to gain an understanding of God and that the Bible was not the one 
true source of religious truth. In a positive sense, Wicksteed ([1892]1903) argued for 
Unitarianism to be built on the unification of three conceptions of God in Unitarian 
thought, that is, God as idealised humanity, as the unknown source of all things, and as 
an ethical principle within us.  
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12 The only reference in Jevons’s published work that gives any inkling that Wicksteed 
knew Jevons personally is contained in his Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy 
entry on Jevons. In a personal aside in the entry, Wicksteed says of Jevons: “Though 
reserved in character, he was a very pleasant companion and extremely instructive in 
conversation. One who had the advantage of knowing him, and frequently experienced 
the help which is powerful mind brought to the solution of any economic problem, 
remarked of his conversation…..” (Wicksteed [1910]1933 pp. 802-803). The reference 
is not clear as to whether Wicksteed himself had first hand experience of Jevons or, on 
the contrary, that he had learnt of Jevons’s personality and conversation  from others. 
However, my view, based on a reading of this particular reference is probably the 
latter. One of the examiner’s alerted me to Black’s (1962 p. 215) suggestion that while 
there is clear evidence that Edgeworth met Jevons, in the ‘case of Wicksteed there is 
less to go on; it seems probable that he was more influenced by Jevons’s writing than 
by personal contact with him.’ There is no extant correspondence between Jevons and 
Wicksteed, but as pointed out by the same examiner of the thesis, Black (1962 p. 215) 
suggested that that could be explained by the fact that Wicksteed lived in London. 
There is, however, some secondary evidence to the contrary position. As noted by the 
examiner, JM Keynes, in his chapter on Jevons in Essays in Biography, cites a 
statement of Clara Collett that Jevons, at the end of his life, was in contact with 
Wicksteed (Keynes 1961, p. 307). Clara Collett was born in 1860 and was the first 
female Fellow of University College, London. She wrote a number of papers on 
women and the labour market, assisted Charles Booth in his Life and Labour of the 
People of London in the late 1880s and worked for many years for the Board of Trade 
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(see Mahalanobis 1948 and McDonald 2004). It is highly likely that she knew 
Wicksteed personally during the 1880s and 1890s in London. 
Moreover, as the relevant examiner also points out, Könekamp (1962, p.272) (a niece 
of Jevons’s daughter) suggests that just prior to his death Jevons ‘began to influence, 
through personal contact, some of the younger economists, especially Edgeworth, 
Foxwell and Wicksteed’. 
13 Wicksteed translated a large number of works in his lifetime in addition to his early 
translations of theological works from Dutch to English. His most well-known 
translations are of the work of Dante. He also translated the work of Aristotle and 
Aquinas. See Herford (1931) for a complete listing of Wicksteed’s work. 
14 As noted by an examiner, Wicksteed’s admiration for Henry George was unusual in 
economist circles. 
15 Wicksteed’s critique, the response to it by Shaw, and the counter-response by 
Wicksteed, have all been reviewed in detail by Steedman (1989b, 1990). The original 
pieces in the debate are bound together in a limited edition, Bernard Shaw & Karl 
Marx. A Symposium 1884-1889 (Ellis 1930). 
16 John Bridge appears not to have alerted Wicksteed to Euler’s theorem and its use in 
proving the product exhaustion theorem (see Flux 1894). Flux’s response to Wicksteed 
on this may have been a major factor behind Wicksteed not continuing down the 
mathematical track from that point on. 
17 A search of the British Library’s on-line catalogue reveals that books of the ‘The 
Common Sense of ….’ variety were very common at the turn of the century (e.g., 
Common-sense Euclid, Common-Sense Theology [published by the British & Foreign 
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Unitarian Association], Common Sense Currency. A practical treatise on money, 
Common Sense in the Nursery, The Common Sense of Riding etc. etc.). 
18 This functional form had the advantage of being simpler, displaying similar attributes 
in the positive quadrant of marginal utility to Pearson’s curve. One feature of 
Wicksteed’s curves in the Alphabet is that they are not asymptotic to both axes as are 
Jevons’s curves (see also Wicksteed 1889). 
19 Harro Maas’s (2005) recent work William Stanley Jevons and the making of modern 
economics, published subsequent to my paper on Wicksteed and Jevons, provides a 
comprehensive outline of the impact of currents of thought from the physical sciences, 
psychology, logic and mathematics on the methodology and content of Jevons’s 
theories. 
20 Presumably Ernest Bax, the Marxist writer, editor, journalist and co-founder with 
William Morris, Eleanor Marx and Edward Aveling of the Socialist League. 
21 Interestingly, when Wicksteed was again to refer to labour power (in the Alphabet) 
he uses ‘labour-power’ rather than ‘labour-force’. 
22 In a subsequent letter to Pearson on 7 July 1885, Wicksteed says that he would be 
‘extremely glad if you would come and show me where you think my case against 
Marx breaks down’. But we hear no more of any further discussion between the two on 
this issue. 
23 Indeed, there is a sense almost of self-betrayal in Wicksteed’s letter to Pearson. In a 
later letter to Pearson (December 17 1888), he refers to the publication of the Alphabet 
and remarks: ‘I wonder whether you will come across my “Alphabet of Economic 
Science”. If you do I shall expect you vindicate Marx’s metaphysics against its pseudo-
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mathematics. If you don’t I shall cherish a deep conviction that no one can – so you 
further your responsibility for my soul’. 
24 Wicksteed clearly planned to produce a volume on production and distribution issues 
at a later point; hence the use of the sub-title ‘Part 1 Elements of the Theory of Value 
or Worth’ for the Alphabet. Wicksteed’s Essay appears to have been conceived as the 
second part of the work but clearly moved well beyond its original role. 
25 Two recent explorations of the history of neoclassical labour supply theory (Derobert 
2001 and Spencer 2003a, 2003b) both fail to mention the Alphabet (no doubt not 
deliberately) and only refer to Wicksteed’s Common Sense analysis. 
26 I am indebted to an examiner of the thesis for pointing out the relevance of 
Marshall’s review of Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy. Marshall’s review is 
reprinted in Pigou’s (1925) Memorials of Alfred Marshall (pp. 93-100). 
27 Here I use the terminology—marginal utility and marginal disutility—that most 
commentators adopt when discussing Jevons’s model, and not Jevons’s own 
terminology. 
28 A total labour supply curve can be derived from the marginal labour supply curve in 
an analogous way to the drawing of the total utility curve from the marginal utility 
curve. 
29 Following Wicksteed’s contribution there were no major new contributions on labour 
supply theory until Robbins (1930a) who examined the impact of rises in the wage rate 
on effort expended and introduced the concept of the elasticity of demand for income 
in terms of effort. It was not until Hicks and the introduction of the indifference curve 
framework that the canonical neo-classical labour supply was developed. Wicksteed’s 
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contribution to the development of neo-classical labour supply theory remains largely 
unrecognised. 
30 The same point was made earlier by Menger in his Principles of Economics (Menger 
[1871]1981 p. 170-171). I am grateful to an examiner of the thesis for this point. 
31 Marshall withdrew the reference to the Essay in the sixth edition of the Principles 
(see Guillebaud 1961 p. 567). 
32 The next major reference to Wicksteed’s Essay appears in Edgeworth’s review of 
distribution theory in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1904 (Edgeworeth 1904). 
To put some context to the absence of strong interest in the Essay in British academic 
circles, one must remember that it had limited circulation. Moreover, Wicksteed did not 
hold down a formal academic post and, consequently may not have been accorded 
sufficient respect among economists. And, finally, there was little take-up of the 
Jevonian program at the time excepting for Edgeworth and Wicksteed; some like 
Cairnes were hostile. As Black also suggests, in the 1880s, ‘Jevons had not attracted 
around him any considerable group of pupils or disciples’ (Black 1970 p.33). 
33 Jaffé ([1964]1992) shows that Walras, Barone and Pareto all have some right to lay 
claim to be among the authors of the first comprehensive general mathematical 
statement of the marginal productivity doctrine, but the relevant evidence is derived 
from unpublished sources (see also Stigler 1941, and Dooley 1998). In writing the 
Essay, Wicksteed appears to have been unaware of the relevant unpublished work of 
Walras, Barone and Pareto. Other major contributors to a mathematical statement of a 
general forms of marginal productivity theory include Marshall (Marshall 1961 and 
Whitaker 1975), and Wicksell ([1893]1954). 
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34 Wicksteed’s paper is included in the book, The New Party, edited by Andrew Reid. 
Reid advocates in the book the formation of ‘The New Party and National Union of 
Socialists’. Another contributor to the book was Keir Hardie (‘On the Independent 
Labour Party’). Inglis (1958) notes that a Labour Church service attended by 5,000 
followed the conference in 1893 at which the Independent Labour Party was formed. 
Keir Hardie wrote for the Labour Prophet, the journal of the Labour Church. 
35 Flavio Comim (2004) gives a detailed account of Wicksteed’s The Common Sense 
of Political Economy, which was published subsequent to my paper on Wicksteed. 
36 As discussed in Flatau (2001b–see chapter 4), Wicksteed developed his position on 
the living wage and support for low-income earners in a paper delivered at the Inter-
denominational Summer School in 1913 (see Wicksteed 1913). 
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Appendix: Jevons and the Theory of Wages 
Introduction 
In chapter 2, we examined the deep Jevonian underpinnings to Wicksteed’s 
universal theory of distribution. This unpublished appendix provides an 
essential complement to the above discussion by providing an outline of 
Jevons’s own theory of distribution and, in particular, his theory of wages. 
A view that is commonplace is that Jevons revolutionised value and 
exchange theory but left intact much of the classical treatment of distribution 
theory. Stigler (1941, p. 13), for example, suggests that Jevons’s ‘theory of 
production and distribution…is fundamentally classical’. Such a position, 
however, tells only half the story. In truth, Jevons’s theory of distribution 
contains a strong mixture of both the “old” (elements of classical theory he 
approved of) and the “new” (Jevonian neoclassical theory). This mixture is no 
more evident than in his theory of wages; the prime focus of the present note. 
Jevons’s marginal productivity theory of interest and his labour supply 
model, referred to in the Wicksteed paper (chapter 2), represent major points of 
discontinuity with the classical tradition. White (2004) has also persuasively 
argued that Jevons’s theory of rent should be viewed as a break with classical 
(Ricardo/Mill) rent analysis rather than an extension of it as it has so often been 
portrayed. In terms of wage theory, Jevons was stridently at odds with both 
Ricardian wage theory and the classical wage-fund doctrine. Moreover, The 
Theory of Political Economy ( TPE) contains elements of a mathematical 
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marginal productivity account of wages as part of his reconstruction of 
Ricardian rent theory. At a more general level, the publication of the second 
edition of TPE in 1879 reveals Jevons moving in the direction of a universal 
marginal productivity theory of distribution capable of explaining the 
distribution of income across all factors of production. It was a matter for the 
second-generation theorists, Wicksteed, Clark and Wicksell, to develop further 
the universal marginalist model of the distribution of income. 
Despite these clear departures from the classical tradition, Jevons 
retained much of the “old” or classical in his wages theory. He upheld the 
centrality of a demand and supply model of the labour market, adhered to 
classical Smithian policy prescriptions on the benefits of free labour markets 
and of the division of labour and referred, in often strident tones, to the harmful 
effects of trade union action on wages. On the other hand, he repudiated the 
classical wages fund doctrine and Ricardian wage theory. 
The appendix is organised on a chronological basis. It considers first the 
early works of Jevons, wherein a demand and supply market-oriented model of 
wage determination is established and applied to an analysis of trade union 
activity in the labour market. Jevons’s break with elements of classical theory in 
the TPE is then discussed. We close with a discussion of Jevons’s contributions 
on wages contained in other published sources through the 1870s and early 
1880s. 
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Early Explorations 
Jevons began his study of economics in earnest in the mid to late 1850s reading 
Adam Smith and subsequently Mill and Malthus (see Black 1981, pp. 115-
120).
1 We know from his diaries and personal papers (Black and Könekamp, 
1972) that he was considering the question of the division of labour through the 
latter half of 1857, suggesting that Jevons’s first economic inquiries began in 
the field of labour. His study of economics continued with some fervour in the 
next year (1858) as a letter to his sister Henrietta Jevons in February 1858 
testifies. Jevons refers to the Wealth of Nations (‘one of the driest on the 
subject’) and to the inherent mathematical nature of the subject. He suggests, 
enticingly, that ‘he has an idea, which I do not object to mention to you, that my 
insight into the foundations and nature of the knowledge of man is deeper than 
that of most men or writers’ (Black 1973, p. 321). 
Jevons’s first explicit statement on labour and wages can be found in a 
letter to Henrietta Jevons in 1859 (Black 1973, pp. 359-362). He suggests that 
‘we enter here into one of those deeply laid & simple propositions of Economy 
which I hope some day to work out into a symmetrical & extensive manner 
hitherto unattempted even by Mills and Adam Smith. It comprehends the whole 
question of Education and the employment of Capital in Industry, and will 
define the proper relation of preparation & performance’ (Black 1973, pp. 359-
361). In the letter, Jevons points to the benefits that accrue to individuals 
because of their ‘investment in human capital’ (to use modern terminology). 
Those who have the means will find it profitable to invest their time (and 
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consequently forego income) to learn ‘mathematics, mechanics, natural 
philosophy, reading writing, and even French and poetry’ (Black 1973, pp. 
360). 
In these early sparse references, there is no suggestion that Jevons had 
arrived at the subjectivist-marginalist framework position that was to become 
the core organising idea of his theory of value and exchange. Indeed, it is clear 
from his famous letter to his brother Henry Jevons of 1 June 1860 that the 
adoption of this position did not occur until early 1860. (‘During the last session 
I have worked a great deal at Pol. Economy; in the last few months I have 
fortunately struck out what I have no doubt is the true theory of Economy’, 
Black 1973, p. 410.) In other words, it can be argued that Jevons developed the 
subjectivist-marginalist theory of utility, value and exchange having previously 
considered issues concerned with capital, the workings of the labour market and 
the role of human capital investments. 
Notice of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy 
Jevons’s first published statement of his new economic theory was the famous 
‘Notice of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy’ (hereafter the 
Notice) sent to Section F of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science at Cambridge in October 1862. The Notice was duly published, in brief 
form in 1862, in a report of the Association (see Grattan-Guiness 2002, pp. 721-
722). A full version of the notice was published in 1866 in the Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London (JSSL) under the title ‘Brief Account of a General 
Mathematical Theory of Political Economy’ (see Jevons [1911]2001, Appendix 
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III, pp. 303-314). Grattan-Guiness (2002) has discovered a second full version 
of the notice, which Jevons sent to the Philosophical Magazine in October 1862 
(‘Notice of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy’). Hence, 
three versions of this important short work exist. 
The 1866 JSSL published version of Jevons’s Notice contains a very 
short summary of his theory of labour. The labour section is placed immediately 
after that on utility theory and just prior to a section on exchange theory. 
Jevons’s theory of labour is built directly on Jevons’s subjectivist-marginalist 
framework: ‘labour will be exerted both in intensity and duration until a further 
increment will be more painful than the increment of produce obtained is 
pleasurable’ (Jevons [1911]2001, Appendix III, pp. 307).
2 While brief, the 
proposition advanced by Jevons is consistent with the more extensive ‘theory of 
labour’ model contained in the TPE.  
Jevons extends his analysis of the labour market in the published 1866 
JSSL  Notice account by further discussing the nature of labour inputs. He 
suggests: 
‘as obviously true, that the abilities of men are infinitely varied, 
whether by nature or by education, so that both the same person 
may vary in his power of producing different objects and any two 
persons may vary in respect of the same object. This, indeed, is in 
direct opposition to the erroneous simplification of the science 
effected by Ricardo, when he assumed that all labourers have a 
certain uniform power; the higher classes of mechanics and other 
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skilled or learned producers being treated as mere exceptions to 
the rule’ (Jevons [1911]2001, Appendix III, pp. 307-308). 
Jevons’s assertion of the inherent heterogeneity of labour represents his first 
direct public break with classical theory. He rejects the ‘Ricardian’ assumption 
of labour homogeneity (never made quite so boldly by Ricardo himself) and 
asserts the primacy of differential labour quality. 
There is little by way of comment on the question of wages in the 1866 
JSSL  Notice.  Jevons writes that wages are the ‘produce of labour after 
deduction of rent, interest, profit, insurance and taxation, which are so many 
payments which the labourer makes for the advantages enjoyed’ (Jevons 
[1911]2001, Appendix III, pp. 314). In the Philosophical Magazine version of 
the Notice (Grattan-Guinness 2002), an additional sentence is included: ‘Thus 
the rate of wages is the last, or it is the most important element to be 
determined, and the difficulty of the problem has been much underestimated 
owing to the erroneous simplification of Ricardo before referred to’ Grattan-
Guinness (2002, p. 720). These statements are obviously too brief to provide a 
definitive conclusion concerning the state of development of Jevons’s theory of 
wages. However, there are clear allusions in the reference to both a residualist 
approach to wages determination and to a theory of wages that takes account of 
the heterogeneity of worker inputs (and therefore differential wage rates) in 
direct opposition to a Ricardian homogenous labour assumption (and a uniform 
wage rate). 
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Trade Unions, Wages and the Operation of the Labour Market 
To develop further our understanding of Jevons’s theory of wages in the 1860s, 
it is important to read the brief account of the theory of wages in the Notice 
against statements on the labour market included in a number of public lectures 
Jevons delivered in the mid- to late 1860s. The first of these was The 
Importance of Diffusing a Knowledge of Political Economy, presented to 
evening classes at Owens College, Manchester in 1866 as part of the 
requirements of his Cobden Lectureship position (Black 1981). The lecture was 
remarkable for its strident attack on trade unions and strike activity. Not 
surprisingly, it elicited a strong negative response from representatives of the 
labour movement in Manchester. 
The aim of Jevons’s lecture was, as the title suggests, to highlight the 
importance of diffusing a knowledge of political economy throughout society, 
but particularly among working people and trade unions. He suggests that it is 
in regard to trade union action we find ‘the best example …of the evils and 
disasters which may accompany progress’ (Black 1981, p. 41). He goes on to 
assert ‘our working classes, with their growing numbers and powers of 
combination, may be led by ignorance to arrest the true growth of our liberty, 
political and commercial’ (Black 1981, p. 43). 
The argument presented by Jevons is that trade unions need to acquire a 
knowledge of political economy so that they may ‘restrain their power within 
natural laws—that they may, in short, know themselves’ (Black 1981, p. 49). 
Common sense alone cannot be the basis for decision-making. What appears to 
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be common sense to workers in terms of labour market outcomes—that 
employers limit wages when dealing with individual workers but that a 
combination of workers yields better results—turns out to be ‘immensely and 
widely hurtful in the end’ (Black 1981, pp. 42-43). Jevons suggests that 
common sense is often proved wrong by a ‘more penetrating course of 
reasoning to involve error and injury’ (Black 1981, p. 46). He cites the example 
of the view that it was once common sense to believe that the earth was flat and 
the sun moved around it. There is a need to overcome similar prejudices ‘which 
lie in the way of the social science, and thus bring on the time when the natural 
laws which govern the relations of capital and labour, and define inexorably the 
rates of profits and wages, will be obeyed’ (Black 1981, p. 46). 
Jevons does not give a full account of what constitutes these ‘natural 
laws’ of wages instead providing a series of loose points suggestive of a general 
position that the natural law of the market is that wages are governed by the 
forces of demand and supply and that disturbing market mechanisms creates 
harm. A crucial source of progress and wage growth is the introduction of new 
machinery. Resistance to technical change by trade unions and workers leads to 
harm. He refers, in this context, to a letter from an iron manufacturer—none 
other, one suspects, than his uncle Timothy Jevons—about the reluctance of 
workers in the depressed iron trade to accept a pay cut. The inevitable 
consequence of workers resisting the natural law of wages, in such 
circumstances, is that of capital flight from Britain (to the colonies, the United 
States and other foreign countries). 
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Jevons says that he is taking a dispassionate ‘neutral’ and scientific 
position on the role of trade unions in his lecture (Black 1981, p. 41). In other 
words, his statements on wages are the natural outcome of a scientific analysis 
of the labour market. However, strands of conservative political opinion are 
never far from the surface as when Jevons cites the example of the Australian 
colonies where the franchise had been extended further than it had been in 
Britain. The result of the extension of the franchise was the ‘overturn of free 
trade and the establishment of protective tariffs’ (Black 1981, p. 43). Jevons 
suggests that ‘To avoid such a disaster as the reversal of the free policy of the 
country we must diffuse knowledge, and the kind of knowledge required is 
mainly that comprehended in the science of political economy’ (Black 1981, p. 
43). 
Jevons goes on to argue that it is not ‘the existence of combinations the 
political economist protests against’ (Black 1981, p. 48). Rather, it is the range 
of issues that unions concern themselves with that is the crux of the problem. 
Unions can concern themselves with issues such as the length of the working 
day, safety, allowances and holidays. However, Jevons draws the line at wages: 
attempts by unions to raise wages interferes with the natural law on wages and 
so brings the welfare of their members into peril (Black 1981, p. 49). 
Not surprisingly, Jevons’s Cobden lectures drew an angry response from 
representatives of the labour movement. ‘A Cobdenite’ responded to Jevons’s 
lecture in a letter to the editor of the Manchester Examiner and Times in the 
following terms: ‘the address of Professor Jevons was calculated to aggravate 
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that distrust of economical science amongst working men which it was the main 
object of this lectureship to remove’ (Black, 1977a, p. 130). In reaction to this 
letter, Jevons denied that ‘I advocated the employers’ interests, or took a 
partisan view of the question of strikes. I advocated what I believe to be the 
workman’s true interest as well as that of the whole country—that strikes should 
cease.’ Jevons suggests that the newspaper report missed out a section, which 
provided a balance to his views namely the role of ‘co-operation and the saving 
of capital’ (Black 1977a, p. 132). Every workman, Jevons suggests, should 
become more or less a capitalist through industrial partnership and co-operation 
arrangements. 
A second Manchester Examiner and Times critic was W. McDonald, 
President of Trades Union Political Association.
3 Jevons’s letter in response to 
McDonald provides further insights into what Jevons had in mind when he 
referred to the ‘natural law’ of wages. He suggests: 
‘the rate of wages, and the demand and supply of labour, are 
things which cannot be regulated at the will of anyone. They 
depend upon the natural advantages of the country or the locality, 
the abundance of capital attracted to trade, the course of foreign 
commerce, the state of the money market, and many other causes. 
Trade unions cannot alter or govern these things, they cannot, 
therefore, raise wages at all in the long run…. The movement and 
investment of capital is perfectly free. It is only by attracting new 
capital to a trade that wages can be permanently and truly be 
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raised in it. And yet workmen will not trust in their own case to 
the operation of free trade and free industry’. 
From these early addresses and public statements an outline of Jevons’s theory 
of wages of the mid-1860s can be given. First, Jevons puts the supply and 
demand model and outcomes from it at the centre of both a theory of wages and 
of an understanding of appropriate policy responses to wage outcomes. Second, 
labour is heterogenous. Differential wage outcomes between individual workers 
are, therefore, to be expected. A Ricardian uniform, subsistence wage model is 
rejected. Third, the development of labour skills and the introduction of new 
machinery represent crucial sources of economic and wage growth. Jevons’s 
optimism on this point stands in direct contrast with negative sentiments on 
wage outcomes associated with the Malthusian population mechanism.
4 Fourth, 
Jevons emphasises the importance of free trade to improved wage outcomes. 
Fifth, he argues for the impossibility of trade unions improving wages in the 
long run by obtaining a larger share of income. Long-run real wage growth 
arises from the combination of growth in the physical and human capital stock 
and mobility in labour in response to market signals. 
In response to the Cobden lecture criticisms, levelled against him by 
trade union members, Jevons gave the paper Trades Societies: Their Objects 
and Policy to the Trades Unionists’ Political Association in Manchester on 31 
March 1868 (Jevons [1883]2001).
5 Unfortunately, for the members assembled, 
a softening of his more strident language was not accompanied by a change of 
heart in respect to the role of trade unions and the operation of the labour 
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market. The themes advanced in this lecture are very much consistent with 
those of his previous public statements and addresses. 
Jevons refers to three functions performed by unions: (1) to act as a 
Benefit or Friendly Society; (2) to shorten the hours of labour, to render 
factories more wholesome and safe, and generally to improve the condition of 
the workman; and, (3) to regulate wages. It was in regard to this latter function 
that Jevons suggests he was likely to part company with his trade union 
audience. Jevons asserts that ‘the attempt to regulate wages is injurious to the 
workmen immediately concerned in the majority of cases, and that in all cases it 
is thoroughly injurious to the welfare of the community’ (Jevons [1883]2001, p. 
110). Beyond this fundamental argument, Jevons extends his treatment of trade 
union action by advancing four key propositions: 
1.  The supposed struggle between unions and capitalists for the 
purposes of raising wages is not a struggle of labour against capital 
but of labour against labour (i.e., sections of labour against other 
sections of labour). 
2.  The struggle between unions and capitalists is one in which only a 
few peculiarly situated trades can succeed in benefiting themselves. 
3.  Unions, which succeed in maintaining wages, only succeed by 
PROTECTION  (Jevons’s capitalisation)—that is by levying 
contributions from other classes and from the population generally. 
4.  Unionism tends to aggravate the differences between the various 
classes of labour. Some sections raise themselves relative to other 
sections. 
       (Jevons  [1883]2001,  p.  111) 
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One new, more technical, argument advanced by Jevons with respect to the 
impact of union action utilises the distinction between nominal and real wages. 
Jevons argues that when unions raise nominal wages, prices rise leaving the real 
wages of relevant union members untouched. But, higher prices harm the 
population generally including other sections of labour. It is the poor who can 
least bear the burden imposed. In cases where produced goods represent inputs 
into the production of other goods, trade unions act to raise the cost of 
production in the resource-using industry. Unionism, therefore, acts like 
protection; a successful union effectively ‘levies a little protective revenue for 
itself’. 
Jevons moves beyond theoretical arguments by suggesting that the 
existing statistical evidence supports the conjecture that advances in real wages 
for workers have occurred in various trades despite the absence of strong union 
power. The growth in real wages, Jevons asserts, is the result of the natural 
prosperity of the trade ‘and it is liberty of trade and industry—not restriction—
which favours industrial prosperity’ (Jevons [1883]2001, p. 117). Jevons also 
returns to the importance of productivity improvements, generated from the 
introduction of new machinery, to real wage growth: ‘It is by the use of 
machinery that the power and usefulness and prosperity of artisans of this 
kingdom are created. Opposition to its introduction is purely suicidal’ (Jevons 
[1883]2001, p. 117). Jevons remains optimistic about future real wage growth 
outcomes based on the adoption of new machinery by labour.
6 Finally, Jevons 
argues, once again, and not for the last time, that he wishes to see ‘workmen 
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becoming by degree their own capitalists—sharers in all the profits and all the 
advantages which capital confers’ (Jevons [1883]2001, p. 119).
7 
Jevons followed up his lecture to the Trades Unionists’ Political 
Association in Manchester with Two Lectures on Political Economy delivered at 
the Mechanics’ Institute in Hyde, Cheshire in February and March 1869 (Jevons 
[1883]2001). The record of the lecture comes from a local newspaper. The 
lectures focus on some familiar Smithian themes. 
Jevons begins with a discussion of the benefits derived from the division 
of labour in producing higher than otherwise output and real wage outcomes. 
Three of the division of labour effects cited are attributed directly to Smith: (1) 
skill gained from repetition and practice (2) the saving of time in changing 
tools; and (3) invention of machines. Jevons adds: (4) the power of doing a 
great many things at the same time (5) repeating operations in a machine like 
manner (6) personal adaptation—people self-select into particular jobs and (7) 
territorial adaptation. Jevons continues with a Smithian theme when further 
examining the determinants of individual differences in wage outcomes. The 
determinants cited by Jevons include: (1) agreeableness or disagreeableness of 
labour; (2) easiness or cheapness with which a trade could be learnt (3) the 
constancy or inconstancy of employment in a trade (4) the degree of 
trustworthiness in a man (5) probability or improbability of success in a trade. 
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The Theory of Political Economy (TPE) 
TPE: first edition 
The first edition of The Theory of Political Economy (TPE) was published in 
1871. By this stage, as we have seen, Jevons’s views on the workings of the 
labour market, the role of trade unions and of the determinants of wage 
outcomes were well developed. However, his new subjectivist-marginalist 
theory of utility, exchange and value had yet to be presented in an extended 
form. It is not surprising, therefore, that the TPE,  focussed as it was on 
theoretical issues and targeted to a specialist audience, would be devoted to an 
exposition of Jevons’s subjectivist-marginalist framework. 
Returning to themes outlined in the Notice, Jevons provides, in the TPE, 
a negative critique of the classical wages fund doctrine and Ricardian wage 
theory.
8 He develops in some considerable detail his marginalist labour supply 
model. The TPE does not, however, include a separate chapter devoted to wages 
as it does in terms of rent and interest, but the concluding chapter contains 
remarks on wages. The comments on wages are brief and undeveloped. There 
are, however, important statements on wages theory in the chapters on rent and 
interest and we shall highlight these connections below. 
In the preface to the first edition, there is a reference to ‘portions of 
Economical doctrine which appear to me as scientific in form as they are 
consonant with the facts. I would especially mention the Theories of Population 
and Rent, the latter a theory of a distinctly mathematical character which seems 
to give a clue to the correct mode of treating the whole science.’ (Jevons 
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[1871](2001), p. vi).
9 Jevons further suggests that if Mill had restricted himself 
to the laws of demand and supply then there would be no quibble: ‘As founded 
upon facts, these laws cannot be shaken by any theory’ (Jevons [1871](2001), 
pp. vi-vii). This remark is certainly consistent with the tenor of Jevons’s 
statements on wages reviewed in the previous section. But, it was in respect to 
other classical doctrines that Jevons took exception. These doctrines he 
regarded as ‘purely delusive, especially the Wage Fund Theory’ (Jevons 
[1871](2001), p. vii). For Jevons, the wages fund theory represented nothing 
more than a truism. 
Jevons’s chapter on the theory of labour is concerned with an 
application of the calculus of pleasure and pain to labour supply decisions. 
Jevons’s presents his model in a simple diagram, which is reproduced below in 
Figure 1 (see Jevons [1871]2001, p. 168). The vertical axis represents marginal 
utility (positive and negative). Produce from a given day’s labour is represented 
on the x-axis. Produce and wages are equated so that all of produce goes to 
labour in terms of wages. However, this must be a simplifying assumption for 
where is interest, rent and other components of the produce? However, as a 
simplifying assumption it does at least imply the simple conclusion that if 
labour produces more, then it receives more in terms of wages. These are, of 
course, assumptions of the model, but if taken at face value we can see that 
Jevons’s assumptions are in line with the view that labour gets what it produces. 
Without any further analysis of the relationship between produce and wages, 
however, we cannot get any further in terms of a marginal productivity theory 
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of wage determination from this presentation. Nor, of course, would we expect 
this as the chapter on labour is not about the determination of wages but the 
determination of labour supply given the range of potential wages (or potential 
produce). 
The curve p-q in Figure 1 represents a marginal utility (to use a modern 
term) curve giving the extra utility gained from the last unit of produce. The 
second component of the model is the painfulness of work function or the 
marginal disutility experienced by labour from the production of goods (the 
curve a-d). Jevons assumes that the marginal painfulness of work falls to begin 
with. However, a point is reached at which the marginal painfulness of work 
begins to rise. Equilibrium labour supply is given as that number of hours which 
produces m goods. At this point, the marginal utility from goods just equals the 
marginal disutility from the labour that produces the goods. 
One important application of Jevons’s labour supply model is the 
allocation of an individual worker’s time between alternative uses. Jevons 
argues that labour will be distributed between competing opportunities 
according to the principle that the ‘increment of utility from any of the 
employments just balances the increment of pain’ (see Jevons [1871]2001, p. 
180). 
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Figure 1 Jevons’s Labour Supply Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x
p
q
d
c b
0
a
m
y
Marginal utility from commodities
Marginal disutility from labour
Jevons’s labour supply model is followed by a short chapter on rent. One crucial 
reason for this ordering of material is that Jevons sets his theory of rent against 
the backdrop of individual labourers making decisions as to which plots of land 
they shall work. Jevons does not provide an explicit role for capital in his theory 
of rent (on the basis that he will discuss capital at a later point). With capital 
absent, the production function adopted by Jevons in his theory of rent is a 
simple one factor (labour) production function. 
Consistent with the theory of labour supply, labour is distributed 
between competing plots of land so that the marginal products of labour 
(dx1/dl1=dx2/dl2=dx3/dl3) are equalised. Jevons assumes the general law of 
diminishing marginal productivity to apply. The crucial assumption that Jevons 
makes is that the last increment of labour applied to land is paid according to its 
marginal product of labour (defined using the differential calculus) and that all 
labour applied to land is so recompensed. The share of output paid to labour is, 
therefore,  l.dx/dl. With labour recompensed at l.dx/dl rent is given as the 
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residual from product (there being no capital): x – l.dx/dl. Without notice or 
fanfare Jevons presents an explicit mathematical marginal productivity 
determination of wages embedded within his theory of rent. The same general 
type of marginalist, mathematical thinking is applied in the case of capital in the 
following chapter. 
Jevons’s discussion of wages is contained in the concluding chapter of 
the first edition of TPE. And here we see him attack two classical postulates. 
The first is that there exists an inverse relationship between wages and profits. 
In other words, as wages rise, profits must fall, and vice versa. This proposition, 
of course, assumes a fixed level of output, which Jevons rejects. The second is 
Ricardo’s theory of the ‘natural rate of wages’: the notion that the wage rate is 
set at the level which ‘is just sufficient to support the labourer’ (Jevons 
[1871]2001, p. 258). 
Jevons attacks Ricardo on two grounds. First, he asserts that the 
statistical evidence supports the proposition that there exists both a great 
variation in labour quality and skills and a concomitant variation in wage rates. 
Second, in regard to the Ricardian assumption of a long-run fixed wage set at 
the subsistence level, Jevons argues that it is impossible to define what we mean 
by the ‘necessaries of life’ (Jevons [1871]2001, p. 258). Furthermore: ‘It is 
quite impossible that we should accept for ever Ricardo’s sweeping 
simplification of the subject involved in the assumption, that there is a natural 
ordinary rate of wages for common labour, and that all the higher rates are 
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merely exceptional instances, to be explained away on other grounds’ (Jevons 
[1871]2001, p. 259). 
Beyond his critical comments on classical wage doctrines, Jevons says 
remarkably little in terms of wages in the concluding chapter of TPE. What he 
does say is consistent with a marginal productivity theory of wages, but 
nowhere does he develop the mathematical propositions on wages advanced in 
the context of his theory of rent. What he does assert is that: ‘Wages of a 
working man are ultimately coincident with what he produces, after the 
deduction of rent, taxes, and the interest of capital’ (Jevons [1871]2001, p. 259). 
This assertion can of course be taken in one of three ways. First, that wages 
reflect productivity. Second, wages are the residual when all else is determined. 
Third, that while wages are a residual, the allocation of wages to particular 
employees is based on the grounds of differences in productivity. 
His analytical treatment in the last chapter is very brief focussed around 
the following equation: Produce = profit and wages. Importantly, produce is 
assumed to be essentially variable; hence, no inverse relationship exists between 
the level of wages and level of profit. Jevons suggests that profits consist of 
wages of superintendence, insurance against risk, and interest. The first is taken 
to be wages of another kind. Insurance against risk is assumed equalised across 
all employments. Interest is said to be determined according to his previously 
developed theory of interest. Jevons’s presentation is one of separate theories of 
distribution rather than one consistent general theory of distribution as presented 
in Wicksteed’s Essay. 
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Jevons goes on to provide additional context to his views on wages in 
terms of the interactions of labour and capital over the payment of wages. 
Paradoxically, his discussion leads him close to the wages fund doctrine. 
Capitalists form expectations of future produce, which stimulate them to invest 
in capital and labour. They are assumed to develop a fund and ‘sustain labour 
before the result is accomplished’ (Jevons [1871]2001, p. 261). The size of the 
capital fund is a function of the level of anticipated profits. Competition to 
obtain workers ensures that workers tend to secure ‘their legitimate share in the 
ultimate produce’ (Jevons [1871]2001, p. 261). As for the implications of his 
model for the wages fund doctrine, Jevons says ‘The wage-fund theory acts in a 
wholly temporary manner. Every labourer ultimately receives the due value of 
his produce after paying a proper fraction to the capitalist. At the same time 
workers of different degrees of skill, receive very different shares according as 
they contribute a common or a scarce kind of labour to the result’ (Jevons 
[1871]2001, pp. 262-263). According to Jevons’s law of indifference, labour 
gets the minimum rate that applies to labour in that area. If there is excess 
produce, higher profits obtain. However, competition implies new entrants in 
the market bidding up the wage rate. 
TPE: second edition 
The second edition of the TPE published in 1879 (Jevons [1879]2001) contains 
an extended preface, which includes a more concerted attack on certain classical 
doctrines than that contained in the first edition. However, Jevons made few 
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substantial changes to the text other than to include sections on the magnitudes 
of economic quantities. 
In the preface, Jevons makes an interesting remark about his original 
discussion of wages suggesting that: 
‘the doctrine of wages, which I adopted in 1871, under the 
impression that it was somewhat novel, is not really novel at all, 
except to those whose view is bounded by the maze of Ricardian 
Economics. The true doctrine may be more or less clearly traced 
through the writings of a succession of great French 
economists… [Jevons also refers to recent English writers 
(Shadwell, Hearn, and Leslie) at a later point].The conclusion to 
which I am ever more clearly coming is that the only hope of 
attaining a true system of Economics is to fling aside, once and 
for ever, the mazy and preposterous assumptions of the Ricardian 
School. Our English Economists have been living in a fool’s 
paradise’ (Jevons [1879] 2001, pp. xlviii-xlix). 
The three elements of classical wage theory Jevons suggests we need to cast off 
from are: the ‘Wage-Fund Theory, The Cost of Production doctrine of Value; 
The Natural Rate of Wages, and other misleading or false Ricardian doctrines’ 
(Jevons [1879]2001, p. l). 
What does the correct theory of wages then consist of? References to the 
role of supply and demand model are made, but Jevons also moves, for the first 
time, towards a statement of a general  or universal  theory of distribution. 
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Jevons suggests that ‘We must regard labour, land, knowledge, and capital as 
conjoint conditions of the whole produce, not as causes each of a certain portion 
of the produce’ (Jevons [1879]2001, pp. l). Jevons undertakes the thought 
experiment that if we were in an ‘elementary position’, labourers would own all 
requisites of production; there would be no such thing as wages, rent, or 
interest. It is only with different owners of factors of production that 
distributional issues arise and then ‘it is entirely subject to the principles of 
value and the laws of supply and demand.’ The law of indifference applies 
precisely—‘in the same open market, at any moment, there cannot be two prices 
for the same kind of article’ (Jevons [1879]2001, pp. li). Further: ‘So no owner, 
whether of labour, land, or capital, can theoretically speaking, obtain a larger 
share of produce for it than what other owners of exactly the same kind of 
property are willing to accept’ (Jevons [1879]2001, pp. li). 
Jevons suggests that there is not much new in his analysis of the 
distribution of income and wages. However, the implications of this new 
reading of distribution theory are startling: ‘We are forced, for instance, to 
admit that rates of wages are governed by the same formal laws as rents’ 
(Jevons [1879]2001, pp. lii). This statement provides a point of departure for 
existing theory. An equally startling result suggested by Jevons is that insofar as 
cost of production affects the value of commodities, wages enter into 
calculations in the same way as rents. However, Ricardian theory does not 
admit rent as cost of production (rent is seen as the effect and not the cause). 
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While wages are treated as the cause in truth ‘wages are the effect and not the 
cause of value’; likewise, interest on free capital and rent on fixed capital. 
The Lectures, Political Economy and other Mature Works 
Lying between the first edition of TPE and the second are Jevons’s Lectures at 
Owens College during the academic year 1875-76, which remained unpublished 
until 1977 when they were reproduced in Black’s volume 6 of his Papers and 
Correspondence  William Stanley Jevons. The Lectures present a student’s 
(Harold Rylett) record of Jevons’s lectures during the academic year in 
question. 
The Lectures provide a far more complete coverage of economic topics 
than those which were addressed in the TPE. This is, in many respects, not 
surprising. TPE was a focussed piece of theory concerned with three things: (1) 
critiquing the errors of the classical school; (2) establishing the methodological 
foundations of Jevons’s marginalist-subjectivist theory; and, (3) applying that 
theory in a number of domains. Other elements of his economic thinking, not 
directly linked to the new marginalist framework, were put to one side in the 
TPE, but were taught and later included in a relatively simple form in the 
Primer of Political Economy and the unfinished Principles. Indeed, in only five 
lectures does a strong overlap with TPE exist: Theory of Utility; Production 
(III); Value (XIV), How Value May be Shown to be Founded on Utility (XV); 
Supply, Cost and Disutility (XVI) and, (but to a lesser extent) The Doctrine of 
Distribution (XI). 
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In terms of labour market and wages issues there is, however, little new 
to be found in the Lectures. Jevons devotes two whole lectures to Smithian 
division of labour benefits. He also gives a further account of Malthus’s theory 
of population, which ends with the remark that Malthus was altogether ‘too 
gloomy’ (Black 1977d, p. 60). On wages, the Lectures record Jevons making 
another strong attack on the wages fund doctrine and reaffirming his opposition 
to Ricardo, both in regard to his view that labour is homogenous and for 
suggesting that wages are set at some subsistence level.  
Jevons also returns to Adam Smith on wages to explain differences in 
wage outcomes between individual workers. The material on trade unions is 
also very familiar. Jevons suggests that the labour vs. capital struggle does not 
exist in reality, it is more a matter of labour versus labour; when trade unions 
attempt to raise wages they push up prices reducing real wages and living 
standards; and trade unions should not attempt to regulate wages, but they can, 
and should, push for appropriate hours and modes of working. His conclusion: 
‘free trade and free competition both of employers and workmen is the true 
thing and that both strikes and lock outs and all those violent measures are 
entirely wrong’ (Black 1977d, p. 79). 
The science primer Political Economy (Jevons [1878]2001) was written 
for a non-specialist audience and follows the format of the Lectures, but omits 
the more technical material contained in the Lectures. The chapters on wages, 
trade unions and co-operation provide excellent summaries of Jevons’s previous 
work. Jevons states that the source of real wage increases lies in productivity 
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improvements and that wages are determined by the same demand and supply 
laws which govern the goods market. He ends the discussion on wages with an 
attack on the ‘fair wage’ principle (‘a man should have a fair day’s wages for a 
fair day’s work’) as a fallacious saying suggesting that wages are what they are 
and what they should be as a result of the operation of the labour market and the 
laws of demand and supply.  
Two final works are worth briefly mentioning. The first is Jevons’s 
notes for the unfinished Principles of Economics which contains an interesting 
fragment (published in 1911 in the fourth edition of the TPE) on investment in 
human capital and the role of education (echoing Jevons’s 1858 letter to 
Henrietta Jevons cited earlier). The second represents Jevons’s last published 
work on wages, trade unions and the role of regulation, namely, The State in 
Relation to Labour (1882). 
In The State in Relation to Labour Jevons suggests that it is impossible 
to say what part of the product is due to any particular contribution—there 
exists no ‘natural, necessary, or legal principle of dividing the proceeds can be 
assigned’ (Jevons [1910]2001, p. 94). Rent, profit, interest and wages must, 
however, be paid out from the money value of the produce. On what principle 
must these elements be assigned? In practice the whole question comes down to 
a matter of the laws of supply and demand. A process of bargaining starts from 
some initial position, but the market determines final outcomes. Any of the 
owners of the factors cannot obtain remuneration that exceeds the market. Why? 
Because, the law of indifference applies: ‘It all comes to this, that the price 
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which the owner of any kind of property, whether land, labour, or capital, can 
demand is limited by the price at which further supplies of the same kind can be 
found’ (Jevons [1910]2001, p. 95). 
Jevons goes on to suggest that demand for labour depends on the 
expected value of the produce. The amount which the capitalist will advance to 
workers is the value of the product he expects to receive taking into account 
what would be sufficient to pay for equally good labour by other men. Further, 
wages depend ultimately on the skills that workers bring to the firm, their 
contribution to production, the extent to which competition exists in the market 
between workers with like skills and how much what is produced is valued in 
exchange. 
Conclusion 
This note has advanced three propositions concerning Jevons’s theory of wages 
(none of which are particularly novel). First, Jevons railed against key classical 
wage doctrines of the ‘natural’ rate of wages in the TPE (particularly Ricardian 
subsistence wage theory) and wage fund theory (Mill). This critique of classical 
wage doctrine was presented in the first edition of The Theory of Political 
Economy ( TPE) (Jevons [1871]2001), but became more strident in the 
significantly revised preface to the second edition of TPE (Jevons [1879]2001). 
Second, while Jevons did not develop an all-embracing marginal 
productivity theory of distribution of the type that Wicksteed advanced a 
generation later in the Essay he can clearly be seen moving to a position that 
universal laws of distribution exist (i.e., the same general law is applicable to all 
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factors of production). Moreover, these laws are based on a marginal 
productivity foundation. Jevons presents such a position with some force in the 
significantly revised preface to the second edition of the TPE. However, 
nowhere does Jevons present a mathematical, co-ordinated, marginal 
productivity theory of distribution of the type set out in the Essay. 
Third, the TPE presents a fully developed marginalist-subjectivist theory 
of labour supply. It also includes a brief mathematical marginal productivity 
theory of wages, but Jevons’s discussion is embedded within his theory of rent. 
However, in TPE as elsewhere, Jevons’s analysis of wages is built around a 
demand and supply model of wages, which includes an important role for 
differential wage outcomes based on productivity differences, the application of 
the law of indifference and a linking of wage outcomes to product market 
outcomes. There are resonances of a wages fund approach (of sorts) and a 
residualist approach to wages. 
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Notes 
 
1 Henry Higgs’s preface to Jevons’s The Principles of Economics, a Fragment of a 
Treatise on the Industrial Mechanism of Society and Other Papers (see Jevons 
[1905]2001), refers to marginal notes made by Jevons to the text which indicate that 
Jevons began his study of the ‘industrial mechanism of society’ much earlier at the age 
of 16 in 1851. See Black and Könekamp (1972, pp. 1-52) and Mosselmans (2004) for a 
discussion on Jevons’s early life. 
2 See White (1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 2004, 2005a and 2005b) for a discussion of the 
antecedents of Jevons’s approach to the calculus of pleasure and pain as related to the 
case of labour and his approach to rent theory and the distribution of income more 
generally. The work of Jennings, Natural Elements of Political Economy was 
particularly important in Jevons’s development. 
3 Jevons subsequently gave a lecture to this group entitled Trades Societies, their 
Objects and Policy (see below for a discussion). 
4 The issue of population growth is addressed further in Jevons’s The Coal Question 
published in 1865 (see Jevons [1865]1906). Jevons suggests that, for the present, 
Britain’s cheap supply of coal, its labour skill advantages and free trade render it 
independent of the limited agricultural area of Britain and ‘apparently take us out of the 
scope of Malthus’ doctrine’ (Jevons [1865]1906, p. 200). He adds the warning that in 
regard to coal, there are serious limits facing the country and ‘so far, then, as our 
wealth and progress depend upon the superior command of coal we must not only 
cease to progress as before—we must begin a retrograde career’ (Jevons [1865]1906, p. 
201). 129 
                                                                                                                                  
5 Jevons’s journal entry for 1 November 1866 suggests that his public position on trade 
unions masked some personal uncertainty, especially in relation to political 
dimensions: ‘My introductory lecture to the course of Cobden lectures, has brought 
some little criticism from the Radicals upon me. I am often troubled and now more 
than ever to know how to reconcile my inclinations in political matters. What side am I 
to take one—the other—or can I take both? I cannot consent with the radical party to 
obliterate a glorious past—nor can I consent with the conservatives to prolong abuses 
into the present. I wish with all my heart to aid in securing all that is good for the 
masses yet to give them all they wish & are striving for is to endanger much that is 
good beyond their comprehension. I cannot pretend to underestimate the good that the 
English monarchy & aristocracy with all the liberal policy actuating it, does for the 
human race, and yet I cannot but fear the pretensions of democracy against it are strong 
& in some respects even properly strong’ (Black and Könekamp 1972, pp. 207-208). In 
a later lecture on industrial partnerships delivered in 1870 to the National Association 
for the Promotion of Social Science, Jevons remained concerned that his views on trade 
union action were affecting people’s perceptions of his regard for working people. He 
says: ‘For my own part I do think that the principle of unionism, so far as relates to the 
regulation of wages, is fundamentally and entirely wrong, but I see no reason why I 
should therefore be supposed to have less sympathy with working-men’ (Jevons 
[1883]2001, p. 148). 
6 Jevons’s optimism at this point stands in sharp contrast with his pessimism in relation 
to the coal question (see Mosselmans 1999, Mosselmans 2000, Peart 1990, Peart 1994, 
and White 1994b). 
 130 
                                                                                                                                  
7 Jevons had previously put forward a specific plan for industrial partnerships in a letter 
to The Times published on 19 January 1867. It involved capitalists advancing ‘ordinary 
wages’ to workers as are sufficient to meet current expenditure. Employers receive 
current interest on capital, which is kept intact by a sinking fund. Management is 
rewarded at a set rate of 5 per cent. Remaining profits in excess of 10 per cent are 
divided fairly between workers and capitalists. In his lecture On Industrial 
Partnerships delivered in April 1870 under the banner of the National Association for 
the Promotion of the Social Sciences (Jevons, [1883]2001), Jevons presented a detailed 
account of industrial partnerships and their potential role for improving outcomes for 
workers. Jevons suggested that industrial partnerships are founded on the ‘surest 
principle of human nature—self-interest’ (Jevons [1883]2001, p. 139). Partnerships 
‘are an innovation of which the utility is evident and the necessity urgent’ (Jevons, 
[1883]2001, p. 148). 
8 Mill (1869) provided a detailed earlier criticism of the wages fund doctrine. 
9 Jevons notes with approval Malthus’s population theory at this point, but he had 
previously, in The Coal Question, suggested that the doctrine did not apply 
unconditionally (see note 4 above). 
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3.  Fair Wages and Just Outcomes: Marshall and Pigou on 
the Labour Market and Redistribution
∗ 
 
History of Economics Review, Winter-Summer 1997; Number 26, pp. 109-124. 
(with revisions) 
3.1  Introduction 
Pigou’s first major work in the field of labour, Principles and Methods of 
Industrial Peace, was published in 1905.
1 In its preface, Pigou records his debt 
to Marshall. It was Marshall who had suggested the topic of Industrial Peace as 
one suitable for investigation and provided detailed criticism, encouragement 
and general guidance. Throughout Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, 
key arguments are developed against a Marshallian backdrop.
2 In particular, 
Pigou advances the view that the appropriate benchmark for arbitrated awards is 
the normal wage—that set by the free workings of supply and demand—and 
any artificial raising of wages adversely affects workpeople taken as a whole. 
For his part, Marshall took it on himself to introduce the manuscript of 
Principles of Methods of Industrial Peace to MacMillan (Whitaker 1996, letter 
810) and references the work in the later editions of Elements of Economics of 
Industry. He had earlier (1900-1901) been instrumental in securing a lectureship 
for Pigou (Groenewegen 1995a, Whitaker 1996, letters 605, 645, 648, 649) and 
was unequivocal in his praise for Pigou: ‘Pigou will be one of the leading 
economists of the world in his generation’ (Marshall to the Provost, King’s 
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College, Cambridge in 1901 concerning Pigou’s Fellowship dissertation, 
Whitaker 1996, letter 668). 
We know very little about Marshall’s views of Pigou’s work in later 
periods.
3 But the existence of a certain tension between the Pigovian framework 
and that of Marshall is a theme repeated in a number of commentaries of 
Pigou’s work. Frank Knight’s 1926 review of the second edition of Pigou’s The 
Economics of Welfare provides an early guide to thinking. For Knight, The 
Economics of Welfare ‘continues and develops the “Cambridge Economics” 
which continues and develops English Political Economy’ (Knight 1926, p. 51). 
He goes on to add, however, that while the ‘doctrine is essentially that of Dr. 
Alfred Marshall; Pigou’s exposition is less deliberate and more readable than 
that of his teacher, but lacks a certain touch of realism, the evidence of vast 
knowledge of detail acquired through first-hand observation’ (Knight 1926, p. 
51). And in later reminiscences, Joan Robinson referred to what she saw as 
Pigou’s role in reducing Marshall’s framework to a neat, consistent but 
essentially flawed static system (Robinson, 1966, p. viii, 1978, p. ix).
4 
This paper explores further the relationship between Marshall and Pigou 
by considering their respective approaches to the determination of wages and 
their views as to the appropriate characterisation of wage outcomes. In 
particular, I focus on the question of whether Pigou’s well-known theory of 
exploitation and his related contribution to the living wage debate represented a 
significant break from the Marshallian framework. 
Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace defined the limits above and 
below the normal wage within which wages could move when they were not 
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fixed by the free workings of supply and demand (the so-called range of 
indeterminateness or settlement locus). However, it provided a largely neutral 
reading as to which party, workpeople or employers, was more likely to be 
significantly disadvantaged in the bargaining process. Pigou’s The Economics of 
Welfare published in 1920 conveys a different image. Here, the emphasis is on 
the ‘exploitation’ of workers by employers and the likelihood of workers being 
exploited—i.e., being paid less than the value of their marginal product — in 
industries where strong trade unions did not prevail; the possibility of 
employers being exploited by workers is relegated to footnote status.
5 
Despite the obvious stronger position advanced in Pigou’s The 
Economics of Welfare, there remains certain ambiguities in Pigou’s presentation 
insofar as the question of a break with Marshall is concerned. On the one hand, 
the broad analytical framework adopted in The Economics of Welfare is clearly 
linked to that of Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace with its attendant 
Marshallian foundations. Moreover, the issue of exploitation is introduced by 
Pigou within the context of a discussion of Marshall’s ‘fair wages’ analysis (see 
Marshall 1887). On the other hand, Pigou’s very use of the pejorative term 
‘exploitation’ appears so much at odds with Marshall’s balanced approach to 
language-use.
6 And despite the significance of the Marshallian foundations in 
Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, specific features of the analytical 
structure developed in this work and later utilised by Pigou in his analysis of 
exploitation in The Economics of Welfare—most notably Pigou’s treatment of 
the range of indeterminateness—must be seen as important original 
contributions to the field.
7 We are left with the question: Does the Pigovian 
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theory of exploitation simply represent a restatement of Marshallian wages 
analysis or does Pigou introduce a new critical dimension to neoclassical 
distribution theory? 
Pigou’s analysis of exploitation covers the case of ‘unfair’ wages. But 
what should be done about low wage outcomes that are considered ‘fair’? For 
Pigou, low wages outcomes, whether fair or not (whether they are in accord 
with the value of the marginal product), are ‘unjust’ (from a broader ethical 
perspective). But, as with Marshall, the policy of setting a ‘living wage’ (a 
mandated national minimum wage based on needs) to meet the problem of low 
wages, harms the very people it is designed to assist. Wealth and Welfare, 
published in 1912, replaces the demand for a living wage—made strongly at the 
time in policy debates—with that of the maintenance of minimum ‘living 
conditions’.
8 To meet this demand, Pigou emphasised the need for major public 
spending programs financed through progressive income taxes and death duties. 
His support for a significant expansion of the state sector raises the second 
major question posed in this paper: To what extent did Pigou deviate from 
Marshall in his support for the maintenance of minimum living conditions and, 
more particularly, the role of the state in achieving those minima. 
The paper is divided into two parts. The first deals with Pigou’s theory 
of exploitation while the second considers his minimum standards policy. 
3.2  Exploitation and Unfair Wages 
Pigou is often credited with establishing the neoclassical theory of exploitation 
in  The Economics of Welfare; Joan Robinson with extending it in The 
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Economics of Imperfect Competition. Hence, the (misleading) label of the 
Pigou-Robinson theory of exploitation.
9 For Pigou, exploitation is defined in 
terms of workers being ‘paid less than the value which their marginal net 
product has to firms which employ them’ (Pigou 1920, p. 506). This definition 
is both precise in form and historically linked. It is precise because whether or 
not a worker is exploited is determined on the basis of a single criterion: Is the 
wage paid above or below the value of the marginal net product? And it is 
historically linked because it utilises a marginalist concept—the value of the 
marginal net product—as its evaluative benchmark. As such, Pigou locates his 
theory within the broad marginalist tradition. More importantly for our 
purposes, Pigou’s analysis of exploitation in The Economics of Welfare is 
prefaced with reference to Marshall’s definition of a fair rate of wages set out in 
Marshall (1887).
10 
The fact that Pigou’s definition is precise and historically linked means 
that it is possible to directly compare, at a structural (or content) level, Marshall 
and Pigou on the phenomenon of exploitation defined in terms of the payment 
of below normal wages. But, can we leave our comparative review at this 
structural level? 
The linguistic dimension 
I would argue that we must go beyond a structural critique and examine the 
linguistic dimension. How authors use language frames their discussion. The 
choices they make in regard to terms used will determine (often precisely so) 
how their analysis will be absorbed and classified. By choosing to use the word 
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‘exploitation’, highly charged with ‘opprobrious’ implications to use 
Robinson’s phrase, (see Robinson 1942) to describe the phenomena of wages 
paid less than the value of the marginal product rather than some more neutral 
term, Pigou leads us to think of deep-seated ethical problems in the structure of 
wage payments. 
While it is certainly true that Pigou’s discussion of wage outcomes is 
transformed by his use of the term exploitation it is another matter altogether to 
go on to conclude that Pigou’s use of language, in and of itself, is indicative of a 
sharp break between Pigou and Marshall. This is because there are limits on the 
extent to which an author’s use of certain terms should be accepted without 
qualification as the basis for contextualising and classifying her or his theory. 
The first qualification is that words have limited lives and undergo 
semantic shifts through those lives. A check on the etymology of key terms is, 
therefore, important when comparing texts over time. This is of some 
importance in the present case, as exploitation is a loanword from French. 
The second difficulty with a face-value acceptance of language use is 
that the choices of terms will strongly depend on the associations that have 
developed around those terms for particular authors. Assume, for arguments 
sake, that Marshall associated the term exploitation with Marx’s analysis of 
exploitation. Marshall might well believe that the exploitation of labour exists 
(in terms of the payment of wages below normal levels) but not accept that 
Marx’s analysis of exploitation is correct and hence not favour the use of the 
term. Finally, irrespective of any links to Marx, ‘exploitation’ is a term, on its 
negative reading, rich with political and emotive appeal and hence may be 
 137 
eschewed by those writers arguing for a ‘scientific’ or ‘neutral’ mode of 
discourse in economics. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED 2nd Edition) notes that the term 
‘exploit’ was adopted into English from Old French. The first example given by 
the OED of the term being used in English, is from 1393 (‘the sail goth up, and 
forth they straught. But none esploit thereof they caught’). However, the first 
example given of its use in a negative sense in the economic domain (‘to utilize 
for one’s own ends, treat selfishly as mere workable material (persons, etc.)’) is 
from as late as 1838: ‘The Humbughausens ... have exploited the obscure (to 
use a French phrase for which we have no equivalent) with ... profit’ (New 
Monthly Mag. LIII. 306, no author cited). The OED cites several examples of 
the use of the word ‘exploitation’ in the sense of “The action of turning to 
account for selfish purposes, using for one’s own profit” from the 1850s to the 
1880s. 
Edwin Cannan’s entry for exploit in Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political 
Economy (first published in 1894) is, however, suggestive of the absence of a 
full assimilation of exploitation (as a loanword) into English even as late as the 
1890s.
11 
The French verb exploiter primarily means simply to use in such 
a way as to make profit out of ......... There are some things 
which it is admittedly improper to use in such a way as to make 
profit out of them; it is disgraceful for instance to exploiter any 
one’s credulity, ignorance, or good nature. Hence the word 
comes to have sometimes a bad sense ......... To exploiter men or 
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labourers thus means to use them in such a way as to make profit 
out of them, it being implied by the use of the word that this .... is 
fundamentally improper .... It is almost exclusively in this bad 
sense that the word “exploit” has been introduced into 
English’.
12 
Against this etymological background, we should not be surprised if we find 
few examples of the use of the term among first generation neoclassical writers 
(includ
ition of Das Kapital; the first English 
edition
ing by Marshall). 
What then of Marshall’s use of the term ‘exploitation’? And what light 
can be shed on why Pigou chose to use the term ‘exploitation’ to define the 
phenomena being analysed as against some other term? In the case of Marshall, 
there is infrequent use of the term. Where it does appear, it is used in the context 
of a discussion of Marx’s analysis of exploitation. Marshall’s first use of the 
term appears to be in the brief background notes on Marx that Marshall utilised 
for his June 1886 Lectures on socialism and the function of government. 
Marshall’s notes relate to the German ed
 not being published until 1887.
13 
Marshall suggests, in his notes, that Marx’s discovery is that the 
‘exploitation’s grad’ (the degree or rate of exploitation) ‘is not as people have 
hither to inquired to be measured’ by S/(C+V) but by S/V.
14 Marshall then adds 
the following comment: ‘As I can’t find out what exploitation means, I am not 
in a position to contradict this’. In saying that he could not find out what 
exploitation means, Marshall is probably referring to the fact that he had been 
searching for but could not find the English equivalent of the word 
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‘exploitation’. No wonder then that when we do see Marshall subsequently use 
the term in published work in regard to labour questions it is in the context of 
Marx’s work. At the same time, however, Marshall had been acquainted with 
Das Kapital from its first edition having purchased the first edition of Marx’s 
Das Ka
on is used but only 
when m
nd it is not true’ 
 the following three conclusions about Marshall’s use of the 
term ex
jected the notion 
explici
pital in Germany in 1867.
15 
In the Principles, for example, the term exploitati
aking reference to Marx’s analysis of exploitation: 
‘They [Thompson, Rodbertus, and Marx] argued that labour 
always produces a “Surplus” above its wages and the wear-and-
tear of capital used in aiding it: and that the wrong done to labour 
lies in the exploitation of this surplus by others. But this 
assumption that the whole of this Surplus is the produce of 
labour, already takes for granted what they ultimately profess to 
prove by it; they make no attempt to prove it; a
(Marshall 1961, pp. 586-587, see also p. 786).
16 
We are left to draw
ploitation.  
First, he was probably not familiar with the word as an English-usage 
term in the period of his early writings. Second, Marshall later identified the 
term with Marx’s writings on the rate of exploitation and clearly did not accept 
that Marxian exploitation of labour existed because he re
t in the Marxian formula that labour creates all value.  
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Finally, we may conjecture that even if (the later) Marshall did not 
identify the term exclusively with Marx’s use of it, he was not prepared, in his 
own original contributions, to use a term which had such strong negative 
connotations. Marshall was particularly concerned with language use. If he 
shied away from using the term, it would be consistent with his cautious use of 
language. Recall his replacement of the term ‘natural’ in The Economics of 
Industry with ‘normal’.
17 Marshall and Marshall (1885, p. 67): ‘it has been 
found best to use ‘Normal’ because the word ‘Natural’ has been used loosely: 
men often call an arrangement ‘Natural’’ merely because they approve it, and 
without taking the trouble to examine whether the Laws of Nature actually tend 
to bring it about.’ 
We have dealt with Marshall’s use of the word exploitation at length. 
Pigou’s use of the term is a little easier to deal with. To understand Pigou’s use 
of exploitation it is necessary to read carefully his discussion of Marshall’s fair 
wages concept in The Economics of Welfare. This discussion precedes the main 
analysis of exploitation. Pigou indicates that for Marshall ‘real wages in any 
occupation are fair .... when, allowance being made for differences in the 
steadiness of the demand for labour over in different industries, ‘they [Pigou 
quotes Marshall] are about on a level with the payment made for tasks in other 
trades which are of equal difficulty and disagreeableness, which require equally 
rare natural abilities and an equally expensive training’’. From this definition, 
Pigou goes on to distinguish two forms of unfair wages. The first is where one 
group of workers in a certain firm or occupation are paid lower wages than a 
group of ‘similar’ workers located elsewhere (but both groups are paid in 
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accordance with the value of the marginal net product). The unfair wages in this 
case result simply from the fact that marginal net products are lower in one 
place than another. The second type of unfair wages results when workers in 
any loc
sness of the phenomena of 
wages being paid below the value of the marginal net product or in terms of his 
view of the likely incidence of this sort of outcome. 
: Leaving aside 
linguis
ation are paid an amount below the marginal net products of their labour. 
Pigou refers to this form of unfair wage as ‘exploitation’. 
Pigou’s distinction between two forms of unfair wages suggests a ready 
and obvious reason for his use of the term exploitation. To avoid verbal 
difficulties, Pigou used the term ‘exploitation’ to clearly underline the fact that 
it was the payment of wages below the value of labour form of ‘unfair wages’ 
which was of major ethical and policy concern. Having already reduced his 
degrees of freedom by one with his use of the word ‘unfair’ Pigou needed to 
find a harsher term to describe this type of wage outcome.
18 Nevertheless, the 
fact that Pigou was prepared to override Marshallian linguistic sensitivities and 
use the opprobrious term ‘exploitation’ is suggestive of a shift in emphasis—
either in terms of Pigou’s thinking about the seriou
The structural argument 
We now turn to the structural argument concerning Pigou and Marshall on 
exploitation. Here we seek an answer to the following question
tic concerns do we find an analysis of below-normal wages in Marshall 
similar to that developed in Pigou’s The Economics of Welfare? 
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For Pigou, free competition is incompatible with exploitation. To the 
extent that there is immobility of labour for one reason or another then a 
‘monopolistic’ element is introduced. Perfect competition results in a 
determinate wage. With monopolistic elements introduced, a ‘range of 
indeterminateness’ arises within which wages will be affected by individual 
‘higgling and bargaining’. The upper limit of the range is given by a wage equal 
to the value of the marginal net product. The lower limit wage is the best 
alternative wage of the worker less the transaction costs involved in moving to 
the new place of employment. Given a gap between the upper and lower limits, 
the degree of exploitation is determined by the bargaining power of employers 
and workers and the willingness of the stronger party to exercise their power. 
(Pigou’s discussion here is simply a transformation of that contained in 
Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace in regard to the settlement locus.)
19 
The role of trade unions is critical. When workers are organised into trade 
unions exploitation is improbable. Where they are not, Pigou suggests, there are 
‘grounds for fearing that exploitation will often occur’ (Pigou 1920, p. 514). 
Employers in these situations have much greater bargaining power than 
workpeople. This leads Pigou to suggest that the incidence of exploitation will 
be greater among women than men because women were less likely to be 
organised than men were. 
Pigou provides support for intervention by Conciliation and Arbitration 
Boards to remove or offset exploitative practices.
20 However, he suggests that 
intervention has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis where prima facie 
evidence for exploitation exists. Because of the difficulties involved in 
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diagnosing cases of exploitation, it is difficult for the State to enact legislation 
to remove exploitation and as between no intervention or legislation designed to 
implement a national uniform wage standard it can be better not to interfere at 
all. Furthermore, removal of exploitation while benefiting ‘economic welfare’ 
(from a distributional point of view), generally makes no difference to the 
magnitude of the ‘national dividend’. There are three exceptions: (1) when the 
elimination of exploitation results in an increase in labour supply; (2) when the 
elimina
ratchets down a worker’s 
value t
tion of exploitation forces employers to use existing resources more 
efficiently; and, (3) when the elimination of exploitation removes inefficient 
employers who tend to be also the worst exploiters. 
One final comment regarding Pigou’s analysis of exploitation is worth 
making. That is his emphasis on efficiency wage influences. Pigou suggests that 
low wages reduce productivity. A fall in productivity 
o the employer. Hence, a worker who is exploited (and receives low 
wages) in one period will be in a worse off position in the following period; 
irrespective of any actions by exploitative employers. 
Let us now consider Marshall’s approach to unfair wages. Marshall’s 
early theory of the determination of wages is based on an amalgam of wages 
fund and demand and supply frameworks (see Whitaker 1975 and Marshall 
[1873]1925, [1873]1996, [1874]1963).
21 Of particular interest for our purposes 
are two unpublished papers ‘Essay on wages’ and ‘Allotments’ (dated by 
Whitaker to the early 1870s). Here Marshall refers to the wage outcomes which 
prevail in a variety of bargaining regimes. When an individual labourer faces an 
employer, or labour markets are separate from each other as a result of mobility 
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frictions, the employer has ‘the advantage of the initiative’. In these 
circumstances, the new hand who produces more (in value terms) than the 
current wage prevailing will not receive payment above the wage paid in the 
market
87 (Marshall 1887) and partially reproduced in Pigou (1925). 
These 
 and in the ‘long-run’ workers 
receive
 but be forced down to that market wage. Pressure from other employers 
and the fear that all additional labourers would need to be paid the higher wage 
would ensure that the employer did not stray from the common position. 
By the late-1880s, we have a variety of sources to draw on. In particular, 
the later editions of the Economics of Industry (Marshall and Marshall 1885), 
Marshall’s lectures on poverty in 1883 (Stigler 1969), his paper read before the 
Industrial Remuneration Conference in 1885 (Marshall 1885), and the essay on 
‘A Fair Rate of Wages’ (written as a preface to Price’s Industrial Peace 
published in 18
works form the essential link to the Principles and to the familiar 
Marshallian demand and supply framework used to examine issues of wage 
determination. 
In the preface to the third edition of the Economics of Industry (1885), 
Marshall suggests that there is unity in terms of the various branches of 
economic theory so that the same law of competition applies to the 
determination of wages as it does to profits and prices. That law in terms of 
distribution ensures that under ‘free competition’
 wages, which reflect two forces: the ‘net return’ of labour and its 
scarcity (Stigler 1969, pp. 193-4, Marshall 1885, pp. 194-199; Marshall 1887, p. 
224; and, Marshall and Marshall 1885, ch. XI).
22 
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To fix our ideas on an (implicit) theory of exploitation in this early work 
we need to examine Marshall’s position on fairness in the payment of wages 
and references to the role of trade unions in determining wage outcomes. 
Marshall equates a fair wage (or more precisely the wages a ‘fair’ employer 
would pay) with the payment of a normal wage—the long run competitive wage 
(Marsh a
linguistic 
exploitativ
exploitatio
1.  ely when they pay workers less than 
23
2.  s ‘makes trade unions 
all  nd Marshall 1885, p. 216 and Marshall 1887, p. xii). If we ignore the 
dimension and equate fairness in the payment of wages to non-
e wage outcomes, then two key Marshallian propositions on the 
n of labour follow. 
Employers are acting exploitativ
their competitors as a result of taking direct or indirect advantage of 
employees who are ignorant of trends in wages in other areas or who 
are in a vulnerable position (particularly if they were taken on from 
the ranks of the unemployed).  
The payment of unfair (or exploitative) wage
necessary and gives them their chief force’ (Marshall 1887, p. xii). It 
is not possible for labour to manage properly without trade unions 
when they face a ‘powerful and unscrupulous master’ (Stigler 1969, 
p. 199 see also Marshall and Marshall 1885). 
Principles of Economics contains a more detailed account of a marginal 
productivity theory of factor remuneration than that presented in his earlier 
work (see Marshall 1961, pp. 334-339,427-450, 554-555, 587-589). Again, in 
general, wages in the long-run tend to their normal values and exploitation (in 
terms of unfair wages) does not persist over time. As discussed previously, the 
 146 
Principles also contains a direct reference to the issue of the exploitation of 
labour but only in terms of a critique of Marx’s theory of exploitation. Here 
Marshall presents the position common to all marginal productivity theorists of 
the time: the output produced by firms results from the co-ordinated input of all 
factors of production (finished goods are the product of ‘labour, together with 
that of
’ (Marshall 1961, p. 569). A lower 
wage re
 the employer and subordinate managers, and of the capital employed’ 
Marshall 1961, p. 587). But, Marx’s theory of exploitation presupposes that all 
surplus arises from labour and in that view he is wrong. Labour is not to be 
given privileged status over other factors. 
Marshall also returns, in the Principles, to the theme of ‘free 
competition’ and the role of unions. Under free competition, isolated workers 
are at a bargaining disadvantage as compared with the employer (Marshall 
1961, pp. 567-569). Bargaining disadvantage results from the fact that labour is 
‘perishable’ (skills decay when workers are unemployed) and because workers 
are often poor and so have no reserve fund. As a consequence, workers cannot 
withhold labour from the market. Marshall also notes that the disadvantage of 
labour is ‘likely to be cumulative in its effects
duces a worker’s efficiency and thereby reduces the ‘normal value of his 
labour’ but also ‘diminishes his efficiency as a bargainer’. Pigou’s discussion of 
the efficiency-exploitation link in The Economics of Welfare can be seen as a 
clear extension of these Marshallian themes. 
For Marshall, trade unions have played a beneficial role in reducing the 
significance of the under-payment of workers. But at the same time, Marshall 
reports a range of examples where trade unions interfere with the achievement 
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of the appropriate standard of wages. One interesting case is that of a depression 
where Marshall suggests that trade unions may enforce a downward stickiness 
in nominal wages at the time of price falls thus leading to the over-payment of 
labour and a decline in employment. In Elements of Economics of Industry, the 
work in which Marshall attempted to summarise Principles to meet the ‘needs 
of junior students’, he considerably extends the discussion with the inclusion of 
a chapter on the role of trade unions. Returning to earlier themes (see ‘The 
Essay on Wages’), Marshall suggests that a resolute employer has a stronger 
bargaining position than his or her workers. He goes on to suggest that ‘in such 
cases as these the special disadvantages of the workman in bargaining certainly 
put his wages for a time below the position at which they would find their level 
under the free action of demand and supply—the force of economic fiction is 
exerted against the workman’ (Marshall 1958, pp. 370-371). In these 
circumstances, the strategy of working people to form trade unions and press for 
wage increases using reasonable methods will make for ‘social well-being’ 
(Marshall 1958, p. 399). Again, Marshall provides a balance: ‘the case is 
different with applications of the Common Rule […the standard wage to be paid 
for an 
on the disadvantage of labour, on the greater 
hour’s work of a given class, or again for piece-work of a given class] 
which make for a false standardisation; which tend to force employers to put 
relatively inefficient workers in the same class for payment as more efficient 
workers’ (Marshall 1958, p. 399). 
In reviewing Marshall’s discussion of wage outcomes, it is hard not to 
be struck by the many similarities with Pigou’s treatment of exploitation. In 
both analyses, there is an emphasis 
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inciden
r -generation neoclassical wage theory.
24 Why? 
on already existed in 
neoclassical wage theory. (It is important to emphasise this point given the 
common  representation of nascent neoclassical wage theory as a ‘non-
exploitation’ theory of wages.)
25 
inimum wage for agriculture’, published in 1913 ‘... is it desirable, 
in thes
ce of unfair (or exploitative) wages in industries with poor trade union 
coverage, on the importance of cumulative causation, and on the benchmark 
norm of long-run competitive wages. In short, Pigou’s reads as a restatement of 
Marshallian unfair wages analysis. 
This is not to deny that Pigou’s treatment of exploitation is bereft of 
interesting new features. His linkage of the degree of exploitation with the 
settlement locus apparatus is an important extension. Nor that Pigou was more 
likely than Marshall to accept that exploitation was an important phenomenon. 
However, what we can say is that Pigou’s exploitation analysis does not 
represent a sharp break from fi st
Because a prototype model of labour market exploitati
3.3  Minimum Conditions and Just Outcomes 
In Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, Pigou asks the question: ‘Is it 
desirable that arbitrators should take the general trend of economic forces for 
granted, or that they should introduce a bias into their awards with a view to 
improving the distribution of wealth? Ought they in short to try to modify long-
period competitive results’ (Pigou 1905, p. 41). A similar question is put in 
Pigou’s ‘A m
e circumstances, that the machinery of Wages Boards should be 
employed to force the rate of wages, which has already, ex hypothesi, attained to 
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the ideal of fairness, towards the different and more elevated ideal of a ‘living 
minimum’?’ 
In both cases, Pigou makes the distinction between fair wages and what 
might b
policy 
‘threate
e referred to as just outcomes. While fair wages are clearly desirable, 
they do not represent the end-point in terms of a just distribution of resources. A 
fair wage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a just distribution of 
income and material resources.
26 
Pigou’s answer to the question posed in Principles and Methods of 
Industrial Peace is that, efficiency wage considerations apart, workpeople will 
generally be adversely affected by an ‘artificially elevated wage’. This is despite 
the fact that if a higher wage is paid, the low-income worker will receive greater 
utility from the additional dollar than the (relatively better off) consumer will 
lose. Three arguments are advanced against the ‘artificially elevated wage’ or 
‘living wage’. Summarised in the Aneurin Williams Memorial Lecture given at 
the Copartnership Congress in 1926, these are: (1) a living wage 
ns heavy unemployment’ and loss of output; (2) the living wage is an 
‘ineffective means of social advance’ as it does not take into account differences 
in needs between families of different sizes; and, (3) it is entirely ineffective in 
dealing with the case of workpeople who lose their jobs or become sick. 
In arguing against a living wage, Pigou was at odds with Fabian policy 
on a national minimum wage advanced in the Webbs’ Industrial Democracy 
and in various tracts such as State Arbitration and the Living Wage (1898) and 
The Case for a Legal Minimum Wage (1906). Fabian policy on the living wage 
received significant public support in Edwardian Britain particularly following 
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the Sweated Industries Exhibition in 1906 and was a central point of debate 
during the miners’ strike of 1912.
27 Interestingly, both Marshall and Pigou 
engaged in the public debate surrounding the miners’ strike. Marshall, in a letter 
to the Daily Chronicle, 25 March 1912, notes that a uniform national minimum 
wage ‘would very greatly increase the evils without materially increasing the 
benefits of collective bargaining as to wages’ (Whitaker 1996, letter 1010). But 
he then goes on to note the benefits that local minima may provide in coal 
mining.
28 Pigou in his letter to The Times (5 March 1912) provides support for 
the miners in the deadlock that had developed during the miners’ strike. He 
argues that the miners should not be forced to arbitration before a set of 
principles on which arbitrated awards are to be made, had been agreed to by the 
miners
duty bound, to do much more than this’ (Pigou 1912, p. 397). As set out in 
, the employers, and the government. To do so would be to give a ‘blank 
cheque’ to an arbitrator. And while not directly suggesting that the principle 
should be minimum wages in each direct set at the ‘fair average’ of the district, 
it is clear from his letter that that would be one plausible principle.
29 
Rather than support a national uniform living wage, Pigou argues 
instead for the establishment of a ‘national minimum of conditions’ ‘at a level 
high enough to make impossible the occurrence to anybody of extreme want’. 
Two features of Pigou’s minimum standard policy should be noted. The first is 
that the minimum standard represents an equality of resources rather than an 
equality of welfare or utility approach. The second is that the minimum standard 
should rise in line with movements in per capita real income. Pigou suggests 
that ‘wealthy States of the modern world can afford, and, indeed, are in public 
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Wealth and Welfare and developed in The Warburton Lecture of 1914 ‘Some 
aspects of the housing problem’, minimum conditions are to be set in a large 
range o
e 
and at 
f areas: health and safety, hours of work, dwelling accommodation, 
education, health care, and food and clothing. Moreover, each standard was to 
be enforced separately. 
As compared to the case of the artificially elevated living wage, Pigou 
argues that the direct transfer of resources from the relatively well-off to the 
needy to ensure maintenance of the minimum set of conditions would not 
necessarily harm the national dividend and therefore lower economic welfare. 
As stated in Wealth and Welfare, the national dividend would sometimes ris
other times fall with such a transfer. Even in the latter case, Pigou was 
prepared to enforce the minimum: ‘it is no more than an acceptance in concrete 
form of the compelling obligation of humanity’ (Pigou [1914]1923, p. 113).
30 
In Pigou’s various discussions on the subject, three methods for 
transferring resources from the relatively rich to the relatively poor are noted. 
These are: (1) philanthropic actions; (2) employer chivalry; and, (3) State 
redistribution. The role of philanthropic actions and employer chivalry are 
examined in Wealth and Welfare together with Pigou’s paper  ‘Employers and 
economic chivalry’ written in 1913 but only published in 1923 in a collected set 
of essays. This latter paper was directly influenced by Marshall’s last public 
lecture in which he introduced the notion of economic chivalry (see Marshall 
1907). In ‘Employers and economic chivalry’, Pigou urges employers not to 
restrict themselves to doing what is ‘right’. Rather they are encouraged to 
undertake ‘praiseworthy’ actions. In other words, not only are employers 
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required to meet legislative standards in areas such as health and safety but they 
are also encouraged to invest in the human capital of their workforce through 
expend
er more the case in Pigou’s work in the post-war period. In this 
context
ay [italics in the original] to some extent check the 
accumu gram 
could h . But 
Pigou g
itures on education. Moreover, Pigou encourages employers to provide, 
on a voluntary basis, wage payments in excess of normal levels and to support 
their employees during periods of temporary slackness in demand. 
While ‘Employers and economic chivalry’ accords a role for employer 
chivalry and Wealth and Welfare, for private philanthropic actions (outside the 
domain of work), the channel stressed increasingly by Pigou is that of direct 
transfers through State intermediation. This is so in Wealth and Welfare and 
becomes ev
, graduated (or progressive) income tax and death duties are accorded a 
central role in financing public expenditures designed to achieve minimum 
standards.  
A significant extension of the tax base raises the issue of negative 
incentive effects and the possibility of a net fall in the national dividend. This 
possibility is recognised by Pigou. A comparison of Pigou’s earlier work on the 
minimum standard with his later analysis reveals, however, an increasingly 
positive stance on this issue. In his well-known Socialism versus Capitalism 
‘lectures’ of 1937, Pigou examined the arguments for and against significantly 
expanding the tax base for redistributive purposes. He suggests that ‘heavy 
taxes on large incomes m
lation of capital home use’. In other words, the redistributive pro
ave little or even no negative effect on private capital accumulation
oes much further: 
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‘but once establish socialism, and the whole argument [of 
possible negative incentive effects] disappears. The accumulation 
of capital is cared for directly by the State. There is no longer 
need to rely on the ability and the willingness of private persons 
tinues to adhere to the gradualist approach to public 
policy  is a 
striden social 
reform,
to mould and transform, 
to provide it....The State has the power to take whatever it pleases 
for capital development before any income at all is distributed to 
individuals’ (Pigou 1937, p. 29). 
In other words, linking redistribution to ‘general socialism’ or Pigou’s limited 
form of ‘collectivism’ significantly increases the possibility of achieving just 
outcomes. One further feature of Pigou’s Socialism versus Capitalism should be 
noted. While Pigou con
evident in Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, there 
cy in his tone. Referring to his own broad program of political and 
 Pigou suggests: 
‘In his political testament he would recommend his successor 
also to follow the path of gradualness—
not violently uproot; but he would add in large capitals, a final 
sentence, that gradualness implies action, and is not a polite name 
for standing still’ (Pigou 1937, p. 139).  
Having set out Pigou’s program to achieve just outcomes for workers receiving 
low wages we can briefly state the main areas where Pigou and Marshall differ. 
Three differences with Marshall can be identified. (However, it must be 
admitted that these differences are not great.) These areas are: (1) Marshall’s 
greater emphasis on the role of education in gradually alleviating the problem of 
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poverty as compared with Pigou’s more generalist and immediate program 
developed around the minimum standard; (2) Marshall’s support for a strong 
role for co-operation and economic chivalry in achieving just outcomes 
(compa
ion and the 
‘earnin
red with Pigou’s apparent waning interest in this approach); and (3) 
Marshall’s less enthusiastic embrace of redistributive taxes and more 
particularly of a significantly expanded program of public spending. 
Marshall’s Lectures on Poverty in 1883 (Stigler 1969) provide a useful 
point of comparison between Pigou and Marshall on the role of remedial state 
action in regard to poverty. As mentioned previously, these lectures can be 
interpreted as providing a clear confirmation of the movement to a marginal 
productivity theory of wage determination in Marshall’s work.
31 However, they 
are also important in setting out an agenda for reform in terms of poverty. To 
overcome the problem of low wages, Marshall emphasises the role of education. 
The provision of a ‘first-rate eduction, general and technical’ to every child 
would result in a decline in the number of unskilled labourers (consequently 
increasing the wages of the unskilled through ‘mechanical effects’) but more 
importantly, the resulting rise in efficiency would increase product
gs-and-interest fund’. Importantly, an increase in levels of education 
could not be expected to have immediate effects. It may take one, or more 
probably, two generations for poverty to be significantly reduced.
32 
The theme of a significant role for education is developed in Marshall's 
presentation to the Industrial Remuneration Conference in 1885.
33 As he 
suggests, the ‘chief remedy, then, for low wages is better education’. He goes 
on to add: ‘School education ought to be good and cheap, if not free’. His 
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presentation also affords an insight into Marshall’s thoughts on the effects of a 
good education. The emphasis is not on specific but rather general skills. The 
chief virtue of ‘book-learning’ is that it helps to form a ‘rigorous, 
straightforward character’ and makes ‘the mind elastic, ready to take in new 
ideas, and able to communicate freely with others’. Although education 
dominates Marshall’s discussion on poverty alleviation in his presentation to the 
Industrial Remuneration Conference (Marshall 1885), it is important to 
recognise that this was not the only target area of concern. In reference to the 
particular problems of workers in London unable to rent adequate housing, 
Marsha
ney must 
flow fr
ll suggests that sanitary regulations need to be enforced with ‘rapidly-
increasing stringency’ and ‘liberal’ action be taken to encourage movement 
from those in London to ‘industrial villages’.
34 
Marshall’s Principles bring together the array of arguments developed in 
earlier works in terms of poverty alleviation. In his final chapter on ‘Progress in 
relation to standards of life’ Marshall suggests that there is no ‘moral 
justification for extreme poverty side by side with great wealth’ (Marshall 1961, 
p.714) but significant progress has already been made and a ‘gradualist 
approach to reform must be adopted’. The positive virtues of education are 
again promoted. Something of a shift in the language used is apparent. The 
education of the people is ‘a national duty and national economy’.
35 In terms of 
public expenditures, Marshall is explicit in suggesting that ‘public mo
eely’. Moreover, it [public money] ‘must flow freely to provide fresh air 
and space for the children in all working class quarters’ (Marshall 1961, p.718). 
Likewise, public aid is required in terms of health care and sanitation. 
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Education for Pigou was also an important critical component of his 
minimum standard. Thus in the Economics of Welfare, Pigou suggests that the 
‘minimum includes some defined quantity and quality of house accommodation, 
of medical care, of education, of food, of leisure, of the apparatus of sanitary 
convenience and safety where work is carried on, and so on. Furthermore, the 
minimum is absolute’ (Pigou 1920). However, education does not appear to 
assume the paramount importance that it does for Marshall and is not given the 
extended treatment that Marshall gives the subject. Nor does Pigou give the 
impres
lry appears to vanish by the 1930s—perhaps in 
respons
sion of being prepared to accept the generational wait that is implied in 
Marshall; poverty being reduced over time as education raises skill levels and 
wages among those who in previous generation were poor. 
The second difference between Marshall and Pigou can be dealt with 
easily. As discussed previously Pigou had, following Marshall, supported a 
focus on economic chivalry. However, his interest in the positive virtues of co-
operation and economic chiva
e to the extremes of the depression—to be replaced by an emphasis on 
State regulation and planning and the expansion of public enterprises in the 
1930s (see Pigou 1935,1937). 
The final difference between Pigou and Marshall relates to Pigou’s 
position, advanced increasingly forcefully over time, of a significant expansion 
of public spending financed by graduated income tax and death duties. The 
differences between Pigou and the later Marshall in this area are not as great as 
might be imagined for as noted by Groenewegen (1995a), Marshall performed a 
volte face on the issue of graduated taxes and death duties. In his letter to Lord 
 157 
Reay (12 November 1909), concerning Lloyd George’s 1909 Budget, Marshall 
suggests: ‘For about fifteen years I taught somewhat eagerly that ‘Death Duties’ 
were a grievous evil because they checked the growth of capital. For the next 
few years I hesitated. Now I think they are on the whole a good method of 
raising a rather large part of the national revenue; because they do not check 
accumulation as much as had been expected, and a small check does not seem 
to me as great an evil as it did then.’
36 While the later Marshall took a position 
close to that of Pigou in regard to effects of increased tax levies on capital 
accumulation, it is probable that Marshall would have baulked at the second 
prong of Pigou’s argument previously noted in the paper regarding the incentive 
effects of redistributive taxes on private production; namely, that with a 
significant expansion of public ownership the argument was irrelevant. As set 
out in his paper ‘Social possibilities of economic chivalry’, Marshall defended a 
role for free enterprise: ‘The world under free enterprise will fall short of the 
finest ideals until economic chivalry is developed. But until it is developed, 
every great step in the direction of collectivism is a grave menace to the 
eiving 
maintenance of even our present moderate rate of progress’.
37 
3.4  Conclusion 
Three propositions on the labour market are accepted by both Pigou and 
Marshall. Firstly, the payment of wages below the value of the marginal product 
is unfair. Moreover, unorganised workers faced by non-chivalrous employers 
are likely to be paid a wage below the value of their marginal product to the 
firm. Secondly, a principle goal of policy must be to raise the standard of living 
of those workers receiving low wages irrespective of whether they are rec
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fair wa
gou retains much of 
Marshall’s broad program emphasising both State and non-State actions in 
redistributing income. However, Pigou increasingly focussed on the single 
channel of State spending to meet the minimum standard.  
ges or not. That is, justice in the labour market is not achieved simply 
when the fair wage is paid. Thirdly, uniform national minimum wage legislation 
is an inefficient policy to adopt to meet the problem of the working poor. 
Where Pigou and Marshall appear to differ is in terms of Pigou’s greater 
insistence on the incidence and severity of exploitation (reflected in some 
degree in the language used) but more importantly in the program required to 
raise the standard of living of poor workers. The early Pi
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Notes 
 
∗ I would like to thank Ray Petridis, Herb Thompson and two referees for their 
extensive comments on this paper together with Meg Jadlowkier for assistance in 
preparing this manuscript. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 
History of Economic Thought Society of Australia Conference in July 1996 and I thank 
Conference participants for their comments. I am grateful to Alex Saunders and 
Rowland Thomas of the Marshall Library, Faculty of Economics and Politics for 
providing access to the Marshall Archive and responding to the many queries I had 
concerning Marshall’s papers. Material from the Marshall Archive is quoted by kind 
permission of the Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge. 
1 Pigou had previously published several short papers and in 1903, The Riddle of the 
Tariff. 
2 Pigou draws on a long list of Marshall references including Economics of Industry, 
Marshall’s Preface to Price’s Industrial Peace, ‘Co-operation’, ‘Some aspects of 
competition’, Principles of Economics, and Elements of Economics of Industry. 
3 Bharadwaj (1972), however, reveals in her study of Marshall’s marginal notes to 
Pigou’s  Wealth and Welfare (1912) that Marshall had difficulties with Pigou’s 
construction of the marginal supply relationship and his treatment of increasing and 
decreasing returns. A referee highlighted a further recorded instance of Marshall’s 
concerns with Pigou’s work. On reading Pigou’s The Economy and Finance of the War 
published in 1916, Marshall wrote to Pigou commending him for his book, but noting 
that he was ‘a little frightened’ at the possibility that some of what Pigou says in the 
book is likely to mislead ‘people who do not know the ropes of economic complex 
interactions’ (Whitaker 1996, letter 1058). 160 
                                                                                                                                  
4 See Collard (1981, 1990) and Groenewegen (1995a) for general assessments of the 
Marshall-Pigou link; Fry (1976) compares Marshall and Pigou on the role of the state. 
5 Despite the close links between Pigou’s Wealth and Welfare published in 1912 and 
The Economics of Welfare, the former work contains no direct treatment of 
‘exploitation’. 
6 On Marshall’s use of language, recall Marshall’s replacement of the term ‘natural’ 
with ‘normal’ in The Economics of Industry. The issue of Marshall’s and Pigou’s use of 
language is discussed further below. 
7 Pigou set out his technical analysis on the range of indeterminateness in Appendix A 
to Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace. It is of some interest that the young 
J.M. Keynes had assisted with the diagrams in the Appendix. As acknowledged by 
Pigou, Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics had some influence on the development of 
his range of indeterminateness analysis. See Creedy (1990) for a discussion of 
Edgeworth and Marshall on wage bargaining models. 
8 The demand for a living wage was made in the parliamentary debates surrounding the 
introduction of Trades Boards legislation in 1909 and again at various points thereafter 
including the crisis debates surrounding the coal miners’ strike of 1912, the 
introduction of Agricultural Wages Boards in 1917 and the introduction of the Trades 
Boards Act of 1918. The Fabians had, of course, advanced the National Minimum 
policy from the 1890s (see McBriar 1962). Despite Pigou’s rejection of the living wage 
policy, he was clearly influenced by the broader contours of the Fabian national 
minimum framework. It may be noted in this context that Pigou makes relatively 
frequent reference to the Webb’s work in his books and articles, not surprising since 
the Webbs were the leading authorities on the subject. 
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9 The ‘Pigou-Robinson’ theory of exploitation is misleading because of the radically 
different frameworks utilised by Pigou and Robinson in their respective analyses of 
exploitation, see Flatau (1997b, and subsequently 2001a). 
10 In the first edition of The Economics of Welfare published in 1920, the allusion to 
Marshall’s ‘fair wages’ is prominent being placed at the beginning of the relevant 
chapter. In subsequent editions, the reference to Marshall becomes more submerged in 
the text. 
11 A referee pointed out that ‘exploitation’ was one of the words examined by Raymond 
Williams in Keywords (Williams 1988). Williams’s entry for exploitation provides 
further examples of early usages of the word exploitation. It is instructive to read 
Williams’s entry in conjunction with the introduction to Keywords, which explores the 
development of the meaning of words within a cultural context. 
12 That Cannan was the author of the entry on ‘exploit’ for the Palgrave is not 
surprising given his interest in distribution theory and his prior analysis of the issue of 
exploitation. In a paper read to the Fabian Society on July 5 1889 (see Cannan 1889), 
he makes reference to the phrase the ‘subjection of labour to capital’. Cannan goes on 
to remark that possibly the phrase ‘means that owners of capital ‘exploit’ labourers. A 
person who says that labourers are exploited cannot very well be contradicted unless he 
is rash enough to give an explanation of the word, which he very seldom is. If exploit 
means anything, I suppose it means to employ at competition wages’ (Cannan 1889, p. 
82). See also Cannan (1914, p.73). 
13 But note that Engels wrote a synopsis (in English) of Das Kapital for the Fortnightly 
Review in 1868 in which the term ‘exploitation’ was frequently used. A referee pointed 
out that Marshall was an avid reader of the Fortnightly. (It should be noted that 
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Marshall was fluent in German and would not have required the assistance of Engel’s 
English synopsis.)  Marshall’s notes are held in the Marshall Archive at the Faculty of 
Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge, Marshall 3/11 (formerly Box 5/1E). 
14 S is surplus labour, C is constant capital, and V is variable capital. 
15 This information was supplied by an examiner of the thesis. 
16 This extract so since the second edition of the Principles (see Guillebaud 1961, 
volume 2, p. 633). In the first edition the corresponding section read: ‘They have 
argued that the value of a thing consists exclusively of the labour that has been spent in 
making it; and that therefore the payment of interest is a robbery of labour.’ While the 
term ‘exploitation’ was not used in this passage, it was adopted in the Historical Note 
on Definitions of the Term ‘Capital’ appended to Book II, Ch. V (p. 138) in the first 
edition of the Principles: ‘Karl Marx and his followers lay down the doctrine that only 
that is capital, which is a means of production owned by one person (or group of 
persons) and used to produce things for benefit for another, generally by means of the 
hired labour of a third; in such a wise that the first has the opportunity of plundering or 
exploiting the others.’  For a later reference to Marx’s analysis of exploitation see 
Marshall (1919, pp. 71-72). A reference to ‘exploitation’ is also made in Marshall 
(1890b). 
17 Marshall returns to the distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ in the Principles 
when referring to Adam Smith’s use of the term ‘natural’. See Marshall (1961, p. 758). 
18 The earliest use by Pigou of the word ‘exploitation’ the author could find is in his 
paper ‘A minimum wage for agriculture’ published in The Nineteenth Century in 1913. 
Here Pigou suggests that the establishment of a minimum wage in cases involving 
payments below the normal level will have the following effect: ‘Labourers upon 
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whom formerly exploitation was practised would now be exploited no longer. Their 
employment would be as extensive as before their wages would be rather larger; and 
there would be no compensating evil to be set against this gain’ (Pigou 1913, p.1175). 
Moreover, he notes that the explanation for the exploitative wages is ‘a species of 
monopolistic action on the part of a group of local farmers’, which restricts the 
economic forces that would tend to raise wages to their normal level. 
19 Pigou’s The Economics of Welfare also includes a discussion of the arbitration 
locus—the range of ‘practicable bargains’—which follows Principles and Methods of 
Industrial Peace. 
20 Saltmarsh and Wilkinson (1960) note that Pigou held a part-time appointment on the 
Board of Trade. 
21 See Guillebaud (1961, pp. 3-26, 503-645,816-827), Whitaker (1974, 1975, pp. 1-107, 
178-250), Petridis (1973, 1990), Matthews (1990), and Groenewegen (1995a, pp. 156-
158, 208-214, 176-179, 399-442) for an outline of the development of Marshall’s 
theory of wages and the role of trade unions. 
22 The net return of labour equals the ‘value of the produce which he [the worker] takes 
part in producing after deducting all other expenses of producing it’ (Marshall and 
Marshall 1885, p. 133). The definition adopted of free competition in this early work is 
revealing as it revolves around both the attitudes adopted by participants in the market 
together with the industrial structure of the market rather than simply the industrial 
structure of the market itself (Marshall and Marshall 1885, p. vi). Individuals compete 
freely when they do not act in combination and pursue their own (and childrens’) 
material advantage (the so-called active principle). The long-run is that time period 
when the so-called passive elements such as custom, inertness, and ignorance have 
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been overcome by active forces. Long-run forces dominate and are, therefore, taken as 
the ‘normal’ outcome. Long-run competitive wages are designated as normal wages. 
23 See Matthews (1990) for a further discussion of Marshall’s views on the employer’s 
advantage. 
24 In this context, it is worthwhile noting that even J.B. Clark adhered to the bargaining 
disadvantage of labour model (see Clark 1902a). At various points in Principles and 
Methods of Industrial Peace, Pigou referenced Clark’s work, including Clark (1902a). 
25 The phrase the ‘non-exploitation’ theory of wages comes from Hamilton’s 1922 
survey of wage theories. Hamilton (1922) describes the ‘productivity’ theory of wages 
as a ‘non-exploitation’ theory of wages because ‘under analysis it becomes an 
argument that, in buying labour and selling its products, the employer cannot 
appropriate an ‘unearned’ surplus produced by labour’. He contrasts the productivity 
theory with the exploitation theory of wages presumably derived from Marx. 
26 Consider also Marshall’s views on just outcomes and fair wages contained in his 
discussion of fair wages in the preface to Price’s Industrial Peace. In making 
judgements about fair wages, Marshall was not ‘trying to settle according to any 
absolute standard of justness’ how much workers should receive. Indeed the normal 
rate has no claim to be an absolutely just rate; it is relative to the existing state of things 
here and now’ (Stigler 1969, p. 198, Marshall and Marshall 1885, p. xi). A point of 
curiosity: a close inspection of Pigou’s reproduction of selections of Marshall’s original 
Preface to Price’s Industrial Peace in the Memorials reveals that Pigou did not follow 
precisely the original text. The above phrase is reproduced as ‘… it is relative to the 
existing state of things at a particular place and time.’ 
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27 See Snowden (1912) for the presentation of the case for a living wage from the 
parliamentary wing of the labour movement. 
28 As pointed out by a referee, Marshall’s general opposition to minimum wages was 
forcibly expressed in the Labour Commission (see Groenewegen, 1996). 
29 Pigou submitted letters to the Times at regular intervals concerning policy issues. 
While not as engaged in government committee work to the same extent as Marshall, 
Pigou did serve on Cunliffe Committee on the Foreign Exchanges, the Chamberlain 
Committee on the Currency and the Bank of England and was involved in the Royal 
Commission on the Income Tax (see Saltmarsh and Wilkinson 1960). 
30 It is interesting to note that Wicksteed advanced a program of support for minimum 
conditions and rejection of a national minimum wage at roughly the same time and in 
the same form as Pigou. See his little known paper ‘The distinction between earnings 
and income, and between a minimum wage and a decent maintenance: a challenge’ 
read at the Inter-Denominational Summer School at Swanwick, Derbyshire in 1913. 
31 As pointed out by a referee, a marginal productivity theory of wages was visible in 
Marshall’s Economics of Industry. 
32 Marshall: ‘It may be too late to get rid of poverty in our generation; let us resolve 
that our children, or at all events our children's children, shall be free from it’. 
33 For an earlier indication of his views, see Marshall’s 1873 paper on the Future of the 
Working Classes and his Lectures to Women. 
34 See also his ‘Where to House the London Poor’ of a year earlier (1884). 
35 In the Principles, Marshall provided a detailed outline of the benefits of education. 
For example, he suggests: “It is true that there are many kinds of work which can be 
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done as efficiently by an uneducated as by an educated workman: and that the higher 
branches of education are of little direct use except to employers and foremen and a 
comparatively small number of artisans. But a good education confers great indirect 
benefits even on the ordinary workman. It stimulates his mental activity; it fosters in 
him a habit of wise inquisitiveness: it makes him more intelligent, more ready, more 
trustworthy in his ordinary work; it raises the tone of his life in working hours and out 
of working hours; it is thus an important means towards the production of material 
wealth; at the same time that, regarded as an end in itself, it is inferior to none of those 
which the production of material wealth can be made to subserve” (Marshall 1961, p. 
211). 
Moreover, Marshall suggests that: “We must however look in another direction for a 
part, perhaps the greater part, of the immediate economic gain which the nation may 
derive from an improvement in the general and technical education of the mass of the 
people. We must look not so much at those who stay in the rank and file of the working 
classes, as at those who rise from a humble birth to join the higher ranks of skilled 
artisans, to become foremen or employers, to advance the boundaries of science, or 
possibly to add to the national wealth in art and literature” (Marshall 1961, pp. 211-
212). 
36 See also Marshall’s 1917 paper ‘The equitable distribution of taxation’. For a further 
discussion on Marshall’s change of mind on the consequences of graduated taxes on 
capital accumulation see Groenewegen (1990). 
37 For a similar viewpoint see Marshall (1919, p. viii). As outlined in detail in 
Groenewegen (1995a), Marshall’s position on ‘socialism’ changed considerably over 
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his lifetime. See McWilliams Tullberg (1975), Elliott (1990) and Groenewegen (1995a) 
for a discussion on Marshall's tendency to socialism. 
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4.  The Methodology of Early Neoclassical Distribution Theory: 
Universalism, the Deductive Method and Ethics
∗ 
 
History of Economics Review, Summer 2001, Number 34, pp. 33- 55. 
(with revisions) 
4.1  Introduction 
Neoclassical distribution theory as a coherent, well-developed framework is 
recognised to have emerged in the last two decades of the 19th century. This 
period includes four major classic works in neoclassical distribution theory: 
Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890), Wicksteed’s An Essay in The Co-
ordination of the Laws of Distribution (1894) Wicksell’s Value, Capital and 
Rent published in 1893, and Clark’s The Distribution of Wealth published in 
1899 but based largely on a series of articles published between 1888 and 1892. 
The 1880s and 1890s was also a period of increased interest in the methodology 
of economics. Inaugural lectures on methodological issues by Marshall 
([1885]1925), Edgeworth ([1891]1997), and Cunningham (1892) at Cambridge, 
Oxford, and King’s College London respectively provide striking confirmation 
of this interest. J.N. Keynes’s The Scope and Method of Political Economy, 
published in 1891, supplied the requisite classic treatise.
1 
In his treatise, J.N. Keynes distinguished between two conceptions of 
economics. The first viewed economics as an ethical, relativist, and inductivist 
science.
2 This methodological position was aligned to the German historical 
 169 
school and championed in the methodological debates of the late 1880s and 
1890s by Cunningham. Under this position, economic doctrines are constrained, 
by the changing nature of people and place, to be period- and site-specific. In 
other words, the principle of relativity in economic doctrines is applicable. 
Economic doctrines, in turn, are to be developed inductively from detailed 
historical, descriptive analyses. The reference to the ethical in this conception of 
economics refers to the stress on the question of how society should be 
organised if the precepts of justice and morality are to prevail. The focus is 
clearly on the normative. 
The second broad methodological stance distinguished by J.N. Keynes 
was a positive, universalist, abstract, deductivist position. Under this position, 
the laws of economics apply across time and place even though differences exist 
between institutional and cultural settings. These differences are not decisive, 
because individuals are affected by similar motives and face similar constraints. 
One can therefore arrive at universal economic principles. This leads to a 
greater emphasis on abstraction and a deductive method with an attendant stress 
on mathematical techniques. One reasons downwards, deductively from broader 
accepted generalisations. As J.N. Keynes suggested in his treatise, this position 
regards political economy ‘as a science that is, in its scope, positive as 
distinguished from ethical or practical, and in its method abstract and deductive’ 
(Keynes [1917]1997, p. 12). 
Keynes’s taxonomy of methodological positions in economics provides 
a useful reference point against which to locate and classify the methodology of 
nascent neoclassical distribution theory. And this is the prime purpose of the 
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present paper. In essence, the paper represents an empirical methodology 
project. Our concern is with classifying and assessing the actual methodological 
practices of Clark, Wicksteed, Marshall and Wicksell—focussing particularly 
on their major works of the 1890s—against Keynes’s taxonomy, against their 
own methodological models and against the range of models we ourselves 
assess as valid benchmarks. 
It comes as no surprise that, during the period in the early 1890s when 
the marginal productivity doctrine took decisive hold in economic theory, the 
dominant methodological position adopted by the key theorists involved could 
be described largely in terms of Keynes’s positive, universalist, abstract model. 
Three of the four most prominent proponents of the marginal productivity 
doctrine in this time, namely, J.B. Clark, Wicksteed and Wicksell can, despite 
their differences, be seen as lying firmly within this tradition. For all three, the 
distribution of income can be described in terms of a marginal productivity 
model applicable across all factors of production and relevant at all times. At 
least for two of the three, Wicksteed and Wicksell, a mathematical mode of 
modelling is seen as being particularly suited to the process of establishing and 
validating fundamental economic propositions. 
The fourth major player in the development of the neoclassical theory of 
distribution, Marshall, provides an obvious point of contrast and will be used as 
such in this paper. The inductivist, historical, anti-universalist position of 
Cunningham was, as is well known, not supported by Marshall.
3 At the same 
time, however, Marshall⎯and J.N. Keynes himself⎯lies one step removed 
from Wicksteed, Wicksell and Clark. The emphasis remains on the development 
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of general laws grounded in the marginalist approach. Marginal productivity 
remains an important component of Marshall’s theory of distribution. But there 
is a clear recognition of the limits within which those laws apply, the role 
played by other influences on the distribution of income (such as labour supply 
forces), the need for careful empirical research to account for changing 
institutional settings and to corroborate the laws derived, and the diversity of 
possible human behaviour. Marshall, in short, was a pluralist when it came to 
methodology (see Groenewegen 1995a and Samuels 1999). As Marshall himself 
suggests in a letter to J.N. Keynes in 1889 just prior to the publication of the 
Principles: ‘I take an extreme position as to the methods & scope of economics. 
In my new book I say of methods simply that economics has to use every 
method known to science’ (Whitaker 1996, pp. 301-302). The differences 
between Marshall and the other theorists surveyed are such as to suggest that 
neoclassical distribution theory does not present as methodologically monist in 
nature. 
Universalism stands as a core feature of the methodological approach 
adopted by Clark, Wicksell and Wicksteed. Section 2 is concerned with 
exploring the universalist perspective of Clark, Wicksell and Wicksteed as it 
applied to their theories of distribution in their key works of the late 1880s and 
early 1890s and contrasting their position with the more pluralist stance adopted 
by Marshall. In examining the universalist perspectives of the four theorists we 
enter debates in the methodology of economics concerned with the scope of 
economic theories and, more broadly, age-old debates on relativism vs. 
universalism which have applied across all disciplines.
4 
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Section 2 considers classical questions in the methodology of 
economics, namely, those concerned with theory generation, appraisal and 
scope. What rules are to be followed when developing economic theories and 
predictions? What are the set of reference points by which theories are to be 
appraised as to their validity and worth? J.N. Keynes placed stress on both the 
inductive and deductive methods in his normative methodological statements on 
theory generation (‘deduction and induction… supplement one another’, 
Keynes [1917]1997, p. 205) and gave some prominence to a role for statistics. 
The use of economic statistics both aids inductively the establishment of 
empirical laws and also enables ‘the deductive economist on the one hand to 
test and where necessary modify his premises, and on the other hand to check 
and verify his conclusions’ (Keynes [1917]1997, p. 346). Keynes can, therefore, 
be seen as advocating an important role for empirical testing in economics. He 
believed that the natural experiment, so often utilised in the sciences, had 
limited applicability in economics. 
In section 3, we examine the position taken by the four economists on 
the role of deduction (and induction) in theory generation and the part to be 
played by empirical testing in theory appraisal. We also consider the relevance 
of mathematics and science to neoclassical distribution theory. Here we 
examine the role and validity of different modes of discourse in economics. 
Those economists within the inductive, empirical Historical School tradition 
will, Keynes suggested, reject mathematics as an instrument in theory 
generation. On the other hand, J.N. Keynes suggested that a natural carry-over 
was evident from universalism to the deductive method, abstraction and then on 
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to the use of mathematical techniques in theory generation. A strict adherence to 
a universal law position implies a reduced need to undertake detailed 
descriptive and historical analysis. Once the universal law is determined, 
attention turns to deducing the applicable principles and predictions from that 
law. A mathematical mode of discourse, then, is warranted as an aid to the 
development of theory. But Keynes put little emphasis on the role that 
mechanics or analogies from physics might play in the generation of economic 
laws. Given the Mirowski (1989) thesis of significant borrowings from physics 
in the development of marginalism in the first generation, it remains of interest 
to determine the role that physical analogies played in the development of 
(second-generation) neoclassical distribution theory. 
Section 4 deals with the way in which ‘morals’ merge with the positive 
in neoclassical distribution theory: the issue of the positive and the normative in 
economics. The early neoclassical distribution theorists bring normative and 
ethical concerns into play in an ambiguous way. Key statements on the 
distribution of income are often presented as positive declarations, as though 
any reference to value judgements or ethical statements might lessen their 
validity as scientific statements. In this respect, Wicksteed, Clark, Wicksell and 
Marshall all conform to later patterns of discourse in neoclassical distribution 
theory by quarantining and giving priority to the positive. However, in spite of a 
stress on the positive, a crossing over into the normative terrain is evident. And 
here we meet a high degree of tension that appears surprisingly common among 
the neoclassical theorists of the period. This tension reflects a general belief in 
the ‘fairness’ of the marginalist prescription that each factor receives a return 
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based on its marginal efficiency, and the ‘injustice’ of low wages and poverty. 
The emphasis on the need for government intervention through social policy 
actions to offset the injustices of low pay and poverty provides a basis for the 
tag of a ‘tendency towards socialism’ noted among commentators in respect of a 
range of first and second-generation neoclassical theorists. 
The concluding section brings together the various arguments presented 
in the paper and examines whether or not it is possible to discern common 
methodological features that allows us to refer to a given neoclassical method of 
deriving theories of the distribution of income. If methodological monism does 
not hold, what are the key methodological differences between the various 
theorists? Our task, then, is one of paradigm delineation assessed at the 
methodological level. And while the period of review chosen in the paper is 
limited, we shall have regard for the impact that the methodological stands 
taken by Marshall, Wicksteed, Wicksell and Clark had on the further 
development of the discipline. 
4.2  The Scope of Economic Theories: Universalism Vs. Relativism 
Neoclassical distribution theory developed rapidly in the late 1880s and early 
1890s, and, for the most part, it was universalist in design. Clark (1888a, 1888b, 
1890, 1891a, [1899]1908), Wicksteed (1889, [1894]1992) and Wicksell 
([1893]1954) represented, arguably, the three key figures in this universalist 
strand of neoclassical distribution theory.
5 
The adherence to a universalist position in Clark, Wicksteed and 
Wicksell involves three inter-connected common elements. The first and most 
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important is that there exists one single all-encompassing law of distribution 
that applies across all factors of production. Distribution theory does not 
comprise a series of separate theories of rent, wages and interest or profits. Nor 
is it residualist in form, composed of a core theory of wages or rent with 
remaining income determined as a residual. Rather, the ‘universalists’ argued 
that Ricardo’s marginalist theory of rent could also be applied (with 
amendment) to the remaining factors of production.
6 The second feature of the 
universalist position as it applied to neoclassical distribution theory was that no 
factor of production was unique. Each factor of production, irrespective of its 
separate qualities and attributes, was to be treated on equal terms in regard to 
the application of the marginalist principle. Of course, the special qualities and 
attributes of the factors of production are important in themselves, and clear 
differences in capital theory are evident between the three key universalists, 
with Wicksell providing arguably the clearest and most developed theory of 
capital. The third component of the universalist position was that theories of 
distribution (and exchange) were founded on a single all-embracing conception 
of economic behaviour, namely, one based on rational action. Rational action 
provided the behavioural reference point against which hypotheses concerning 
the distribution of income are to be assessed.
7 
Clark’s paper ‘A Possibility of a Scientific Law of Wages’ (Clark 
1888b) arguably provides the first clear methodological blueprint for how a 
theory of wages, within the emerging neoclassical framework, is to be organised 
if it is to be developed on a ‘scientific’ basis. The first key requirement is that a 
theory of wages must conform to ‘natural’ law. What Clark is referring to by his 
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use of the term ‘natural law’ is that the law of wages must be consistent with the 
‘native impulses in men and in society’ (Clark 1888b, pp. 39-40). The reference 
is, therefore, to the behavioural assumptions that are required to underpin the 
theory of wages. The ensuing discussion makes it clear that Clark is here 
referring not to a multitude of possible behaviours and customs but to a single, 
optimising self-seeking behavioural assumption. In other words, Clark is 
arguing that one (universal) behavioural assumption provides the necessary 
foundation on which to develop a theory of wages. The actions and motivations 
of man are ‘essentially simple’; so too are the laws of distribution that must 
account for them. The second requirement that Clark puts forward in regard to a 
scientific theory of wages is that the law of wages must have ‘universal’ appeal. 
What Clark is referring to here is the fact that the law of wages must apply 
regardless of context. It must, as he puts it, be capable of explaining wages in a 
monopolised environment just as much as in a competitive one. 
Clark’s third scientific method requirement is that the law of wages must 
be ‘remorselessly theoretical’. Clark does not deny that there is a time and place 
for a consideration of the ‘practical facts’ of life that may vitiate the laws of 
wages that are constructed. But what he argues against is that these practical 
facts should receive undue attention. In essence, Clark argues for a framework 
that favours both a single applicable method built around limited organising 
principles⎯rationality, self-seeking behaviour⎯and the development of a 
universalist law of distribution. For Clark, that universal law of distribution is 
the law of (using Clark’s terminology) final productivity.  
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Clark’s paper ‘The Possibility of a Scientific Law of Wages’ provides not 
only a methodological discussion but also, together with its ‘twin’ published in the 
same year (1888), ‘Capital and its Earnings’, the first tentative statements of a 
universalist theory of distribution itself based on the final productivity principle. 
These papers reveal Clark applying a final productivity principle to both capital 
and labour. As stated in ‘Capital and its Earnings’: ‘The Ricardian Law of Rent, 
when correctly stated, governs the market rent, not only of land, but of all concrete 
things into which pure capital enters’ (Clark 1888a, pp. 53-54). In ‘The Possibility 
of a Scientific Law of Wages’, Clark states that ‘general wages tend to equal the 
actual product created by the last labor that is added to the social working force’ 
(Clark 1888b, p. 49). 
Clark’s most explicit statement of the universal nature of the law of final 
productivity is found in his famous 1891 paper ‘Distribution as Determined by a 
Law of Rent’. The principle that has been made to govern the income derived 
from land actually governs the income derived from capital and from labor. 
Interest as a whole is rent; and even wages as a whole are so. Both of these 
incomes are ‘differential gains’, and are gauged in amount by the Ricardian 
formula’ (1891a, p. 289).
8 Later, this principle was to be reformulated by Clark 
in The Distribution of Wealth into perhaps the most well-known of all marginal 
productivity statements:  ‘Free competition tends to give to labor what labor 
creates, to capital what capital creates, and to entrepreneurs what the coordinating 
function creates’ (Clark [1899]1908, p. 3).
9 The law of final productivity for Clark 
is to be contrasted to the ‘higgling of the market’, which has only a narrow 
application. It represents the dominant force effecting economic outcomes.
10 
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If the law of final productivity is to apply to all factors of production, then 
it follows that it must explain away the total product. Clark’s recognition of the 
complexities of the product exhaustion issue is not immediate. Indeed, it can be 
argued that it is not until The Distribution of Wealth that we see Clark attempt to 
present a clear ‘proof’ (diagrammatic and verbal in Clark’s case) of the product 
exhaustion theorem. What Clark attempts to show in The Distribution of Wealth is 
the proposition that, if wages are determined according to the final productivity 
doctrine, then the difference between total product and the wages so derived must 
equal the amount of interest that is separately determined by that doctrine and vice 
versa; otherwise a residual results (see Clark 1899[1908] ch. 13). 
As we have seen, Clark’s final productivity theory was stated in strict 
universalist form, in that it applied equally to all factors of production and was 
centred on a single conception of the nature and structure of man (that of rational 
self-seeking ‘economic man’). Interestingly, however, it is possible to see a 
watering down of Clark’s theory of distribution when we examine The 
Distribution of Wealth more closely. Clark, in fact, entertained three theories of 
distribution. The fundamental or core element is the law of final productivity. For 
Clark, this law, however, applied only in static equilibrium. Around this core, 
Clark allowed for a ‘protective belt’ consisting of the ‘dynamic’ law of factor 
remuneration and the ‘law’ (it was never stated as such) of impediments to free 
competition and their effect on factor returns.
11 
In a favourite (physical sciences) analogy, the universal law of final 
productivity performs the same role for factor remuneration as weight, pressure 
and fluidity do for the flotation of ships on the ocean. Disturbances to the system 
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in the form of dynamic changes are smoothed out and wages and interest move 
back to levels consistent with the law of final productivity. While for any dynamic 
change the static competitive forces would apply, it is important to stress that the 
time expected for the impact of a change to be worked through is a long one 
(Clark suggests 20 years or more at one point). However, Clark suggests that often 
a number of dynamic changes occur simultaneously, leading to the (unproved) 
assertion of Clark’s that wages are ‘much nearer to what they would be under the 
influence of competition alone than it would be possible to have them if there were 
fewer disturbing forces working’ (Clark [1899]1908, p. 404). 
More important is the question of Clark’s conception of free competition 
and the forces which may impede the movement to static equilibrium. Two points 
are worth making in this context. First, in The Distribution of Wealth, Clark 
suggests that a legal monopoly does not simply impede the static law of final 
productivity, but destroys its application. More generally, trusts, other 
consolidations of capital, ‘traces’ of monopoly (imperfectly competitive market 
structures?), and labour unions may impede the application of static equilibrium 
forces. While The Distribution of Wealth, ends on a positive note—‘competition is 
an inextinguishable force’ (Clark [1899]1908, p. 441)—much of his subsequent 
work revolved around the growing problem of monopolies and trusts for the 
achievement of the desired competitive outcome. In ‘The Dynamics of the Wages 
Question’, published in 1902, Clark suggests that ‘monopoly may conceivably 
retard the rise of the standard of wages and at the same time cause the actual rate 
of pay to lag by an abnormal and increasingly long interval behind it’ (Clark 
1902b). In The Control of Trusts, Clark warns against the growing problem of 
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trusts and monopolies in reducing the impact of free competition. He goes on to 
outline a program of significant reform designed to limit the role of monopolistic 
elements (as well as destructive competition) and preserve competition.
12 
Clark was never satisfactorily to provide an analytical framework for the 
dynamic law of distribution or the role of impediments to free competition as he 
had done so for the final productivity doctrine, except insofar as he spelt out the 
various dynamic forces that applied (e.g., changes in social wants, changes in 
mechanical processes; alterations in the mode of organising society; and changes 
in factor supplies; Clark 1891a, p. 290). The universal law of distribution was 
exhaustive in terms of explanatory content in the static state, but required 
significant further supplementation to cover non-equilibrium states and 
impediments to free competition. 
We now turn to the work of Wicksteed, our second case study of the 
universalist strand of emerging neoclassical distribution theory. While links to a 
neoclassical theory of distribution are evident in Wicksteed’s early works, it 
was not until the publication of An Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of 
Distribution in 1894 that we see the first detailed presentation of a theory of 
distribution applicable across all factors. As with Clark, Wicksteed argues that 
there exist not separate theories of wages, profit, and rent based on independent 
coda but one theory of distribution that can be applied across all factors of 
production. His classic work, An Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of 
Distribution, proceeds in precise mathematical terms to the conclusion that each 
factor’s remuneration is based on its ‘marginal efficiency or significance’, with 
the sum of factor incomes so derived exhausting the product.
13 
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At an even higher level of generalisation, Wicksteed suggests that the 
same principles that guide the distribution of the product also determine market 
exchange outcomes. Value theory and distribution theory are inextricably 
linked. The theory of distribution is not a separate branch of economics. The 
principles of choice behaviour governing factor remuneration are synonymous 
with those governing general market exchange. Just as the exchange value of 
each commodity or service is determined by the effect on total satisfaction 
which the addition or the withdrawal of a small quantity of it would have, all 
other variables remaining constant, so the remuneration to each factor is given 
by effect on the product of a small increment of that factor all other factors 
remaining constant (Wicksteed [1894]1992, pp. 56-58). The marginalist 
principle involved is applicable to all factors and is consistent with the 
experience of general life (Wicksteed [1894]1992, pp. 58-61).  
Wicksteed maintained the emphasis on the universalist character of 
marginalist theory in his later works. As he puts it in The Common Sense of 
Political Economy: ‘There can be but one theory of distribution, and that the 
theory of the market’ (Wicksteed [1910]1933, p. 6). Or elsewhere in The 
Common Sense of Political Economy: ‘the underlying considerations that affect 
the terms on which effort is remunerated are identical with those that determine 
the price of commodities’ (Wicksteed [1910]1933, p. 332). 
Wicksteed, an enthusiastic supporter of Henry George, was undoubtedly 
affected by George’s emphasis on The Co-ordination of the Laws of 
Distribution (see George [1880]1906, p. 217).
14 However, the influences 
drawing him towards a universalist position are varied. Comte is one clear point 
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of early influence (Wicksteed 1875). Comte stated his position in terms of grand 
all-embracing laws. The best example of this is, of course, Comte’s well-known 
‘fundamental law’ of human progress in which all knowledge proceeds in three 
stages: the theological or fictitious, the metaphysical, and the scientific or 
abstract (Comte [1855]1974). Wicksteed’s Unitarian church affiliation may also 
have acted as an important early influence on the development of his 
universalist position particularly when set in the context of his theological 
statements on connectedness and unity. 
The third major neoclassical universalist is Wicksell, who published his 
first major economic work, Value, Capital and Rent, in 1893. The importance of 
Wicksell’s book to the development of neoclassical distribution theory lies in 
the explicit modelling of capital and time. An important feature of Value, 
Capital and Rent, for our purposes, is that it contains an extended explicit 
methodological discussion, which makes clear Wicksell’s view of the principle 
of relativity. 
Wicksell ([1893]1954, pp. 30-31), while admitting a role for historical 
inquiries in economics, suggests that the Historical School greatly exaggerates 
the role both of historical inquiries and of the degree of relativity of economic 
life (which would lead to a diminution of the possibility for universal laws): 
‘However valuable (indeed even indispensable) historical investigation may be 
for every social science (and consequently for political economy), it has value 
only in so far as it succeeds in revealing and throwing light on the general laws 
which govern and direct human action. Without the existence of such laws, 
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history itself would be inconceivable and what it teaches us of no avail to our 
generation and wholly inapplicable to the conditions of our own time.’ 
As with Wicksteed, Wicksell presents marginal productivity results in a 
calculus form. Taking output as a function of the factors of production, ‘then the 
share in the proceeds of the different factors of production must be proportional 
to the partial derivative of the above-mentioned function in respect of the factor 
in question as variable; and in this simple formula lies indeed the true solution 
to the problem, provided that at the same time the special position of capital as 
an element in production is sufficiently considered’ (Wicksell [1893]1954, p. 
25). Wicksell suggests that if this condition were not met then it would be more 
remunerative for the employer to employ less or more of the various factors. In 
this sense, Wicksell uses the principle of rational self-seeking behaviour to 
provide justification for the marginal productivity theory of distribution. He 
then proceeds to combine production based on the above principle with 
exchange equations based on a similar principle following the Walrasian 
method. His reference, in the above quote, to the ‘special position’ of capital 
relates to his extensions of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of capital. 
In contrast to Wicksell, Clark and Wicksteed, Marshall presents a quite 
different figure in regard to the universalist character of distribution theory. 
Marshall is neither a relativist in the Cunningham sense (who clashed head-on 
with Marshall on methodological matters in a series of papers between 1889 and 
1892) nor a universalist in the Wicksteed or Clark sense. Rather he represents a 
mixture of positions. He supports the use of general frameworks, but at the 
same time qualifies the applicability of laws derived from such frameworks. He 
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utilises the general demand and supply framework as an organising tool across a 
range of topics, but does not rely solely on conclusions from the abstract model. 
Facts and historical inquiry, for Marshall, are of critical importance in the 
development of a sound reasoned position.
15 ‘Ceteris paribus’ was for Marshall 
the most important of all economic terms. Rather than focus on a single 
principle such as the Clarkian principle of final productivity, he utilises 
marginal productivity theory within a broad set of influences on the distribution 
of income. Most importantly, the role of ‘economic man’ in the development of 
a distribution theory was severely curtailed by Marshall.  
The tone was set early in Marshall’s inaugural lecture at Cambridge 
‘The present position of economics’, in 1885 (Marshall [1885]1925). In that 
speech, he attacks Ricardo (and his followers) as being too universalist in both 
their conception of the nature of man and in their formulation of the theory of 
distribution.
16 On the former, he suggests Ricardo and his followers ‘regarded 
man as, so to speak, a constant quantity, and gave themselves too little trouble 
to study his variations’ (Marshall [1885]1925, pp. 154-155).
17 Marshall 
suggests that the use of a single conception of the motives and make-up of man 
‘did little harm so long as they treated of money and foreign trade, but great 
harm when they treated of the relations between the different industrial classes.’ 
In terms of distribution theory, Ricardo ‘laid down laws with regard to profits 
and wages that did not really hold even for England in their own time’ 
(Marshall [1885]1925, p. 155).  
In the Principles of Economics (hereafter Principles), Marshall develops 
further the limits to universality in the application of economic doctrines. He 
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suggests that ‘an economic law is applicable only to a narrow range of 
circumstances, which happen to exist together at one particular place and time, 
but quickly pass away. When they are gone the law, still true as an abstract 
proposition, has no longer any practical bearing, because the particular set of 
causes with which it deals are nowhere to be found acting together without 
important disturbance from other causes. Though much of the scheme of 
economic theory, much of its scientific machinery, is of wide application, we 
cannot insist too urgently that every age and every country has its own 
problems; and that every change in social conditions is likely to require a new 
development of economic doctrine’ Marshall (1890a, p.90). 
4.3  Theory Generation and Appraisal: The Deductive Method and 
the Role of Mathematics and Science 
The deductive method 
A strong argument can be put for viewing the hypothetico-deductive method as 
the central prescriptive methodological framework in modern economics. 
Following Hausman (1992), the hypothetico-deductive framework suggests that 
knowledge is and/or should be generated from a process of formulating theories 
or hypotheses, deducing predictions from these hypotheses, testing these 
predictions, and evaluating the hypotheses based on such tests. Rationality, 
deductivism, and empiricism are embedded in the approach. Stated in such a 
way, falsificationism can be thought of as nested within this broad framework 
and providing a sharper representation of it.
18 For example, falsificationism 
says that we cannot prove but can disconfirm a hypothesis; it provides a more 
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precise statement about what constitutes good science. In this context, we can 
ask a series of questions: did the four neoclassical distribution theorists espouse 
such a framework? Do they suggest problems with such an approach? If they 
espouse it do they follow it? If they do not espouse or follow such an approach, 
what approach do they espouse or follow? 
As in the case of universalism, the position of Wicksteed, Clark and 
Wicksell differs from that of Marshall with respect to the relative roles of 
deduction and induction in the development of economic principles. Clark, 
Wicksteed and Wicksell all develop their laws of distribution by deduction from 
general marginalist principles. In this sense, Clark, Wicksell and Wicksteed 
present a clearly defined deductivist position. A striking feature of the work of 
Wicksteed is that no regard whatsoever is paid to any detailed statistical 
analysis of relevant data and little reference made to the role of institutional 
forces and specific policy developments; the same is not true of Clark and 
Wicksell who both note the need to test hypotheses against the facts.
19 In 
contrast, Marshall stresses the applicability of both inductive and deductive 
methods to the development of a theory of distribution. Ultimately, he views the 
two modes of analysis as being inseparable; one is needed along with the other. 
The division between Wicksteed, Clark and Wicksell on the one hand 
and Marshall on the other, in respect to the role of deduction and induction, 
should not surprise us. If a belief is held that there exist universal laws of 
distribution independent of time and place, then it follows that there is a reduced 
requirement to undertake detailed descriptive and historical accounts for a given 
epoch from which period and country-specific laws can be derived. In the limit, 
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it would appear that the universal law obviates the need to undertake detailed 
analyses of the operations of a particular economy. Once the universal law is 
determined, it becomes a matter of deducing from this law more specific laws 
by a hierarchical process. 
While there remains a natural link between universalism and the 
deductive method, the adherence to a universalist position does not in fact 
obviate the need to undertake corroborative empirical analyses. Nor does it 
remove from view the question of the basis for the original derivation of the 
universal law. An economic doctrine (whether universalist or not) requires 
corroborative evidence to be maintained. Otherwise, it must be passed over. 
Both Clark and Wicksteed skirt the question of corroboration by suggesting that 
the universal laws of distribution are based on subjectivist self-evident truths 
(e.g., that man is a self-interested egoist). The principles on which the 
universalist laws of distribution are based can be corroborated by simple 
introspection or, in the language of Wicksteed, by simple recourse to ‘common 
sense’. 
Marshall’s approach to the question of induction versus deduction was 
not one of support for either position as such. Rather his view was simply that 
deduction and induction were part of an integrated methodology. Both the 
techniques of induction and of deduction were required. In a letter to J.N. 
Keynes in 1890 in reference to Keynes’s treatise, Marshall suggests that the 
separation of induction from deduction is artificial, as ‘one involves the 
other…historians are always deducing …and even the most deductive writers 
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are always implicitly at least basing themselves on observed facts’ (Whitaker 
1996, volume 2, pp. 338-339). 
In the Principles, Marshall suggests that ‘induction and deduction go 
hand in hand. The progress of economic reasoning depends on the study of 
economic facts, and on the other hand, that study itself requires to be guided and 
directed by the scientific knowledge which is the outcome and abstract of a 
previous study of facts’ (Marshall 1890, p. 76). General statements or laws are 
derived as a result of the careful analysis of facts. Facts enter the process again 
when it comes to the verification of those theories. The role of deduction arises 
when new laws and principles can be derived from the core principles and laws 
derived from the inductive process. In other words, every step in the 
formulation of economic statements requires both induction and deduction. 
Marshall’s stress on the study of the facts arises in part from his belief 
that self-seeking ‘economic man’ does not have universal applicability: ‘Those 
actions that are governed by free enterprise and self-regarding motives are, as 
we have seen, those which are most easily reduced to law and measured; and 
reasonings with regard to such actions afford the simplest types of economic 
theory: but they are not the whole of it’ (Marshall 1890a, p. 86). 
The role of mathematics and science 
The interconnections between mathematics, science, and the methodology of 
economics are large. Firstly, we need to consider the question of the language in 
which theories and hypotheses are generated. This is the issue of formalism 
(Davis 1999, Hausman 1998, Punzo 1991, Chick 1998, Krugman 1998). Under 
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logical positivism, theories need to be stated using strictly defined terms, which 
are brought together in hypotheses and theoretical statements in such a way that 
the principles of logic are adhered to. In other words, theory development must 
conform to the requirements of formal logic. Against this is the view that 
imprecision is embedded in the subject matter of economics and that economics 
must use the language of its own subject matter. This leads to a ‘common sense’ 
presentation of theory.  
Secondly, and closely connected to the first issue, mathematical 
instrumentalism suggests that through the use of mathematical techniques we 
can learn things about the world that we may otherwise not have known. In a 
weak sense, mathematical instrumentalism says that we can use mathematics as 
a check on the development of our ideas. In a strong sense, mathematics 
generates truths. The neoclassical theorists we examine all use mathematics to 
varying degrees. In this section, we describe the use of mathematics in the 
works of the key theorists. 
Both Wicksteed and Wicksell rely heavily on mathematical structures to 
develop and explain their theories. In the case of Clark, this was simply by way 
of diagrammatic illustration (which extended to a proof of the exhaustion of the 
product). Wicksteed’s and Wicksell’s presentation of the marginalist theory of 
distribution in terms of the application of the differential calculus was clearly of 
greater importance. While Wicksteed’s 1894 work An Essay on the Co-
ordination of the Laws of Distribution attracted immediate attention among the 
key theorists of the period (for example, Walras, Barone, and Flux), Wicksell’s 
1893 Value, Capital and Rent was little noticed. Both books had no readership 
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among the general public, something which could not be said for Marshall’s 
Principles. 
The Co-ordination of the Laws of Distribution and Value, Capital and 
Rent provide not only the highpoint of a universalist stream of development, but 
also an emphasis on stating the theory of distribution within a mathematical 
framework. Of the two books, Wicksteed’s is the more explicit in terms of the 
calculus of the marginal productivity doctrine. Each factor’s (K) share in the 
total product (P) is given by ∂P/∂K.K. In other words, the rate of payment for 
each factor is its relevant marginal product with the total value of payment 
being set equal to the rate of payment times the quantity of the factor used. A 
tortuous proof followed of the fact that if each factor were so paid then the 
product would be exhausted, so ensuring internal consistency. As in the case of 
Wicksteed’s adherence to a universalist position, so his desire to present his 
theory of distribution in mathematical form may have been influenced by 
Comte, who puts particular emphasis on mathematics as the foundation stone of 
scientific sociology. 
Wicksell’s presentation of the marginal productivity doctrine is not set 
out in as simple terms (see, for example, Wicksell [1893]1954, p. 151) as that of 
Wicksteed, leading Stigler (1941) to claim (p 293) that ‘Wicksell’s mode of 
presentation in the Über Wert [Value, Capital and Rent] unfortunately obscures 
the fact that he is presenting the first complete mathematical formulation of the 
marginal productivity theory of distribution’. However, what he loses in terms 
of a precise statement of the marginal productivity doctrine itself he makes up 
for in terms of a more structured mathematical model.
20 There are three key 
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elements of this more structured setting. First, unlike Wicksteed there is an 
explicit attention to time (following closely Böhm-Bawerk) through the 
modelling of production in terms of production periods. Second, Wicksell sets 
his model within a general equilibrium framework. Third, he incorporates, in a 
structured way, a role for capital. In other words, Wicksell’s mathematical 
model extends both Böhm-Bawerk (on capital and time) and Walras (on 
exchange, production, and the general equilibrium framework). 
Interestingly, given the Mirowski (1989) thesis of significant borrowings 
from physics, little use is made by Wicksell, Clark and Wicksteed of analogies 
from the natural sciences. The role of physical and biological analogies is given 
greater prominence in the work of Marshall.
21 Analogies from mechanics are 
relevant when our interest is limited to the movement of unchanging economic 
entities and variables towards some central point. The more complex case is that 
when we allow the character of those entities to evolve over time. This is the 
case more relevant to biology and in particular to models of evolution (Marshall 
[1898]1925). Marshall suggests, that in the early stages of economic model 
building, the emphasis on physical analogies is more likely, but pre-eminence 
should be given to biological analogies as economics moves towards a more 
structured presentation of economic life. As set out in the Principles, 
‘economics, like biology, deals with a matter, of which the inner nature and 
constitution, as well as the outer form are constantly changing’ (Marshall 1961, 
p.772).
22 
In terms of his use of mathematics, the early writings of Marshall (i.e., 
prior to the 1880s) reveal the presentation of marginal productivity theorems 
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based on the differential calculus (drawing on von Thünen) and the heavy use of 
mathematics in other contexts (such as in terms of the pure theory of trade).
23 
Marshall also attempted, in this early period, the task of converting Mill’s 
theories into mathematics because he could work through the material more 
clearly in a mathematical form.
24 However, in the Principles and other later 
major published work Marshall rarely uses mathematics at all, and when he 
does so he relegates mathematical expression to appendixes (much of which, 
Marshall suggests, was written in his early period). What role then did Marshall 
see mathematics playing in economic analysis? 
The evidence from Marshall’s correspondence points to a view that he 
saw mathematics as a tool in the development of economic theories. At the 
same time, it is clear that, for Marshall, mathematics cannot capture the richness 
and dynamics of economic life and may constrain economic theory if taken too 
far. In a letter to Bowley, Marshall suggests that ‘A good mathematical theorem 
dealing with economic hypotheses was very unlikely to be good economics’ 
(Whitaker 1996 volume 3, p. 130). 
4.4  The Positive and Normative Divide: Ethics and Justice in the 
Labour Market and in Public Policy 
We have emphasised the distinction between the position, of Wicksell, Clark and 
Wicksteed on the one hand and Marshall on the other in regard to universalism, 
the deductive method and formalism. There is, however, a greater degree of 
commonality when it comes to the question of the treatment of ethical questions. 
Following the precepts of J.N. Keynes, all three engage in the practice of 
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demarcating the positive from the normative. Yet all four make clear ethical 
judgements on what ‘ought to be’, judgements which turn out to be surprisingly 
close to one another. The policy prescriptions of Clark, Wicksteed, Wicksell and 
Marshall are remarkably similar.
25 
Ethical concerns are fundamental to a reading of the development of 
neoclassical distribution theory. Ethics enters into an analysis of the 
development of neoclassical distribution theory in one of two ways. The first 
channel is a methodological one relating to the status of distributive justice 
statements in economics. Should a sharp demarcation line be drawn between the 
positive and the normative in economics? Should the theory of how the product 
is divided be quarantined from statements of how the product should be 
divided? The second channel through which ethics enters into neoclassical 
distribution theory is a more direct one. It relates to how ethical theory provides 
an important foundation stone for the framing of distributive justice statements 
once they are admitted as valid statements in economic discourse. The first of 
these issues is of primary interest in the present paper.  
Clark makes the observation early on in The Distribution of Wealth that 
whether or not the final productivity principle provides for just outcomes is not a 
question for economists to address. That is an ethical issue: ‘Whether labor gets 
what it produces or not is a question of economic fact not of ethics and it is not for 
him to make ethical judgements’ (Clark [1899]1908, pp. 8-9). In other words, 
Clark wishes to set a strict demarcation line between the positive and the 
normative. However, regardless of his stated desire to present a value-free theory, 
he does step over the positive divide and moves into the normative arena.
  26 
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Despite his protestations, he attaches ethical content to his reading of factor 
remuneration outcomes. And when he does so the outcome is not clear-cut. We 
can summarise Clark’s position in two propositions. 
First, the final productivity law provides just and ethically right outcomes 
under conditions of perfect competition. For example, at the end of his discussion 
of von Thünen’s marginal productivity theory in The Distribution of Wealth Clark 
suggests that (as ‘von Thünen did not suspect’) the ‘natural law of wages gives a 
result that would satisfy his own requirement, as being desirable and morally 
justifiable’ in that it does not involve exploitation (Clark [1899]1908, p. 324). In 
Social Justice without Socialism he states that the ‘fundamental law [of final 
productivity] makes for justice …[and] it is impossible to prevent it from working’ 
(Clark 1914, p. 35). 
Second, when individual workers bargain against employers the potential 
exists for unjust outcomes for labour and a possible beneficial role for 
arbitration. In ‘Is Authoritative Arbitration Inevitable?’ (Clark 1902a), ‘The 
Minimum Wage’ (Clark 1913), Social Justice without Socialism, and Essentials 
of Economic Theory, Clark promotes the extension of efficient trade unions as a 
necessary condition for the payment of wages equivalent to the fair standard. 
Without unions in the field, equilibrium wages are below the natural rate or 
static standard, so that exploitation of labour results. The natural rate lies above 
the ‘amount that idle men may here and there consent to take’ (Clark 1902a, p. 
566). In modern terminology, the natural rate should not be driven down to the 
reservation wages of the involuntarily unemployed. The natural rate coincides 
with the level ‘a union that is extended and efficient but not monopolistic can 
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get’ (Clark, 1902a, p. 566). (Indeed the argument progresses to the point that we 
can read off from a non-monopolistic union-influenced wage what the static 
standard is.) By a monopolistic union, Clark means one that uses force to 
restrict the mobility of non-unionised labour. This discussion implies that free 
competition does not involve individual labour bargaining with employers, as 
this entails inequality in the bargaining relationship. The introduction of the 
union brings about equality in the bargain.  
It is in this context that a role for arbitration exists. Clark suggests that the 
law of final productivity works most efficiently when competing employers 
bargain with locally unionised labourers (Clark 1907). However, there is a role for 
arbitration to set such rates of pay consistent with such an outcome when these 
conditions do not prevail. 
As we shall see with Marshall, there is an emphasis in Clark on the 
inequalities in the bargaining process that hold between individual workers and 
employers and which lead to exploitative outcomes.
27 Unions provide, in this 
model, a necessary counter to employers who opportunistically exploit asset 
specificity among workers to achieve exploitative wage outcomes. Monopolistic 
elements in the commodity market also interfere with the workings of free 
competition and these forces together provide a rationale for state intervention.
28 
In common with Clark and other key neoclassical thinkers of his time, 
Wicksteed both protects a notion of fairness in remuneration according to 
marginal products, while allowing for the dual possibility of underpayment 
according to these principles in non-competitive markets and underpayment 
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according to need. These latter two injustices support a role for state action for 
their amelioration.  
Imperfections in markets may result in earnings not being set by 
economic forces; underpayment results. The appropriate remedy is for the 
obstacles to competition to be removed. In addition, custom may dictate 
outcomes different from those suggested by economic forces. Moreover, in 
some markets it may be difficult to determine the appropriate economic wage. 
In other cases, the economic wage will be volatile, creating menu costs (as in 
modern new Keynesian macroeconomics) that would mean that a pooled (or 
average) contract wage would be a more efficient solution. 
Where economic forces result in low wage outcomes against needs-
based criteria, Wicksteed advocated, in The Common Sense of Political 
Economy, policies of ‘changing the people’ and ‘changing their place’. A 
‘changing the people’ policy is based on making people worth more through 
training and education enhancement. A ‘changing their place’ option means 
shifting people to areas where they are worth more. In terms of the former 
directive, Wicksteed supported a tax on the ‘unearned increment’ together with 
a super tax on high ‘earned income’ as a means of supporting training and 
education programs. 
Wicksteed’s support for an expanded role for the state in the 
development of public programs did not extend to the advocacy of living wage 
policies to relieve the low wage problem. As set out in The Common Sense of 
Political Economy, ‘the idea that life can be improved by a simple decree that 
higher wages shall be paid, in other words the hope of social regeneration by the 
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enactment of a minimum wage, appears illusory. We have noted again and 
again that you cannot make a man worth so much a week by saying that he shall 
receive it’ (Wicksteed [1910]1933, p. 699). 
Wicksteed’s strong line against a living wage policy but advocacy of 
government programs to alleviate poverty by ‘changing the people’ means that 
he is difficult to classify in terms of his position on socialism.
29 In this respect, 
he is similar to both Marshall and Pigou, who shared with Wicksteed a concern 
with living wage policies and yet supported an expanded role for the state 
sector. In the year (1895) following the publication of An Essay on the Co-
ordination of the Laws of Distribution, Wicksteed provided support for a more 
equal distribution of wealth in his short paper ‘The Advent of the People’.
30 In 
so doing he presents the classic (marginal) utilitarian defence of greater 
equality: ‘a more even distribution of wealth would obviously relieve misery so 
intense that it would be more than a compensation for the loss of enjoyment at 
the other end by which it would have to be purchased. By a well-known law that 
lies at the basis of all sound consideration of social phenomena, each successive 
application of wealth to the supply of the wants of the same individual becomes 
less and less effective as a producer of satisfaction’ (Wicksteed 1895, pp. 237-
238). 
Wicksteed’s paper also presents an interesting account of a standard for 
a just distribution of wealth. The point of interest is that the account of justice 
presented combines Wicksteed’s interest in medieval studies and his adherence 
to the marginalist method. He indicates that the medieval conception of justice 
consists in the ‘presentation by man of that balance established by God and 
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nature between capacities and opportunities’. He goes on to add that ‘if we look 
at society as it now is we see capacities starved of opportunity alike by excess 
and by defect of wealth, and our cry for justice is not a cry for a dead level, but 
a cry for the opening up of opportunities’ (Wicksteed 1895, p. 242). 
While Wicksteed argued for a more equal distribution of wealth in his 
1895 paper, he clarified his position on how this was to be achieved in a paper 
delivered at the Inter-denominational Summer School in 1913. The paper’s title 
was ‘The Distinction between Earnings and Income, and between a Minimum 
Wage and a Decent Maintenance: a Challenge’. The issue of the living wage 
was one of the key policy issues of the time and had attracted the attention of a 
number of economists who, in the main, opposed the policy. 
Wicksteed argues that a distinction should be maintained between the 
concept of ‘wages’ and ‘maintenance’. While wages should not be forced 
beyond the levels determined by economic forces, workers on low wages should 
receive additional support to achieve a decent standard of living. Wicksteed puts 
the case for a separation between the demand for a ‘decent standard of living’ 
and a ‘living wage’ very clearly: ‘My contention is, that …we shall see that the 
proposed living wage is intrinsically impossible as a complete solution, and that 
even if legislation in the direction of raising wages should turn out to be 
desirable and effective on its own ground, it will still be necessary to 
supplement it by other instrumentalities; and further that if we attempt to make 
living wage legislation do what it cannot in its nature do, we shall be sure to 
aggravate at one end even if we partially relieve at the other the very evils we 
are seeking to remove’ (Wicksteed 1913, p. 77). 
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While not supporting a living wage policy, Wicksteed does not suggest 
that there is no role for government intervention in the labour market: 
‘Obviously, direct legislation as such, cannot raise this maximum economic 
wage. But it does not follow that legislation can do nothing. In the first place we 
can hope to make the average worker actually worth more, intrinsically, by 
education and training, and in some cases by the very fact of raising his wage; 
in the next place we may hope to place him where his work will count for most, 
by labour exchanges and so forth; and in the third place we may hope to 
supplement (and also perhaps to control) the action of trade unions in seeing to 
it that he actually gets his maximum wage, i.e., the true incremental value of his 
work’ (Wicksteed 1913, pp. 81-82). 
Like both Wicksteed and Clark, Marshall moves the analysis of 
distribution theory beyond the positive and into the domain both of normative 
judgement and policy advice.
31 A constant theme in Marshall’s work is the 
recognition that labour may be at a disadvantage in the bargaining process and 
that therefore wage outcomes may be unjust. Bargaining disadvantage results 
from the fact that labour is ‘perishable’ (skills decay when workers are 
unemployed) and because workers are often poor and so have no reserve fund. 
As a consequence, workers cannot withhold labour from the market. Marshall 
also notes that the disadvantage of labour is ‘likely to be cumulative in its 
effects’ (Marshall 1961, p. 569). Here Marshall uses a biological analogy to 
good effect. A lower wage reduces a worker’s efficiency and thereby reduces 
the ‘normal value of his labour’ and also ‘diminishes his efficiency as a 
bargainer’. 
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To overcome the problem of low wages, Marshall consistently 
emphasised the positive role of education, good health and housing as the 
appropriate remedies. His argument is well known. A first-rate education and 
good living conditions, improves the productivity of workers. It also results in a 
decline in the number of unskilled labourers. As a consequence of these 
combined supply and demand forces, real wages would rise. These remedies 
would not have immediate effect but would take a generation or two. State 
intervention was required to achieve appropriate standards. The education of the 
people is ‘a national duty and national economy’. In terms of public 
expenditures, he is explicit in suggesting that ‘public money must flow freely’ 
(Marshall 1961, p. 718). 
4.5  Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that Wicksteed’s, Clark’s and Wicksell’s 
contributions to the development of neoclassical distribution theory share a 
number of distinctive characteristics. These include an adherence to a 
universalist statement of distribution theory and a methodology based on 
deduction, abstraction, and rationality. 
A universalist theory of distribution, as set out by Clark, Wicksell and 
Wicksteed, has a number of features. First, and fundamentally, it refers to the 
fact that there exists a general principle of distribution that can be applied across 
all factors of production. The requirement to specify separate theories of rent, 
wages, and interest is, therefore, negated. An important consequence of 
Wicksteed’s, Clark’s and Wicksell’s universalist approach is that it implies a 
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rejection of what might be termed residualism. Residualism relies on the 
identity that if there exist n factors of production together with an explanation 
for the division of the total product that applies to at least one of the factors, 
then the remaining factor returns can be determined as a residual. (If we have a 
theory of rent alone, then wages and interest fall out as the residual; if we have a 
theory of wages and a theory of rent, then interest falls out as a residual.) The 
Wicksteed-Clark-Wicksell universalist approach, on the other hand, requires 
that no recourse can be made to the residual catch-all term. The universalist 
principle that is meant to determine all factor shares must, simultaneously, 
ensure that the product is thereby exhausted. If it cannot be proved that the 
product is exhausted through the application of the universalist principle then 
there remains an element(s) of the total product that remains unexplained by the 
principle. This acts to undermine the universalist claim. Hence the extensive 
efforts by Wicksteed, Clark and Wicksell to prove that the product is indeed 
exhausted when the universalist principle is applied. 
The Clark-Wicksteed-Wicksell universalist approach further suggests 
that no particular factor of production assumes a special place in the theoretical 
structure. The return to capital is in no different a position from the return to 
labour or land. Moreover, the statements of Wicksteed, Clark and Wicksell are 
universalist in another sense, in that they deny the possibility of alternative 
truths concerning the distribution of the product. Universalism for Wicksteed, 
Clark and Wicksell is exclusionary in nature. Finally, the universalist character 
of the Wicksteed-Clark-Wicksell approach can be found in the fact that it is 
grounded in a single principle of human behaviour, that is, the optimising 
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rational agent. To give added force to the applicability of this principle, 
Wicksteed suggested that the economic principles derived from the rational 
agent assumption were simply a matter of ‘common sense’. 
In contrast, Marshall placed strict limits on the applicability of the laws 
of distribution, allowed for a greater range of causal factors, and put significant 
emphasis on the role of facts in both uncovering the laws of distribution and 
corroborating those laws. The pre-eminent role given to the ‘economic man’ 
construct was significantly reduced. 
Whatever their differences on method, all four theorists, Wicksteed, 
Clark, Wicksell and Marshall took very similar positions in regard to wage 
outcomes. There is a general assertion of the notion of fairness in remuneration 
according to marginal products. But labour can be at a disadvantage in the 
marketplace (which should be corrected and gives unions their force). 
Moreover, the state should intervene to attack the sources of work-related 
poverty, namely, poor education and living conditions. 
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Notes 
 
∗ I would like to thank Herb Thompson, Ray Petridis, and John King for their 
comments on previous versions of this paper. The paper benefited from the comments 
of two anonymous referees and from conference participants at the 1999 History of 
Economic Thought Society of Australia Conference, at which a much earlier version of 
this paper was given. 
1 See Moore (2001) for an overview of the part played by J.N. Keynes’s The Scope and 
Method of Political Economy in the English methodological debates of the late 19
th 
century. Phyllis Deane’s book The Life and Times of J. Neville Keynes (which was 
published in 2001 shortly after the present paper was written) provides an excellent 
biographical sketch of Keynes and a discussion of Keynes’s The Scope and Method of 
Political Economy.  
2 J.N. Keynes recognised that it is not necessarily true that each of these elements of 
methodology need be grouped together in such a way, nor that economists would fall 
neatly into one or other methodological camps. Keynes himself prescribed neither of 
his two methodological models, opting instead for a mixture of the two. Deane (2001 
pp. 140-142) notes that Marshall ‘had a positive aversion to hard and fast demarcation 
lines’ presented in Keynes’s schema. 
3 Groenewegen (1995a) provides a detailed examination of Cunningham’s criticism of 
Marshall and the ensuing debate between the two. See also Whitaker (1996 volume 1, 
pp. 363-366) who reproduces a report from a Cambridge Senate meeting of 7 March 
1889 on a proposal to allow students specialising in Economics in Part II of the Moral 
Science Tripos to substitute Political Philosophy for Metaphysics. Cunningham and 
Marshall took strong opposing positions in this debate. Moggridge (1997) and Moore 204 
                                                                                                                                  
(2001) set the debate between Marshall and Cunningham in the wider context of the 
British historical school debates. 
4 See Armstrong (1978), Kincaid (1996), Beuchamp and Childress (1997), Lamarque 
(1999), Gewirth (1988), and Pütz and Verspoor (2000) for the relevance of the 
relativist vs. universalist debate across the biological, physical and social sciences, 
medicine, philosophy, logic, aesthetics and linguistics. 
5 While we emphasise the work of Clark, Wicksteed and Wicksell in this paper, Webb 
(1888), Wood (1888-89) and Hobson (1891) also presented early universalist-oriented 
neoclassical theories of distribution. See Schneider (1996) for a critical account of the 
role of Clark and Hobson in the development of the neoclassical theory of distribution 
and, in particular, the relationship between their contemporaneous articles in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1891. 
6 As pointed out by a referee (to the published paper), Ricardian marginalist theory is 
different from neoclassical marginal productivity theory. In the former, the same 
quantities of non-labour (and non-substitutable) inputs are applied to additional plots of 
land which are less fertile. The non-labour inputs are homogeneous while land is 
heterogeneous. 
7 Some care must be taken when using the phrase ‘rational action’ in reference to the 
three ‘universalist theorists’ and to Wicksteed in particular. In The Common Sense of 
Political Economy, Wicksteed makes frequent comment about the limitations of taking 
a narrow, self-seeking, individualistic, or wealth-oriented view of ‘rationality’ and of 
‘economic man’. He suggests that economics must account for altruistic motives and 
for the co-ordination of peoples’ actions. Nevertheless, his theoretical structure is based 
on each actor doing his or her best given their motives (wealth-oriented or otherwise) 
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and the constraints they face. Taking such a position, Wicksteed argues, is in accord 
with plain common sense. See chapter 2 of the thesis for a more detailed discussion of 
Wicksteed’s position. 
8  Hobson (1891, p. 263) writing at the same time, and clearly unaware of Clark’s 
contributions, suggests: ‘It is strange that writers like General Walker and Mr Gunton, 
who have rigidly applied [the law of rent] to profits, should have failed to see that it is 
equally applicable to the other participants of the net product’. 
9 Karayiannis (2005, p. 86) points out that Clark paid particular attention to the role of 
the entrepreneur beyond the management and co-ordinating function of the enterprise 
and, consequently, the returns to the entrepreneurship function. As Karayiannis (2005) 
suggests, Clark emphasises the fact that innovative activity on the part of an 
entrepreneur, which decreases the cost of production, results in a “pure profit” (1891a, 
p. 313). Such a profit exists until the role of imitators increases the quantity supplied 
and, thus, lowers the price to a new lower level which includes only a reward for the 
management of the enterprise. See also Clark (1891b) and Clark, J.B. (1899[1908] pp. 
405, 410, 425). 
10 For a more detailed treatment of Clark’s distribution theory, see Henry (1982), 
(1983), (1995), and Morgan (1994). 
11 See Clark (1891b), ([1899]1908), (1902b), (1904) (1907). 
12 As pointed out by a referee, Clark does allude to a check on the adverse impacts of 
monopolies. If monopolies attempt to charge monopoly prices, the higher profits would 
induce entry into the industry. As a consequence, the monopolist would not set prices 
so high as to elicit entry into the industry. See Henry (1995, chapter 7) for a further 
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discussion of Clark’s treatment of monopoly, workers’ bargaining strength and labour 
unions. 
13 Wicksteed’s discussion of the product exhaustion theorem is tortuous. As Flux 
(1894) immediately pointed out, Wicksteed’s discussion could be simplified by 
reference to Euler’s Theorem. If the production function (P = f (A, B, C,…) is a 
linearly homogenous function, then, by Euler’s Theorem: 
P = A(∂P/∂A) + B(∂P/∂B) + (∂P/∂C) + …... 
The role of the product exhaustion theorem in studies on Wicksteed’s theory of 
distribution (and neoclassical distribution theory more generally) remained a point of 
significant interest. See, in particular, Joan Robinson’s (1933b), (1934a) reviews of 
Wicksteed’s contributions, Steedman (1992) and Makowski and Ostry (1992). 
14 A referee points out that, while Wicksteed was a very strong supporter of Henry 
George, Clark certainly was not (see Henry 1995). The same applies to Marshall (see 
Stigler 1969, and Groenewegen 1995a). 
15 On universalism and Marshall, see, in particular, Groenewegen (1995b, pp. 138-
141). 
16 While Marshall attacked Ricardo in regard to these issues in his inaugural speech, he 
did, of course, have a very high regard for his work generally. 
17 Marshall did not alter his views on this matter when it came to the Principles. He 
repeated exactly the same point in the Appendix to the Principles entitled ‘The growth 
of economic science’ (Marshall 1961). 
18 See Popper ([1934]1959), (1989), Lakatos and Musgrave (1970), De Marchi (1988), 
and Hausman (1992). 
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19 As pointed out by an examiner to the thesis, Clark did argue, in The Distribution of 
Wealth of the need to check both the assumptions and conclusions of theories with the 
facts (see Clark (1899[1908] pp. 73-75). However, the implementation of such a 
program is a matter for the future. As Jalladeau (1975, pp. 221-223) points out, the 
imperative to develop a mathematical statement of economic theories and to 
corroborate theories with the evidence is much weaker in Clark than in Jevons and 
Walras. Wicksell also argued for the importance of statistical evidence to the study of 
economics in his Lectures (Wicksell [1901]1934, pp. 9-10), and in his 1904 paper Ends 
and Means republished in his selected works (Wicksell ([1904]1969). However, in his 
key statements of the theory of distribution, there is little attempt to use evidence to 
verify or refute particular propositions. 
20 Wicksell’s recognised that mathematics had an important role to play in economics 
but also recognised the limitations in its application to economics arising from the 
limited availability of statistical data. In his 1925 ‘Mathematical Economics’ paper 
republished in Selected Papers on Economics, Wicksell suggests that ‘mathematics has 
the same usefulness in economics as it has everywhere else—it helps us to think; that 
is, to the extent to which it can actually be applied, which unfortunately is not very far, 
on account of the lack of sufficient, or sufficiently exact, statistical data. It cannot 
replace actual thinking, of course—the occasional attempts which have been made in 
that direction have not turned out well—but it contributes a great deal to clarity and 
vigour of thought by defining inflexibly the assumptions and concepts upon which our 
reasoning is based, and which (otherwise) are only too liable to change their form, or 
even to become totally obscured, during the course of a long and complicated chain of 
reasoning, so that in the end there is no sure distinction between premises [sic] and 
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conclusion’ (Wicksell [1925]1969, p. 204). I am grateful to an examiner of this thesis 
for drawing this paper to my attention. 
21 As noted by an examiner of the thesis, Clark appears to have been influenced by 
Darwinian evolutionary theory (see Clark [1886]1967 pp. 37-38) but the use made of 
biological analogies is limited. 
22 Marshall’s key statement on the role of biological analogies in economics is given in 
Marshall (1898). The role of biological analogies in Marshall’s work is given much 
fuller treatment in Dooley (1985), Loasby (1986), Boland (1990), Loasby (1990), 
Niman (1991), Thomas (1991), Foss (1991), Hart (1992), Foster (1993), Prendergast 
(1993), Nightingale (1993) and Foss (1994). 
23 See Whitaker (1996). 
24 See Whitaker (1996) and Groenewegen (1995a). 
25 We focus on the work of Clark, Wicksteed and Marshall in what follows. Our 
interest lies primarily in labour market concerns and this was not a strong focus in 
Wicksell’s work. Wicksell did, however, have a strong interest in population control 
and supported a strong role for the state in reducing inequalities in income and wealth. 
See Gårdlund (1958), and Uhr (1960), (1991). 
26 The espousal of a positive/normative divide, combined with a practice in which 
ethical concerns figure clearly in the development of economic models, is also evident 
in Marshall’s work. Indeed the role of individual ethical motives is given some 
emphasis in Marshall. Maloney (1985, chapter 9), Coats (1990) and Groenewegen 
(1995a, 1995b) provide a detailed discussion of Marshall and ethics. 
 209 
                                                                                                                                  
27 As pointed out by an examiner of the thesis, both Marshall and Clark followed Adam 
Smith’s ([1776]1904) Wealth of Nations in this respect. 
28 For further discussion of Clark’s defence of arbitration and minimum wage 
legislation see Prasch (2000). 
29 To further confuse the characterisation, recall Wicksteed’s well-known attack on 
Marxian economics in his first major economic article, ‘The Marxian theory of value. 
Das Kapital: a criticism’ Wicksteed ([1884]1933). 
30 Wicksteed’s paper is included amongst a collection of papers in The New Party, 
edited by Andrew Reid. Interestingly, Reid advocates in the book the formation of a 
new political party called ‘The New Party and National Union of Socialists’. Another 
contributor to the book was Keir Hardie (‘On the Independent Labour Party’). Reid’s 
boast that around one-third of current Liberal party members would join the new Party 
the day his book was published remained unfulfilled. 
31 See Flatau (1997a–chapter 3) for a fuller account of Marshall’s analysis of fair 
wages and the remedies for low wage outcomes. 
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5.  Hicks’s The Theory of Wages: Its Place in the History of 
Neoclassical Distribution Theory
∗ 
 
History of Economics Review, Summer 2002, Number 36, 44-65. 
(with revisions) 
5.1  Introduction 
Hicks’s The Theory of Wages was published some 70 years ago now, in 1932. 
At the time of publication, Hicks believed that there had been little 
development, over the preceding thirty years, in neoclassical distribution theory. 
He was also clear in his view of the place of The Theory of Wages in the history 
of wages theory: ‘The task which is attempted in this book is a restatement of 
the theory of wages’ (Hicks 1932a, p. v). He goes on to suggest that the ‘most 
recent comprehensive statements of a positive theory of wages in English⎯of 
anything more than an elementary character⎯are now thirty or forty years old’ 
(Hicks 1932a, p. v). He cites Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890a) and 
Clark’s The Distribution of Wealth (1899[1908]) as his key reference points.
1 
In contrast with this bullish contemporaneous assessment of The Theory 
of Wages, Hicks turned against his work, first in his paper ‘Wages and Interest: 
the Dynamic Problem’ (Hicks 1935b), and then again some thirty years later in 
his commentary on his book (Hicks 1963). As he suggested in the 1963 
reprinting of The Theory of Wages: ‘I let it go out of print because my own 
views upon its subject had changed so much that I no longer desired to be 
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represented by it’ (Hicks 1963, p. v). He refers to the book as a ‘juvenile work, 
which (almost at once) I felt myself to have outgrown’ (Hicks 1963, pp. 310-
311). In his 1963 commentary, he dates his own revolution in thinking about 
wages and distributional questions (and more besides) to 1933, the year after 
The Theory of Wages was published, marking off the book as a work that could 
safely be left to one side. His revolution relates to his movement to a dynamic 
framework structured around the ‘Monday week’ model. As Samuels (1993) 
points out, however, Hicks consistently displayed considerable modesty about 
his past contributions and was continually reassessing his past work in line with 
his current beliefs and interests. Unfortunately, too many commentators have 
taken Hicks at his word and tend to pass too quickly over the Hicks of The 
Theory of Wages. 
In this paper, we return once again to Hicks’s The Theory of Wages. Its 
aim is to provide an assessment of its importance to the development of 
neoclassical wages and distribution theory. We pose two sets of questions. First, 
did The Theory of Wages add significantly to extant neoclassical distribution 
theory? Did The Theory of Wages provide an important restatement of wages 
theory as claimed by Hicks at the time of its publication in 1932 or did it 
represent a minor work? How important was The Theory of Wages to the 
subsequent trajectory of neoclassical distribution theory? Second, what was the 
importance of The Theory of Wages to the future development of Hicks as an 
economic theorist, and, in particular, to the later development of Value and 
Capital? Can we largely ignore it, accepting a conclusion that the revolution in 
Hicks’s thinking occurred in 1933? 
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The paper argues that Hicks’s The Theory of Wages provides important 
precursors for developments in Hicksian theory, which were soon to follow in 
Value and Capital (Hicks 1939a), and developed a number of significant 
contributions to neoclassical distribution theory. These contributions included a 
resetting of marginal productivity theory, the introduction of the elasticity of 
substitution tool, contributions to the product exhaustion theorem, the 
development of a theory wages in the context of strike action, and the provision 
of a macro determination of relative factor shares. Mention should also be made 
of his study of the workings of the labour market, which were, sadly, largely 
ignored (both by Hicks himself and other neoclassical theorists) in the 
continued push to formalism and abstraction until the New Keynesian 
developments in the 1980s.
2 These contributions need to be highlighted so as to 
balance the ledger, given Hicks’s own largely negative assessment of the work; 
a view, as suggested, that is too often accepted uncritically by modern readers.
3 
Section 2 of the paper considers Hicks’s treatment of marginal 
productivity theory in The Theory of Wages. There is, perhaps, as much interest 
in what Hicks brings to neoclassical distribution theory as what he did not in the 
early chapters of the book. Hicks, perhaps more than any other theorist within a 
broad neoclassical tradition, emphasised the role of the substitution between 
methods of production (and thus between factors of production) and the 
distinction between the scale of output and variations in proportions of factor 
use for a given scale. This led to the design of the elasticity of substitution tool. 
Hamouda (1993), Kennedy (1994), and Rothschild (1994) all provide excellent 
reviews of this development, and we shall have less to say than otherwise as a 
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result. What Hicks left out was a presentation of the marginal productivity 
doctrine in a generalised form, one which allowed for imperfect competition. It 
was Shove ([1933]1989) who brought Hicks to task for not presenting a general 
marginal productivity theory of distribution, but it is the subtext of Shove’s 
critique which interests us as much as anything else: Was imperfect competition 
theory all there in Marshall? What exactly was Joan Robinson’s contribution to 
imperfect competition theory? 
Section 3 considers Hicks’s contributions to labour supply theory, while 
Hicks’s analysis of the workings of the labour market is discussed in section 4. 
There are three crucial features of Hicks on the workings of the labour market in 
The Theory of Wages. First, his emphasis on the role of adjustment processes, 
time and foresight, which provides an early precursor to the dynamic analysis 
that followed in arguably Hicks’s most famous work, the 1939 Value and 
Capital. Second, the importance Hicks attaches to the social nature of the labour 
market, a theme Hicks returned to but much later in his life. Third, the role 
Hicks assigns, in the determination of wage outcomes, to organisational and 
legal structures in the labour market. The linkages between Hicks’s early work 
on themes and subsequent developments in New Keynesian theory are given 
some attention in these two sections. 
Section 5 considers the question of the importance of Hicks’s 
contribution to the theory of wage determination in the presence of collective 
bargaining and the threat of strikes. His theory of bargaining had a significant 
impact on the evolution of bargaining theory in the 1950s and 1960s.
4 We 
review this connection in section 5 and also assess Hicks’s contribution against 
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previous studies on wages and strike activity, in particular, Zeuthen’s (now) 
well-known 1930 book Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare, and a 
rarely cited earlier work by Pigou (1905) on wage bargaining in the presence of 
strike activity. 
In section 6, we examine Hicks on the relationship between technical 
change and the distribution of income. This was an area of very clear 
importance for the future direction of neoclassical theory: first in terms of his 
‘macro’ distribution theory, where Hicks introduces the concept of the elasticity 
of substitution to explain relative shares; and, second in terms of his 
introduction of the labour-saving capital-saving invention classification and the 
role of relative factor prices in inducing inventions of these two types (as 
compared with autonomous inventions). 
While the emphasis in this review is on the place of The Theory of 
Wages in neoclassical distribution theory, we briefly consider in section 7 
Hicks’s contribution to pre-Keynesian macroeconomic theory. Here we argue 
that Hicks macroeconomic model, applied in the context of wages policy in 
chapters 9 and 10 of The Theory of Wages, should receive more emphasis than 
it has hitherto been given both in treatments of pre-Keynesian macroeconomics 
and in studies of the historical roots of real business cycle theory and new 
classical macroeconomics. The discussion picks up on Hahn’s (1994, p. 22) 
insight that ‘Hicks in 1932 (Theory of Wages) started more or less where the 
“new” macroeconomics is now’. 
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The conclusion provides an overall assessment of the importance of 
Hicks’s  The Theory of Wages to both neoclassical theory and to Hicks’s 
development as an economic theorist. 
5.2  Marginal Productivity Theory and Imperfect Competition 
Hicks begins The Theory of Wages in what would apparently be calm waters 
with a discussion of the marginal productivity doctrine that wages tend to equal 
the value of the marginal product of labour. This doctrine had, of course, been 
worked over in the first generation of neoclassical distribution theory and may 
otherwise not have been expected to create difficulties. But, like others before 
him, Hicks’s discussion of the meaning of the ‘value of the marginal product of 
labour’ creates the interest. And it is Shove’s (1933) review of The Theory of 
Wages that is the immediate point of interest, rather than Hicks’s discussion 
itself.
5 Hicks’s precise rendition of the marginal productivity doctrine is that: 
‘At any given wage it will pay employers best to take on that 
number of labourers which makes their marginal product⎯that is 
to say, the difference between the total physical product which is 
actually secured and that which would have been secured from 
the same quantity of other resources if the number of labourers 
had been increased or diminished by one⎯equal in value to the 
wage’ (Hicks 1932a, p. 8). 
Hicks adopts an explanation of this marginal productivity dictum that is 
perfectly traditional: wages will be set equal to the price of the product 
multiplied by the marginal product of labour. The reason for our interest here is 
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that Shove, in his review of The Theory of Wages, suggests that Hicks’s 
specification of the marginalist equation is at odds with Marshall in a decisive 
way. The crux of the point is whether or not Hicks recognised the implications 
of non-competitive markets for marginal productivity theory. Marshall, Shove 
suggests, did fully account for the impact of a non-competitive market, even 
though he spelt out his version of marginal productivity doctrine in the context 
of a competitive market.
6 Hicks did not. 
It is the manner of Shove’s presentation and its timing that is of most 
interest here. Shove is claiming for Marshall a place in the imperfect 
competition account of the marginal productivity theory of distribution.
7 Shove 
suggests that Marshall’s presentation of the marginal productivity doctrine was 
that employers would employ labour up to the point where the marginal outlay 
on labour (i.e., the addition to outlays from a small increment to labour) was 
equal to the additional receipts from employing it. He interprets this to mean 
that Marshall had in mind, to use modern terminology, a ‘marginal factor cost’ 
equals ‘marginal revenue product’ construction and was well aware that 
differences between price and marginal revenue (in the product market) and the 
wage and marginal factor cost (in the factor market) could be significant in a 
single-price market. This has, as is well-known, enormous implications for the 
way in which we see factor rewards and Shove spells out these implications in 
some detail. He suggests that if the product market is non-competitive, prices 
are higher than ‘marginal revenue’ (Shove uses the term) and workers, 
consequently, will be paid less than the value of their marginal product.
8 As a 
result, they will be exploited (from product market influences). Likewise, if the 
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factor market is non-competitive, marginal factor cost will be greater than the 
wage and workers will be exploited in the sense that the profit-maximising 
wage under these conditions will be less than the competitive wage. 
What Shove was perhaps doing in his review at this point was not only 
attacking Hicks and bolstering Marshall’s position but also indicating that the 
essence of the distribution theory in Joan Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect 
Competition, which had just come out in print, was already there in the 
Marshallian canon. Shove was claiming that a marginal revenue 
product/marginal factor cost interpretation of the traditional neoclassical 
statement of factor returns was part of the Marshallian tradition. This, of course, 
reduces the contribution Robinson (1933a) was making. An interesting feature 
of Shove’s 1933 review is that he acknowledges that Robinson had indeed just 
published the Economics of Imperfect Competition, but that his review was 
written  before its publication. He goes on to suggest that she ‘analyses the 
tendency to exploitation along lines similar to those followed here. Her 
treatment is more elaborate than is possible in a notice such as this, but it also 
presents certain differences of detail. It has therefore seemed worth while to let 
the above paragraphs stand’ (Shove [1933]1989 p. 11). In short, Shove suggests 
that he had no reason to amend what he has written on the Marshall versus 
Hicks interpretation of marginal productivity theory now that Robinson had 
published her book. Letters in the Joan Robinson archives held at Kings College 
reveal that Shove had been involved in a heated exchange with Robinson on 
elements of Robinson’s imperfect competition work prior to the publication of 
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Economics of Imperfect Competition, and this snipe at Robinson was the public 
face of this exchange.
9 
Hicks himself remained a little ambivalent on the relative importance of 
the imperfect competition revolution. On the other hand, he wrote to Robinson 
following the publication of her book (and their ‘recent rather surly 
correspondence’) to say how much he admired it. He indicated that he had 
recently been lecturing on monopoly (see his survey on monopoly theory for 
Econometrica in 1935—Hicks 1935a) and had arrived at many of the same 
conclusions, but suggested that Robinson had taken the matter much further 
than he had been able to take it.
10 He goes on to indicate that Robinson’s book 
had cleared up for him the distinction between the ‘entrepreneur-monopolist 
who can exploit others by restricting his demand for their services, and a factor-
of-production-monopolist, who can only exploit by restricting the supply of his 
own.’ As for the role of imperfect competition analysis generally, however, 
Hicks suggests that ‘for long-period analysis, it is fair to assume that the 
elasticity of demand to the individual seller is very high (apart from the cases of 
“bilateral monopolies”), and consequently the competitive analysis, (which, as 
you agree, is so much easier to handle in problems of production and 
distribution) is a fair approximation’.
11 This was a point Hicks was continually 
to return to in later published work. 
The main contribution that Hicks makes to the demand side of 
neoclassical distribution theory is quite clearly not in the area of imperfect 
competition doctrine but in terms of the role to be played in neoclassical 
distribution theory by the substitutability of factors of production. The emphasis 
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on substitutability is omnipresent in The Theory of Wages and is a clear 
hallmark of the Hicksian method at this point. What is ‘helpful’ for Hicks in 
emphasising substitutability at this stage of his theory development is the 
assumed pure malleability of capital. In The Theory of Wages, it is if anything 
labour that is problematic, as a result of differences between individual workers. 
Capital appears as a homogenous malleable factor of production. Even more 
than this, Hicks drifts at will between a ‘realist’, or as he later preferred to call 
it, a ‘materialist’ conception of capital (see Hicks 1974) and a funds-based 
approach to capital as the conditions suit and the problem at hand requires. 
Rothschild (1994, p. 67) has previously commented that Hicks’s treatment of 
capital ‘deliberately excludes a special consideration of capital problems’ and is 
‘completely flat’, while Hamouda (1993) provides a detailed history of Hicks’s 
attempt to grapple with capital after his inauspicious beginning in The Theory of 
Wages.
12 
The key assumptions of the Hicksian approach to marginal productivity 
theory is that firms adopt a minimum cost method of production, input prices 
are given, marginal products are known and continuous, and firms may vary 
factors when minimum cost is not achieved. Firms are assumed to adopt that 
method of production (i.e., that combination of factors) that ensures minimum 
costs of production. For given marginal products of the factors and input prices, 
the minimum cost of production is given by the now familiar formula as: 
MPa/Pa = MPb/Pb. 
When input prices change, firms alter factor proportions so as to maintain the 
minimum-cost formula. Hicks shows that his minimum cost of production 
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approach, in equilibrium, is consistent with a traditional marginal productivity 
doctrine that factors are paid according to their marginal products. 
Hicks utilises the minimum cost equilibrium tool in the context of the 
Wicksteed product exhaustion debate, making an important contribution to this 
on-going debate within the neoclassical tradition (Wicksteed [1894]1992, Jaffé 
[1964]1992, Flux 1894, Walras [1926]1954, Wicksell [1893]1954, [1900]1969, 
[1901]1934, [1902]1969). Here he follows Wicksell’s insights, and proves in a 
mathematical appendix that, on the basis of cost-minimisation, total product will 
be exhausted without recourse to a constant returns to scale assumption. The 
discussion reflects Hicks’s clear early awareness of the work of both Walras and 
Wicksell (introduced to him by Robbins at the LSE).
13 Hicks does make brief 
reference to the problems of monopoly revealed in the famous note by Sraffa 
(1926), but, in the main, ignores the difficulty presented by his minimum cost 
equilibrium condition that minimum-cost is not a necessary condition for profit 
maximisation. 
One further use of the Hicksian substitution method should be 
mentioned. That is in terms of his analysis of wage indeterminateness, which 
represented a follow-up to his earlier paper on the subject (Hicks 1930b). The 
principal argument concerning wage indeterminateness was based on the 
indivisibility of labour (we must often employ a ‘whole’ worker than a part of 
one) and the likely distance between the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ marginal 
product of labour in the event of indivisibility. The internal marginal product of 
labour is the additional product generated by the last worker employed, the 
external marginal product is the additional product generated by the next worker 
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that the firm could employ. Wages must lie between these points but are 
indeterminate within this range. Hicks suggests, however, that the degree of 
indeterminateness falls significantly when we take seriously the options for 
substitutability available to firms, with which it may be possible for them to add 
on different types of labour (labour is heterogeneous in Hicks), switching from 
labour of one type to labour of another. Likewise, firms may switch from 
employing an additional unit of labour to employing capital instead. Both of 
these points of substitution may mean that the gap between the internal and 
external marginal product may be relatively large for a given set of wage-
earners but not be relevant when options exist across different types of workers 
or between capital and labour. Hence, with the ‘external’ margin becoming ever 
more pliable, the gap between it and the existing internal margin becomes 
smaller. Hicks returns to the theme of determinateness in wage outcomes when 
he considers the determination of wages in the context of strike activity and 
bargaining, where he again pushes against prevailing orthodoxy in pressing for 
a determinate wage rather than a range of possible wage outcomes. 
5.3  Labour Supply Theory 
We now turn from Hicks’s discussion of labour demand to that of labour 
supply. His treatment of labour supply theory is relatively standard for the time. 
He has yet to build the standard choice framework of Value and Capital, which 
allowed for the analysis of labour supply in terms of income and substitution 
effects. The arguments on labour supply are, therefore, presented in very 
general terms. However, the interesting part of Hicks’s labour supply 
presentation is that of the emphasis, both in his labour supply chapter and 
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throughout the work as a whole (including in the macroeconomic model of the 
final chapters of The Theory of Wages), on efficiency wage effects.
14 
The incorporation of efficiency wage effects in modern labour 
economics and macroeconomics can be traced to a series of works by Akerlof 
and Yellen (among many others) in the 1980s.
15 As Hicks himself observed in 
The Theory of Wages, however, the ‘gospel of high wages’ had been around for 
some time. Allusions to efficiency wage effects can be discerned in the work of 
Marshall, Walker, Hobson, Pigou and Wicksteed and Hicks’s discussion of 
efficiency wage is best characterised as lying squarely within this older 
tradition.
16 Our interest in Hicks’s discussion of efficiency wage effects lies, 
therefore, not in their absolute novelty. Rather, it lies primarily in the fact that, 
as with so many other components of The Theory of Wages written in an 
informal style, the efficiency wage material is left to lapse as Hicks further 
develops his formalist structure in the 1930s (of which Value and Capital 
represents the prime standard bearer). Interestingly, efficiency wage effects 
return to the cannon in the 1980s only when they were given a more formal 
mathematical treatment. 
One interesting feature of Hicks’s efficiency wage arguments, which is 
not reflected in the modern efficiency wage theories (nor the older ‘gospel of 
high wages’ tradition), concerns the impact of high wages on the internal 
structure of the household of the employee. For Hicks, higher wage rates feed 
through to better opportunities for recreation and self-improvement and for the 
specialisation of labour in the household. This gives to the (mainly male) 
worker (for Hicks) greater opportunities for genuine leisure, thus providing an 
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improved platform for enhanced work effort. As with the earlier neoclassical 
authors, Hicks refers to the cumulative causation processes involved. High 
wages increase efficiency, which then promote high wages. Another feature of 
the cycle is the diminishing returns to efficiency of high wages. In other words, 
at low wage levels an increase in wages has greater positive efficiency effects 
than an increase in wages at a higher wage level. More generally, the efficiency 
effects may provide a floor to wages in a downturn. Employers may be reluctant 
to allow wages to fall too far because the adverse efficiency effects that may 
result. 
5.4  The Workings of the Labour Market  
Hicks’s chapter on the workings of competition and the labour market (chapter 
IV) goes well beyond a simple rendition of how changes in labour demand or 
supply feed through into new labour market equilibrium outcomes. Rather it 
emphasises a multiplicity of forces and reflects his recent past interest in labour 
history and applied labour issues (see Hicks 1928, 1930a). There is a strong role 
for the importance of social custom, particularly in relation to attitudes towards 
fairness, in affecting labour market outcomes. This is an area of his work in the 
early 1930s, which, like that of efficiency wage effects, he lets lapse in his 
formalist developments later in the decade. There is also considerable 
discussion of labour market questions in light of real-world firm and labour 
market institutional arrangements (e.g., his emphasis on the regular and casual 
employment distinction) and adjustment costs. A final important facet of the 
working of the labour market that Hicks refers to, but which he certainly did 
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extend in the 1930s and then returned to in a different form much later in his 
life, was that of the role of time, expectations, and uncertainty.  
In his 1963 commentary, Hicks referred to the fact that The Theory of 
Wages adopted an essentially static equilibrium framework. That might be true 
in terms of a structured model involving capital and time (Value and Capital 
provides such a framework). However, The Theory of Wages provides a good 
‘unstructured’ discussion of dynamics (in the sense of adjustment, time, 
expectations, and uncertainty) that can be viewed either as a precursor to Value 
and Capital or to a much later Hicks, whom Collard (1993) refers to as ‘Deep 
Hicks’, where equilibrium and change are dealt with in terms of a ‘true 
dynamics in historical time’. 
Hicks pays special attention to the adjustment process in labour markets. 
This is, of course, not the first time that economists had touched on this 
question. Treatments of the adjustment process are available in Marshall’s 
discussion of earnings and labour markets in the Principles (Marshall 1961), 
which are extended in Pigou’s early works, including Wealth and Welfare, his 
pre-war Unemployment and, most importantly, The Economics of Welfare. Both 
Marshall and Pigou consider the process by which the labour market adjusts to 
the movements of labour from ‘trade to trade and from place to place’ (Marshall 
1961, p. 573) and both made much of the fact that the labour market was quite 
different from the market for commodities (see, for example, Marshall 1961, p. 
336). However, Hicks’s treatment is certainly more developed than that of his 
predecessors in combining adjustment costs, expectations and uncertainty in a 
fluid dynamic environment.  
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He begins with a discussion of how shocks feed through the labour 
market. From a given equilibrium, an event shocks the system so that it is 
necessary for workers to consider a possible move from one employment 
position to another and for employers to consider a change to their methods of 
production. These changes take time and are accompanied by costs. The time 
and cost taken in the adjustment process may have important implications for 
the trajectory of the labour market. If adjustment costs are relatively large, 
moves to alternative methods of production, which would otherwise be 
profitable, are suspended. In other words, adjustment costs may generate a 
wedge between the existing structure and some alternative structure. 
Adjustment costs per se for Hicks are not necessarily the most important 
problem facing labour market participants. Adjustment costs can potentially be 
defrayed over a relatively long time period if change is of a ‘once-and-for-all’ 
form or follows some set (e.g., seasonal) pattern, with relatively clear 
understanding of its effects. It becomes more of a problem, however, if there is 
no strong expectation that change will be maintained. In conditions of flux, 
adjustment costs can be a critical determinant of the path the labour market can 
take. To provide a concrete context to potential difficulties, Hicks gives the 
example of new orders that a firm receives. What does this mean for the firm? It 
might mean that ordinary orders have been brought forward, that a special order 
has taken place, or that demand has risen to a new level at which it will stabilise 
or that demand is on a growth path. Which of these possibilities actually holds 
cannot, of course, be known for certain in advance. 
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Hicks continues to stress the role of expectations and uncertainty in his 
discussion on unemployment. In this discussion, he compares the case of an 
anticipated temporary downturn to that where there is genuine uncertainty as to 
the length of the downturn. In the former case, wages and employment may be 
kept relatively constant. Employers, who take advantage of an anticipated 
temporary downturn by cutting wages, may find that it comes at a significant 
cost in terms of labour relations in the firm and its future ability to attract good 
workers. This cost is likely to deter many firms from cutting wages during a 
period of anticipated temporary decline. Hence, there can be some rigidity in the 
downward movement of wages, but this rigidity comes from employers and not 
from workers or unions (at least in the early parts of The Theory of Wages). 
There may be some upward rigidity in wages as well. Firms may be reluctant to 
raise wages when there is an anticipated temporary upturn, as the shortage 
pressures they face in the labour market are likely to be short-lived. As Hicks 
puts it, ‘although each firm’s demand for labour fluctuates continually, a change 
in wage-rates would affect, not the present, but the future supply of labour’ 
(Hicks 1932a, p. 67). 
It is a somewhat different matter when either the downturn is expected 
to last a long time or when there is uncertainty as to the length of the downturn. 
In the former case, the movement to an immediate generalised cut in wages may 
be fairly quick. In the latter case, the movement to lower wages may be a 
relatively long one. Firms may initially assume that the downturn is relatively 
short and so maintain wages for a period. As the duration of the downturn 
increases, some firms will begin cutting wages. Those firms that do not cut 
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wages will find it increasingly more difficult to maintain a higher wage. As a 
greater proportion of firms cut wages, the ‘bad employer’ effect of immediately 
taking action to reduce wages becomes less important in the market and ‘good 
employer’ firms believe that they will no longer have signalling problems when 
the labour market improves. 
The distinction Hicks makes between anticipated and unanticipated 
events and temporary and permanent events has, of course, strong parallels in 
modern macroeconomics and in labour economics. We see evidence of this type 
of thinking early on in Friedman’s consumption function and in the Friedman-
Phelps inflation-unemployment models of the late 1960s.
17 Hicks’s discussion 
also provides an important link in his own work to the developments in dynamic 
analysis that were soon to take place in his later work in the 1930s, influenced 
by the Swedish School (first Wicksell and then Myrdal and Lindahl), 
culminating in Value and Capital (see Hicks, 1991a).
18 
In addition to his analysis of time, expectations, and uncertainty, Hicks 
makes an important distinction between the role of casual and regular labour in 
the workings of the labour market. Casual labour is characterised by the absence 
of a long-standing continuous relationship between a given employer and a 
given employee.
19 Costs of adjustment for both employees and employers are 
low. Regular labour, in contrast, is characterised by a continuing relationship 
between a given employer and an employee, in which employer-specific skills 
and knowledge develop. This leads to a mutually advantageous position for both 
employees and employers. (The modern parallel to internal labour market 
theory is obvious, particularly to those authors within this tradition that 
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emphasise transaction cost foundations.)
20 The breaking of such a relationship 
means that both sides incur costs. On the employee’s side, there may be 
significant locational adjustment costs should a move by a worker to an 
employer located in a different region. These costs are exacerbated by a loss of 
the wage benefits that accrued at the previous firm from the specific human 
capital built up in that firm. On the employer’s side, a new employee requires 
considerable investment in terms of employer-specific knowledge and skill 
training. 
Hicks concludes that, in the case of casual labour, wages are more likely 
to move quicker than for regular trades. There is also likely to be a greater 
tendency for wages to fall rather than to rise. The reason for the latter effect is 
that the flow of labour into the casual labour market is much greater than the 
outward flow. As Hicks suggests ‘the gate into casual employment stands wide 
open, and can always be entered by the unemployed of other trades’ (Hicks 
1932a, p. 69). In regular trades, wages tend to be more rigid. This is because the 
transaction or adjustment costs of introducing labour from outside can be 
considerable in the case of regular trades. Hence, the incentives to reduce wages 
are blunted, unless the forces moving in the direction of a reduction in wages 
are particularly strong. Wage rigidity results. 
As with much of his chapter on ‘the working of competition’, Hicks’s 
analysis of regular and casual labour, when combined with his emphasis on 
expectations, imperfect information and uncertainty has a modern resonance to 
those elements of (post-1970) modern labour economics that emphasise 
employer-employee attachments, firm-specific human capital, the role of the 
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internal labour market, and the importance of transaction and adjustment costs. 
One example of a clear influence is in Arthur Okun’s posthumous classic Prices 
and Quantities, which brings many of these elements together in the analysis of 
implicit contract theory, career labour markets (and the invisible handshake), 
and the toll model. Indeed, Hicks’s The Theory of Wages is cited by Okun 
(1981, p. 79) as a crucial early work that focussed on the importance of 
employee-employer attachments to an understanding of the workings of the 
labour market. (The next cited is Walter Oi’s classic 1962 paper on quasi-fixed 
labour.) 
The final element of Hicks’s discussion of the workings of the market is 
an emphasis on a role of fairness. For Hicks, fairness in labour market outcomes 
can be analysed both against an ‘objective’ criterion (the competitive market 
equilibrium) and in terms of the perceptions of individual actors and how these 
perceptions affect the workings of the market and the productivity of individual 
workers.
21 He suggests, with regard to the latter, that demands for wage rises 
are made by employees because the proposed rise is seen to be ‘fair’ in the eyes 
of employees. Likewise, employers will be concerned to ensure that wage 
reductions are not perceived to be ‘unfair’. However, these perceptions, together 
with their impact on the behaviour of participants, are seen as being ultimately 
constrained by the forces of demand and supply. In terms of the ‘objective’ 
criterion of fairness, Hicks adopts the Pigovian exploitation framework. 
Exploitation of labour, according to Pigou, exists when workers are paid less 
than the value of their marginal net products to employers (Pigou 1920, p. 
512).
22 There is nothing new in Hicks’s analytical framework on the 
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exploitation of labour that does not appear in Pigou’s earlier analysis. There is 
no inkling, for example, of the deep analysis of both product and labour market 
imperfections that Robinson was to bring to exploitation theory. What is 
interesting, however, is that Hicks suggests that exploitation is not a major 
problem experienced by employees in the labour market. And here he stands 
apart from both Pigou and, of course, Joan Robinson. 
5.5  Strike Activity and Wages 
In The Theory of Wages Hicks presents a model of wages in the presence of 
strike activity. Wages in Hicks’s strike model are based on two forces. The first 
reflects the wage concessions employers are prepared to make in response to 
strike activity. The longer the strike, the higher are the costs to the firm. Setting 
wages on the vertical axis and the expected length of the strike on the horizontal 
axis, the employer’s concession curve begins with the wage that they would be 
prepared to concede in the absence of trade union action (the ‘no-strike wage’). 
As the expected duration of an industrial stoppage increases, the highest wage 
the employer is prepared to concede to avoid the strike also rises. The 
employer’s concession curve rises as the expected duration of the strike 
increases, and is bounded above by that wage at which the employer would no 
longer wish to remain in operation (the zero economic profit position). 
The second component to the model is the union’s resistance curve. This 
curve traces out the lowest wage that a union is prepared to accept given the 
expected length of the strike. The union’s resistance wage represents a balance 
between two forces. The first is the possibility of low wages in the future, and 
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the second is the possibility of unemployment resulting from a wage offer that 
is too high. The union’s resistance curve starts at some unspecified level. The 
longer the expected duration of the strike, the greater is both the loss of income 
and the likelihood of job loss. In an imperfect capital market, it pays workers to 
reduce their minimum accepted wage as the expected length of the strike 
increases. There will come a point where the union’s resistance curve hits the 
wage level that wages would have been at had there been no trade union action 
at all. 
The highest wage that the union can achieve when both sides have equal 
expectations of the duration of the strike is the point of intersection of the 
employer’s concession curve and the union’s resistance curve. Hicks’s model 
therefore specifies a deterministic wage solution. On the basis of the expected 
duration of the strike (and each sides’ knowledge of the other side’s relevant 
curve), employers and unions may negotiate a settlement. If they do not, then a 
strike will occur. At this point, dynamic factors come into play. The curves shift 
according to how long the action has gone on for. The ‘expected length of the 
strike’ now reads as the ‘expected remaining length of the strike’. The union’s 
resistance curve starts to shift inwards. 
The importance of Hicks’s contribution to the theory of wage 
determination in the presence of union strike activity lies in the specification of 
a model that accounts for the various forces that may impact on wage offers in 
the presence of strike activity. However, it is not the first major treatment of the 
issue and it appears appropriate to list it in concert with two other early models: 
Pigou’s 1905 model of wage outcomes developed in Principles and Methods of 
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Industrial Peace and Zeuthen’s 1930 Problems of Monopoly and Economic 
Warfare. Shove ([1933]1989) was quick to point to these models in his review 
of The Theory of Wages and to suggest that Hicks adds little or nothing to the 
existing literature. There is some truth in this remark. This is certainly one area 
where Hicks’s contributions have perhaps been given a little too much emphasis 
(and Pigou’s 1905 model, perhaps, not enough). 
Pigou develops an Edgeworth-type model of wage determination in a 
world of non-competitive markets (Edgeworth [1881]1961). As with 
Edgeworth, the wage is indeterminate, but the contribution of Pigou is to 
specify the locus of possible wage bargains, which is derived from the 
elasticities of labour demand and supply, the costs of using industrial action to 
achieve a desired wage outcome, and the expectations concerning the likely 
result from industrial action.
23 While Pigou’s models provide the basis for 
specifying the factors that influence the size of the wedge between employers’ 
wage concessions and workers’ wage demands, they do not produce a final 
deterministic solution. Zeuthen’s model does. Taking Pigou’s wage limits (in 
the absence of industrial activity) as a starting point, Zeuthen determines a path 
that wage outcomes could take, based on the probabilities that unions and 
employers establish on the likelihood of conflict resulting from a wage offer and 
the expectation of firm resolve on the part of the other party. Starting from a 
point of a high wage offer from the union side and a low wage offer from the 
employer side, the probability of conflict occurring if both sides continue with 
their offers is very high. Each side makes concessions, thus successively 
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reducing the probability of strike action, until a commonly agreed point is 
reached. 
In spite of the fact that Hicks’s model of wage outcomes in the presence 
of union strike activity is one of four major relevant models (in chronological 
order: Edgeworth, Pigou, and Hicks/Zeuthen) and has no particular right to pre-
eminence among them, it was particularly influential in the development of 
wage bargaining and strike activity models into the 1970s. Both Kennan (1986) 
and Farber (1986) in their reviews of union behaviour and strike activity point 
to the importance of the Hicksian and Zeuthen traditions in this field. For 
example, Shackle’s (1957) model of the bargaining process represented a 
conscious and direct off-shoot of Hicks’s work, which is also evident in the 
influential Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) bargaining model (see also Bishop 
1964 and other relevant work cited in Wood and Woods 1989). Other early 
contributions to bargaining theory follow Zeuthen in the main (Pen 1952, 
Harsanyi 1956) but again the relevant alternative reference point is Hicks 
(together with Nash in Harsanyi’s case). 
5.6  Technical Change, Growth and Distribution 
The clearest advances in what might be called the pure theory element of 
Hicks’s The Theory of Wages occur in chapter 6, in which Hicks introduces the 
concept of the elasticity of substitution, utilises it in the context of determining 
the effect of a rise in the supply of a factor on the relative shares of income, and 
considers the impact of inventions on the distribution of income. Each of these 
three areas was to form the basis for continuing debate in neoclassical theory. 
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As is well known, Hicks makes a distinction between economic progress 
resulting from an increase in the supply of a factor (labour and capital) and 
economic progress resulting from inventions and improvements. In respect of 
the first source of economic progress, Hicks asks: what is the effect on the real 
incomes (‘absolute shares’ in his terminology) and relative shares of an increase 
in the supply of a given factor? It is in the context of his discussion of relative 
shares that Hicks introduces the concept of the elasticity of substitution. As he 
suggests, ‘an increase in the supply of any factor will increase its relative share 
…if its “elasticity of substitution” is greater than unity’ (Hicks 1932a, p. 117). 
The elasticity of substitution measures the ease with which one factor can be 
substituted for another. Hicks goes on to provide a mathematical derivation of 
the elasticity of substitution and reinterprets Marshall’s four principles in light 
of the elasticity of substitution. 
The introduction of the elasticity of substitution concept was 
fundamental to the whole Hicksian neoclassical framework and as such 
provides clear grounds for connecting The Theory of Wages to the more 
celebrated Value and Capital. The framework is grounded entirely on economic 
actors reacting to relative price signals and marginal product movements and 
the malleability of capital (and labour). As price signals are emitted, the supply 
of a factor is affected. The elasticity of substitution then measures the degree to 
which one factor will be substituted for another. As is well known, Hicks’s 
elasticity of substitution concept was immediately seized upon in the literature, 
with a major debate in the 1930s as to its measurement and its role in predicting 
relative shares (see Hicks 1963 for a review). 
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Hicks goes on to consider the second main form of an increase in 
economic progress, namely, the case of inventions. Here we see the introduction 
of another famous conceptual tool. Hicks distinguishes between three categories 
of inventions depending on their effect on the ratio of the marginal product of 
capital to that of labour (Hicks 1932a, pp. 121-122). First, inventions may be 
‘labour-saving’ (they increase the marginal product of capital more than that of 
labour), ‘capital-saving’ (they increase the marginal product of labour more 
than capital), or ‘neutral’ (the invention does not impact on the ratio of the 
marginal products). What type of invention do we see, and why? Hicks 
distinguishes between two forces. The first is changes in relative prices and 
factor substitution. These are ‘induced’ inventions. The second are 
‘autonomous’ inventions. These inventions tend to be of a labour saving nature. 
As with the elasticity of substitution concept, the introduction of the 
distinction between induced and autonomous inventions and that between 
labour-saving and capital-saving inventions was novel and proved fundamental 
in the future development of neoclassical theory on technical progress and 
economic growth in the later 1930s and into the Cambridge Controversies 
(Harcourt 1972).
24 As Blaug ([1963]1971) points out, the history of the 
economics of technical change go back to Ricardo, Marx, Mill, Wicksell, and 
Schumpeter.
25 Pigou (1920) had previously made distinctions between various 
forms of technical progress, but these distinctions were not linked, as in Hicks, 
to a structured neoclassical substitution framework.  
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5.7  Macroeconomics (Just) Before Keynes 
When The Theory of Wages was published, Hicks regarded the two chapters on 
wage regulation as the culmination of his work. The titles of the two chapters 
(‘Wage-regulation and unemployment’ and ‘Further consequences of wage-
regulation’) are a little misleading, suggesting a more microeconomic 
orientation. However, as the analysis progresses, it is clear that what Hicks was 
concerned with is the macroeconomic consequences of a policy to achieve a real 
wage outcome above its equilibrium point across all industries. The macro 
model utilised by Hicks has an interesting place in the history of economic 
thought, given that it represents perhaps the last comprehensive macroeconomic 
statement made in a decidedly neoclassical vein prior to Keynes’s General 
theory. Looking much further forward, however, the importance of the model 
lies in the fact that it provides a clear precursor to real business cycle theory and 
New Classical Macroeconomics, with its emphasis on substitution possibilities, 
in reaction to relative price changes, as the driver of the macroeconomy.
26 
Hicks was soon to disown the chapter in one of his first clearly dynamic papers, 
‘Wages and interest: the dynamic problem’, not at that stage (1935) on the 
grounds of its being superseded by Keynes, but more so for what he saw were 
instances of faulty logic and the lack of a clearly specified dynamic 
framework.
27 Despite his repudiation of these two chapters, it remains odd that 
reviews of business cycle theory and macroeconomic theory prior to Keynes do 
not cite Hicks’s The Theory of Wages, but rather emphasise his well-known 
reactions to Keynes in the 1930s and the development of the IS-LM model (see 
Hicks 1936b, 1937).
28 
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The starting point for Hicks’s model is that of a trade union attempt to 
attain a real wage outcome for the economy as a whole above the equilibrium 
wage. What sort of model does Hicks develop to examine this state, and what 
are the consequences of the trade union action? Hicks’s model is an amalgam of 
various elements, but at its core is the focus on the substitution of factors in 
reaction to relative price signals that lies behind much of The Theory of Wages. 
To this should be added a quantity theory of money structure that determines 
the general price level. There is only a hint in the concluding stages of the two 
chapters that a strict quantity theory approach is an appropriate organising tool. 
Hicks’s analysis of a policy to sustain a real wage above its equilibrium 
is broken into two stages. The first stage is a ‘short-run’ analysis assuming 
‘stationarity’, i.e., no change in secular forces, which are referred to as 
inventions, the accumulation of capital and foreign trade. The second stage 
allows these forces to change. We shall examine the short-run model first, but 
even here we must be careful, as Hicks provides for a large number of channels 
through which the rise in wages affects the economy. There are three main 
channels (each taking a considerable period of time to work their way through), 
which we will concentrate on. For Hicks, the first is the most innocuous. We 
can refer to it as the consumption effect. The second is the method of 
production effect. The final impact is the supply of capital effect. The latter two 
effects serve to increase unemployment.
29 
Hicks adopts a bold starting assumption. He assumes that the rise in 
wages does not directly increase the community’s spending power in aggregate. 
Instead, there is a redistribution of spending power. Wage earners spend more, 
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the receivers of profit spend less, but the two balance out. The fact that the two 
income groups will have different spending patterns means, however, that a 
disturbance of relative rates of profit occurs within the economy. This will 
result in a transfer of resources to those industries with a relatively high demand 
from the wage-earner class and away from those industries more influenced by 
the spending behaviour of the profit-receiving class. This represents the first 
major substitution impact of the attempt to raise the general level of wages. 
Hicks, however, assumes that the labour shifts, induced by the relative profit 
effects will balance each other out and so not result in any net impact on 
unemployment. (There is an assumption here that the methods of production in 
the two sectors are equivalent.) 
The second major impact comes not from relative consumption changes 
but from the impact of a rise in real wages on methods of production. Industries 
that have higher labour-capital ratios will face higher relative cost pressures 
than industries with low labour-intensity. Profit rates will decline in labour-
intensive industries relative to capital-intensive industries. The relative price 
signal acts, therefore, to move resources away from industries (and methods of 
production) with a relatively high labour-to-capital ratio to those industries (and 
methods of production) with a relatively high capital-to-labour ratio. This shift 
is assumed to increase unemployment in net terms, as the more capital-intensive 
industries will require less labour. Employment will rise in the capital-intensive 
industries, but this rise will not be sufficient to absorb the movement of labour 
from the labour-intensive industries. As compared with the consumption effect 
set out previously, this relative price impact affects the choice of methods of 
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production. The movement in capital and labour resulting from this relative 
price effect implies a weak position for labour in those areas of production with 
a relatively high pre-existing labour-capital ratio. 
There is a third effect to consider. This is the impact of the real wage 
increase on the supply of ‘capital’ (the term being used by Hicks in a funds 
sense). The increase in real wages will reduce the stock of capital in a number 
of ways. First, by throwing some firms into liquidation. Second, by inducing 
firms to provide for higher dividends than would be expected given a profit rate 
decline, so reducing the stock of capital available for investment purposes. 
Third, capitalists save less (and this decline in saving is greater than the rise in 
saving by wage-earners).  
This last effect provides the starting point for Hicks’s long-run analysis. 
The decline in the funds available for investment will further reduce the ability 
of firms to employ labour. Hicks claims that it is possible that this reduction in 
investment resulting from the decline in funds could be cumulative. The 
contraction of industry may induce firms to further consume their capital funds, 
which in turn contracts industry. To short-circuit this process, a significant 
claw-back in terms of dividends and/or wages must take place. However, this 
may not be possible. One reason given for this is that unemployment benefits 
may need to be funded in part from industry and private saving, so reducing 
further the available capital funds. Hicks suggests that ‘if a high level of 
unemployment benefit is maintained, the cessation of contraction becomes 
nearly impossible’ (Hicks 1932a, p. 201). A second reason why the outlook is 
bleak for a return to good outcomes is faulty anticipation. To begin with, firms 
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anticipate that good times will soon return. They therefore undertake policies on 
that basis, including continuing to pay out high dividends. This policy will only 
serve to reduce the available funds further. 
Is there any good news in Hicks’s story for the unemployment rate? 
Hicks mentions two possible ways out (other than, of course, a change to the 
trade union wages policy itself). First, there may well be a rise in inventions 
(but these are likely to be labour-saving inventions). Second, there may be 
important labour supply effects. Here, the efficiency wage argument is used. 
The rise in real wages results in efficiency gains, but Hicks does not put much 
store in the ability of these efficiency wage effects to fully offset the negative 
outcomes. In essence, he argues that a policy of setting real wages above the 
competitive level is likely, in net terms, to produce harm. 
5.8  Conclusion 
We may now return to the theme of this retrospective. How significant was The 
Theory of Wages in the history of neoclassical distribution theory and in Hicks’s 
own development as an economic theorist? I would argue that the work 
deserves to receive major attention for four main reasons. 
First, a significant number of important contributions to neoclassical 
theory are scattered throughout the work. In The Theory of Wages, Hicks resets 
marginal productivity theory, introduces the elasticity of substitution tool, 
provides a macro determination of relative factor shares, introduces a typology 
of inventions and growth, and develops a model of strike activity, which, 
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though post-dating the contributions of Pigou and Zeuthen, has been influential 
in the development of labour market and trade union theory. 
Second, elements of the book provide important precursors to 
developments in Hicksian theory, which were soon to follow in Value and 
Capital (Hicks 1939a). The static equilibrium analysis of the first half of Value 
and Capital builds on concepts developed first in The Theory of Wages, while 
the 1932 book also provides a starting point for discussion of the role of 
expectations in a more developed dynamic analysis. 
Third, there is a modern resonance (New Keynesian efficiency wage 
theory, the role of custom and fairness, internal labour market theory and 
transaction cost economics), to much of Hicks’s discussion of the workings of 
the labour market. Interestingly, it is this part of The Theory of Wages, which 
Hicks was to let go immediately the work was published, only to return to it 
much later in life. 
Fourth, the timing of the work (1932) provides for some fascinating 
interludes. As Hicks pointed out in his 1963 retrospective, The Theory of Wages 
preceded both the imperfect competition revolution (Robinson’s The Economics 
of Imperfect Competition) and the Keynesian revolution and was published just as 
the Great Depression was taking hold, which made Hicks’s discussion of 
unemployment, demand management and monetary forces look decidedly shaky. 
However, this ‘poor timing’ provides the platform for us to view a specimen of 
the last (perhaps first!) pre-Keynesian macroeconomic model in action (the last 
three chapters of the work) on the one hand, and lets us into an interesting side-
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debate on the imperfect competition theory of Joan Robinson on the other (we 
allude here to Shove’s 1933 critique discussed earlier). 
The Theory of Wages represented for Hicks the end of phase one of his 
theoretical developments in neoclassical theory and the beginnings of the next 
phase. On the workings of the labour market and on trade unions there was to be 
little more from Hicks for some time while, of course, in ‘pure’ theory much 
more was soon to follow. 
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Notes 
 
∗ I would like to thank John King, Ray Petridis, Herb Thompson, and two anonymous 
referees together with conference participants at the 2001 History of Economic 
Thought Society of Australia Conference for their valuable comments on a previous 
version of this paper. I am grateful to the archivists at The Archive Centre, Kings 
College for access to the papers of Joan Robinson. I am grateful to Anthony Courakis 
(John Hicks’s literary executor) and the John Hicks Foundation for permission to quote 
from the unpublished writings of John Hicks. 
1 Wicksteed’s An Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of Distribution, published in 
1894, could be added to this list as could Wicksell’s Value, Capital and Rent published 
in 1893 (though not in English). Hicks gave a more detailed overview of the 
development of neoclassical distribution theory in his paper ‘Marginal Productivity and 
the Principle of Variation’ (Hicks 1932b) published just prior to The Theory of Wages. 
In that work, he mentions an extended array of contributors to distribution theory 
including, in addition to Marshall and Clark, Wicksteed, Wicksell, Walras, Pareto, and 
Cassell. 
2 As pointed out by an examiner of the thesis, the same fate fell to a number of 
members of the Marshallian school, principally Layton and Fay (see Groenewegen 
1995a, pp. 755-756), whose work on the labour market has also been largely ignored 
(see Fay 1920a, 1920b, Layton 1912, 1914). 
3 In undertaking a review of The Theory of Wages, I follow in the path of Rothschild 
(1994) in his recent review of The Theory of Wages and Hamouda his 1993 book John 
R. Hicks. The Economist’s Economist.
 My review places less weight on elements that 
are given a full treatment in Rothschild’s and Hamouda’s assessments and more weight 
on aspects of The Theory of Wages that need further attention. Rothschild’s and 244 
                                                                                                                                  
Hamouda’s treatments are particularly strong on marginal productivity theory, Hicks’s 
treatment of the production function and the concept of capital, and the importance of 
the development of the elasticity of substitution tool. In addition to Rothschild and 
Hamouda there are numerous references (albeit relatively short ones) of Hick’s book in 
the many assessments of Hicks’s contributions to economic theory (see, for example, 
Wood and Wood 1989). Particular mention should be made of reviews by Kennedy and 
Hahn in Hagemann and Hamouda (1994). 
4 The contributions that Hicks’s theory of wages and strike activity made to labour 
economics are well recognised within the labour economics sub-discipline (see Farber 
1986 and Kennan 1986), but are not given sufficient attention in more general reviews 
of Hicks’s contributions to economics. 
5 Shove ([1933]1989), for good measure, makes a number of further criticisms of 
Hicks’s work, including, most importantly, the question of how one defines and 
measures capital (see the following paragraphs), and the macroeconomic importance of 
monetary factors, but it is his attack on the imperfect competition issue that most 
interests us here. See also Kennedy (1994). On the question of the absence of a detailed 
discussion of monetary factors, see Hamouda (1993). 
6 As pointed out by an examiner to the thesis, Marshall’s competitive framework was 
rarely that of perfect competition as it came to be defined after Marshall’s death. 
7 As suggested by an examiner of the thesis, a great deal of the theory of imperfect 
competition can be found implicitly in Marshall’s work. See Shackle (1967) for an 
account of the development of the theory of imperfect competition. 
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8 Shove ([1933]1989) refers to the term ‘marginal revenue’ having first been used by 
Viner ([1931]1952). For a further discussion of the development of the imperfect 
competition revolution, see Flatau (2001a–chapter 6). 
9 This correspondence is held at the Archive Centre, Kings College, Cambridge (see 
Joan Robinson collection, hereafter JVR, vii/Shove). Shove went on to write a review 
of Robinson’s The Economics of Imperfect Competition, in which he sought to limit the 
contribution Robinson’s work by suggesting that it rested largely on the work of 
Marshall, Pigou and Sraffa (see Shove 1933). 
10 Kings College Archives, Joan Robinson Collection, JVR vii Hicks 10/7/33. 
11 Kings College Archives, Joan Robinson Collection, JVR vii Hicks 10/7/33. 
12 By the time Hicks came to write his paper ‘Capital Controversies: Ancient and 
Modern’ in 1974 he displayed an acute awareness of the issues involved in the 
measurement of capital, devoting the entire paper to distinguishing between materialist 
and fundist measures of capital. Interestingly, Hicks chose in this paper to focus on the 
work of Pigou, Hayek and Keynes (rather than on the Robinson-Solow et al. 
Cambridge controversies). The question of the measurement of capital has been a 
reoccurring theme in economics, from the ‘first’ capital controversies of Böhm-Bawerk 
and Clark through to the famous Robinson-Solow et al. debates of the 1950s and 1960s 
(see Harcourt 1972). As noted by an examiner to the thesis, the issue of the malleability 
of capital was a long-standing one having been raised in commentary on Böhm-Bawerk 
and Clark. 
13 Robbins’s English edition of Wicksell’s Lectures on Political Economy (translation 
by Classen) was not published until 1934, a year after the publication of Hicks’s The 
Theory of Wages. 
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14 Reviews of efficiency wage theory generally do not cite Hicks’s efficiency wage 
models (see, for example, Rotheim 1998 and Mankiw and Romer 1991). 
15 See Rotheim (1998) and Mankiw and Romer (1994) for general reviews.  
16 As Petridis (1996) ably documents, the ‘gospel of high wages’ reflects the impact of 
‘amateur economists’ from the business world, such as Brassey, on academic economic 
work. As pointed out by an examiner of the thesis, efficiency wage effects can be 
discerned in eighteenth century economics. 
17 We are perhaps moving ahead of ourselves in emphasising works in the Friedman-
Phelps tradition of modern macroeconomics. Some of the best early work dedicated to 
the role of expectations occurred much earlier in the piece and include, of course, 
Keynes, the Swedish School, and Shackle’s 1952 classic book Expectation in 
economics. 
18 See Hamouda (1993) for a discussion of the development of Hicks’s dynamic 
analysis from the point of The Theory of Wages through to Value and Capital and 
beyond. 
19 Needless to say we are using Hicks’s definitions of casual labour here and not a 
definition utilised in modern treatments or by official statistical agencies. Hicks, 
furthermore, was more interested in specifying those ‘trades’ that are more casual in 
nature and those which are more ‘regular’ in nature rather than classifying an 
individual employee as being casual or non-casual. 
20 Doeringer and Piore (1971, p. 22) cite Hicks’s The Theory of Wages as an important 
early source dealing with internal labour market structures, but how influential Hicks’s 
book was in the development of internal labour market theory is unclear. 
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21 Witness again modern parallels, particularly in Akerlof and Yellen’s models of social 
custom and fair wages (see Akerlof 1984, Akerlof and Yellen 1988, 1990). 
22 See Flatau (2001a–chapter 6). 
23 It is also worth mentioning Pigou’s (1908) analysis of equilibrium outcomes under 
bilateral monopoly. 
24 In his review of the Cambridge Controversies, Harcourt (1972) consistently cites 
Hicks’s  The Theory of Wages as a pivotal work within the neoclassical marginal 
productivity tradition. First place in terms of citation of neoclassical theorists goes, 
however, to Wicksell whose work Joan Robinson focuses on in her seminal 1950s 
contributions. See Hamouda (1993) for subsequent developments in Hicks’s analysis of 
the relationship between technological change and the distribution of income, 
particularly in his 1973 work Capital and Time. 
25 As pointed out by an examiner to the thesis, the economics of technical change goes 
back further to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
26 See Bhaduri and Marglin (1990, 1991) for both a critical review of neoclassical real 
wage models of the type set out by Hicks and an alternative formulation. 
27 By dynamic, Hicks is referring to a requirement that economic variables are dated, 
and that the time path of their evolution is specified and expectations fully 
incorporated. This he was doing in his 1935b article by using his weekly model. He had 
a fundamental difficulty with The Theory of Wages in that it does not contain a 
developed theory of capital. 
28 The most comprehensive (other than its failure to mention Hick’s The Theory of 
Wages) of these reviews of business cycle theory is O’Brien’s (1997) three volume set. 
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The same omission is evident when one examines how various authors treat Hicks’s 
role in the Keynesian revolution. See, for example, the classic works of Klein (1950) 
and Hansen (1953) or more modern treatments which consider the Keynes and the 
Classics link, where references to Hicks’s macroeconomic model of The Theory of 
Wages should be found, such as Ahiakpor (1998). An exception to the general 
indifference to Hicks’s macroeconomics of The Theory of Wages is Hamouda (1993). 
29 Hicks also mentions an international competitiveness effect: The rise in real wages 
will result in a decline in the competitiveness of the export and import-competing 
industries. This will have immediate negative effects on employment. 
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6.  Some Reflections on the ‘Pigou-Robinson’ Theory of 
Exploitation
∗ 
 
History of Economics Review, Winter 2001; Number 33, pp. 1-16. 
(with revisions) 
6.1  Introduction 
Neoclassical exploitation theory is typically dated to Pigou’s 1920 work The 
Economics of Welfare (EW), the last edition of which was published in 1932. 
Joan Robinson’s The Economics of Imperfect Competition (EIC), published in 
1933, is recognised as the key subsequent reference.
1 Rather than being 
presented as separate models of exploitation within a broad neoclassical 
tradition, the EW and EIC treatments of exploitation are often meshed together 
in such a way that Robinson’s work appears as a linear extension of Pigou’s 
analysis or is indistinguishable from it. The term ‘Pigovian exploitation’, for 
example, is utilised to describe an amalgam composed of Pigou’s definition of 
exploitation and Robinson’s discussion of the distinction between monopolistic 
exploitation and monopsonistic exploitation. 
In certain respects, it is not difficult to understand the reasons why the 
two works have been linked together. In her retrospective of her life’s work, 
Robinson indicates that, although EIC was ‘inspired by a hint from Sraffa, [it] 
was mainly influenced by Professor Pigou’ (Robinson 1978, p. ix). In terms of 
her discussion of exploitation itself in EIC, Robinson adopts Pigou’s definition 
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of exploitation—exploitation results when workers are ‘paid less than the value 
which their marginal net product has to the firms which employ them’—and 
maintains the Pigovian position that exploitation is incompatible with long-
period competitive equilibrium.
2 
Notwithstanding these obvious points of connection, the view that the 
Robinson treatment of exploitation represents some sort of linear extension of 
Pigou’s work fails to recognise that the EW and EIC treatments are a generation 
apart and represent quite different ways of modelling exploitation. Despite the 
fact that the much referred to fourth edition of EW was published in 1932, a 
year prior to EIC, Pigou’s treatment of exploitation reads best as a recounting of 
his first major work Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, published in 
1905, supplemented by updated institutional material relating to the introduction 
of minimum wage legislation. Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace 
reflects Marshallian wage theory, but also includes an extended discussion of a 
bargaining model of wage outcomes influenced strongly by Edgeworth. The key 
feature of Pigou’s model is that, other than in the case of free competition, 
wages fall within a band and are indeterminate in that band. Robinson’s work, 
in contrast, is an altogether different kind of treatment, reflecting the application 
of her deterministic marginalist theory of firm behaviour to the issue of 
exploitation. 
This paper contains four sets of reflections connected to the ‘Pigou-
Robinson’ theory of exploitation. The first, covered in section 2, is concerned 
with highlighting the important theoretical differences between the EW and EIC 
analyses of exploitation.
3  The second theme of the paper relates to 
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methodological differences between Pigou and Robinson in their respective 
treatments of exploitation. Robinson’s mode of presentation deviates markedly 
from the Pigovian ideal, a point Pigou was keen to emphasise in his 
correspondence with Robinson leading up to the publication of EIC. Pigou’s 
discussion of exploitation in EW combines analysis with realism and a 
discussion of current and possible policy regimes and follows Marshall’s dictum 
of ‘hiding the machinery’.
4 Robinson’s EIC is within the modern ‘analytical’ 
neoclassical tradition where conclusions are derived in a deductive fashion from 
a set of prior assumptions and where technique is brought to the forefront.
5 
These methodological and stylistic issues are covered in section 3 of the paper. 
In addition to a comparative critique of the two halves of the ‘Pigou-
Robinson’ theory of exploitation, this paper also considers, as a third reflection, 
an interesting question in Robinsonian biography. Feiwel (1987, p. 54) argues 
that ‘in later years ... [Robinson] was fond of stressing how delighted she was to 
have shown that wages do not equal the marginal productivity of labour. 
Whether or not this was one of her chief objectives at the time is not now easily 
disentangled from time-distorted perspectives.’ Harcourt (1995, p. 1230) 
suggests that Robinson’s subsequent claim that the principal result of EIC was 
to ‘throw doubt on the marginal productivity theory of distribution, destroying 
the equality of the real wage with the marginal product .... is hindsight history’. 
What light do the published evidence—including EIC and her other 
publications of the period—and the archival sources shed on these questions? 
The best conclusion that can be drawn from the archival sources (principally the 
Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn collections at Kings College and the Austin 
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Robinson collection at the Marshall Library), and from the structure of EIC 
itself, is that EIC began as an adventure in pure theory. Put simply, Robinson 
was initially concerned with writing a marginalist theory of market 
imperfection. Armed with Charles Gifford’s (a student of Austin Robinson) 
marginal revenue curve, Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn set about developing 
the box of tools that became the basis for standard neoclassical imperfect 
market theory for generations to come. The archival sources do not suggest that 
Robinson was motivated by a concern for exploitation theory in the early stages 
of writing EIC nor that she was concerned with throwing doubt on first-
generation marginal productivity results (of the Clark and Wicksteed variety). 
(Of course, we cannot go from the absence of clear archival or other evidence of 
motivation of this kind to a strong conclusion that such a motivation did not in 
fact exist. We do not keep records of everything that sways us and, even if we 
do, there is no guarantee that these records will survive to the public archive 
point.) 
Whatever the nature of the archival evidence, the evidence from EIC and 
other published sources is very clear. It cannot be a coincidence that the area in 
which she chose to apply her box of tools most decisively was that of the 
exploitation of labour (accounting for three chapters of EIC). Nor can it be a 
coincidence that Robinson arrives, with little qualification, at the damning 
conclusion that an absence of perfect elasticity of firm-specific commodity 
demand or the supply of labour leads necessarily to the exploitation of labour. 
There are numerous references in EIC, in the three chapters specifically on 
exploitation and elsewhere, to the fact that wages will not equate to the value of 
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marginal net products other than in the case of perfectly competitive input and 
output markets. Not content with setting out the arguments concerning the 
prevalence and importance of exploitation in EIC, Robinson utilised her EIC 
analysis in an important concurrent critique of Wicksteed’s ([1894]1932) 
marginal productivity theory of distribution (Robinson 1933b, 1934a, 1934b). 
And, while the archival sources tell us little about the specific development of 
the theory of exploitation in EIC, they do provide tantalising allusions to the 
fact that Robinson, at the final stages of writing the book, recognised that she 
not only had re-set the theory of value but also had used that theory to make 
strong welfare judgements. Section 4 of the paper, therefore, considers the 
question of whether or not Robinson, in later life, over-emphasised the 
importance of the results on exploitation for the development of the EIC project. 
The paper closes with
 a final reflection, a postscript: what ever happened 
to the neoclassical theory of exploitation? 
6.2  Pigou and Robinson on Exploitation 
The first edition of EW was published in 1920; the fourth in 1932. Though 
substantial revisions were made to other parts of EW over this period, those 
sections which related to the theory of exploitation were left largely intact. But 
to appreciate where the foundations of the Pigovian analysis of exploitation lie, 
we need to go further back in time; namely, to Pigou’s pre-war writings. Indeed, 
a close inspection of Pigou’s first major work, Principles and Methods of 
Industrial Peace, published in 1905, suggests that Pigou’s 1920 EW analysis of 
exploitation is framed within a theoretical apparatus developed in Principles 
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and Methods of Industrial Peace and referred to in the pre-cursor to EW, Wealth 
and Welfare, published in 1912. This means that the Pigovian tool box used to 
examine exploitation in EW is largely to be found in his earliest major work, 
published a generation prior to the appearance of EIC. A comparative analysis 
of the two halves of the so-called ‘Pigou-Robinson’ theory of exploitation is, 
therefore, largely an inter-generational one. 
Exploitation of labour, according to Pigou, exists when workers are paid 
less than the value of their marginal net products to employers (Pigou 1920, p. 
512). To clarify the meaning of Pigovian exploitation, consider the figure below 
reproduced from EW. DD´ is the employers’ demand curve for labour. SS´ is 
the workers’ supply curve. Under free competition, the equilibrium wage is 
given by PM. Exploitation is defined by Pigou as the payment to workers of a 
wage less than the value of their marginal net products. If, say, the wage paid by 
employers is RM´ (at OM´ units of labour), then workers are being exploited, 
since RM´ falls below KM´. The degree of exploitation is then KM´ less RM´, 
ie KR´. Pigou’s ‘degree of exploitation’ measure should be distinguished from 
Pigou’s related concept of ‘unfairness’, which measures the difference between 
the free competition wage (PM) and the wage paid (RM´). (The wage difference 
PM less RM´, could conceivably be denoted as an alternative measure of the 
degree of exploitation if we wished to treat the free competition equilibrium 
wage as the yardstick rather than the demand price.) 
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It is natural to ask what determines the degree of exploitation. Pigou 
answers this question in EW by reference to his 1905 model of wage outcomes 
set out in precise form in an appendix to Principles and Methods of Industrial 
Peace (to which a young Keynes contributed). That model contained two key 
constituent elements. The first was the ‘settlement locus’, which gives the range 
of wage rates that workers and employers wish to bargain over. The second was 
the ‘range of practicable bargains’ which adjusts the settlement locus to account 
for the costs of the bargaining process itself. 
Consider a market in which free competition does not prevail. In this 
sort of market, for Pigou as for many of his contemporaries, the wage is 
indeterminate. Pigou suggests that the highest possible wage that workers 
(acting as a group) wish to be paid is given by that point on the employers’ 
demand curve for labour, which provides the highest utility to workers (taken as 
a group). This provides the highest wage rate on the settlement locus. Workers 
would not push the wage too high because this would result in too high a loss in 
employment. Correspondingly, the lower limit to the settlement locus is given 
by the point on the workers’ supply curve of labour that gives the highest utility 
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to employers. To the settlement locus, Pigou, in Principles and Methods of 
Industrial Peace, adds a role for the costs of using industrial action to achieve a 
desired wage outcome together with expectations concerning the likely result 
from industrial action. These costs and expectations determine minimum wages 
that workers would accept rather than undertake industrial action; employers 
have similar ‘sticking points’. The range of practicable bargains (or the 
arbitration locus) is then given by employers’ and workers’ sticking points. 
These sticking points lie within the settlement locus. Bargaining strength is both 
affected by the elasticities of demand and supply and affects the perceived costs 
of undertaking industrial action. It also acts as an additional force on final wage 
outcomes. 
To return to Pigou’s EW treatment of exploitation, the range of 
practicable bargains may be given by the wage range between QM´´ and RM´. 
If, as suggested above, RM´ is actually paid, then workers are receiving a wage 
at the lowest point in the range of practicable bargains. It is apparent that, since 
exploitation is linked to the underlying demand and supply curves for labour, 
the degree of exploitation must depend on the size of the demand and supply 
elasticities. This fact is fully understood by Pigou in both EW and his earlier 
Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace treatment. Given the underlying 
bargaining framework adopted, the degree of exploitation will also depend on 
the perceived costs of industrial disputation, anticipated wage outcomes and 
bargaining strength. 
The range of indeterminateness framework adopted in Principles and 
Methods of Industrial Peace and again in his discussion of exploitation in EW 
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relies heavily on Edgeworth, but the role of the free competition wage in 
thinking about unfairness also reflects a Marshallian ‘normal’ wage influence. 
For Marshall, the normal wage acted as a yardstick for a ‘fair’ wage. The 
normal wage is determined by the free workings of supply and demand. It 
provides one benchmark against which actual wage outcomes should be judged 
and, therefore, the basis for interference in the labour market. If workers receive 
a wage less than the free competition wage (both an unfair wage and an 
exploitative wage, according to Pigou’s criteria), wages should be increased. 
Such a move would raise the National Dividend. On the other hand, when 
workers receive low but fair wages, interference in the market reduces the 
National Dividend. Pigou was, therefore, opposed to proposals to implement 
‘living wages’ which had been prominent in the immediate pre-war period (e.g., 
Snowden 1912). Instead, Pigou accepted, in Wealth and Welfare (and later in 
EW), a broader ‘Minimum Conditions’ program.
6 Minimum conditions were to 
be achieved largely via government expenditure programs. Pigou’s support for 
poverty alleviation programs left him less exposed to charges of a lack of proper 
concern for the position of the working poor when making his attacks on the 
living wage. 
One final significant component of Pigou’s EW discussion of 
exploitation, which again had its antecedents in Principles and Methods of 
Industrial Peace and was heavily influenced by Marshall, is the link between 
wages and efficiency (Marshall’s ‘biological analogies’).
 When workers receive 
high wages, this produces positive efficiency effects and hence, all other things 
being equal, increases the value of the marginal net product. Correspondingly, 
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workers who are exploited and thereby receive lower wages will be less 
productive than if they received fair wages. This fall in productivity then lowers 
their marginal net product to the firm. As a result, wages will fall even further. 
What Pigou introduces into his analysis of exploitation by the insertion of these 
efficiency wage considerations are the Marshallian forces of cumulative 
causation. Last period’s exploitative wage outcome affects this period’s 
productivity, which then lowers the base for next period’s exploitation and what 
will be observed as next period’s ‘fair wage’. 
What is evident in this overview of the EW framework is not only the 
extent to which it relied on tools developed a generation previously (which 
themselves find their heritage in Edgeworth and Marshall), but also the 
multiplicity of tools employed. This gives the EW treatment of exploitation a 
certain richness and texture. In hindsight, of course, the most remarkable feature 
of the Pigovian exploitation analysis does not relate to the tools he used but to 
those he did not. The 1920s had seen a series of major controversies focussing 
on the theory of firm and market processes to which Pigou himself contributes 
(e.g., ‘empty economic boxes’, marginal supply relations, and the Economic 
Journal representative firm symposium). Yet Pigou’s EW treatment of 
exploitation ignored these debates (as EW was revised through 1920s). It was 
Robinson who recast the theory of the firm and then decisively centred the 
theory of exploitation within that new framework. 
As is well known, Robinson, in EIC, extended the theory of the firm to 
account for imperfection across both input and output markets.
 In particular, 
Robinson used her new marginalist toolbox to determine and evaluate (in terms 
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of the degree of exploitation) wage outcomes when either firms in the product 
market face less than perfectly elastic demand for their product or firms face 
less than perfectly elastic supply of labour, or both. 
Three chapters of EIC (25 - 27) are devoted to the theory of exploitation. 
The first two (25 and 26) refer to exploitation when a single industry is 
considered, while chapter 27 is concerned with the case of exploitation in a 
‘world of monopolies’ (all commodities are produced by monopolies). Although 
Robinson at times refers to the exploitation of ‘factors’, the only specific factor 
mentioned is labour. For example, the definition of exploitation adopted is: ‘a 
group of workers are being exploited when their wage is less than the marginal 
physical product that they are producing, valued at the price at which it is being 
sold’ (Robinson 1933a, p.283). The possibility of reverse exploitation (workers 
exploiting employers) is not mentioned, which is consistent with Pigou’s 
emphasis on the exploitation of labour in EW (although in Pigou’s case he does 
refer, in passing, to the possibility of reverse exploitation). 
In EIC, Robinson moves quickly to make the distinction between her 
approach to exploitation and that of her predecessors (namely, Pigou). She 
suggests: 
‘It is commonly said that exploitation (the payment to labour of 
less than its proper wage) arises from the unequal bargaining 
strength of employers and employed, and it can be remedied by 
the action of trade unions, or of the State which places the 
workers upon an equality in bargaining with the employers. 
Bargaining strength, as we shall find, is important in many cases, 
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but the fundamental cause of exploitation will be found to be the 
lack of perfect elasticity in the supply of labour or in the demand 
for commodities’ (Robinson 1933a, p.281). 
While Robinson is clearly wrong in thinking that extant exploitation theory 
revolved only around a bargaining strength model, it is certainly true that 
Robinson provided a sharp alternative perspective on exploitation. Most 
importantly, Robinson significantly expanded the domain over which 
exploitation may apply by allowing for the possibility of exploitation as a result 
of imperfect competition in either the product market or the factor market. This 
generalisation of the theory of exploitation compares with the Pigovian model, 
which applies to a specific structure; namely, that of workers acting in 
combination in the input market against employers. Moreover, Robinson’s 
model provides clearly deterministic solutions to wage outcomes in other than 
perfectly competitive markets, as against the Pigovian model, which is of a 
range of indeterminateness in wages when free competition does not prevail. 
This means that Robinson provides a unique solution to the determination of the 
degree of exploitation in imperfect markets, which Pigou does not. In addition, 
Robinson’s theory of price discrimination provides a richer discussion of 
exploitation outcomes so that the degree of exploitation can be examined for 
both price-discriminating firms and non-discriminating firms.  
Robinson’s model of the labour market is well known. Firms determine 
the employment of labour by setting employment at the point where the 
marginal revenue product of labour (or marginal physical productivity 
multiplied by marginal revenue), is just equal to the marginal cost of employing 
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the next unit of labour. This formula applies regardless of whether the product 
or factor markets are perfect or imperfect. As such the wage is deterministic and 
so too the degree of exploitation. 
In the case of imperfection in the output market (but no imperfection in 
the input market), the marginal revenue product of labour may be set equal to 
the wage but marginal revenue is less than price. Hence, exploitation exists 
because the wage paid is less than the value of the marginal product (or price 
times the marginal product). Increasing wages is not the solution to the problem 
of exploitation. It would result in unemployment and exploitation at the higher 
wage. The only remedy available is the control of prices or removing the source 
of market imperfection. Robinson, therefore, attaches some importance to the 
intervention of the State to affect exploitative outcomes. (Robinson argues that 
the removal of imperfection in the output market may eliminate exploitation but 
actually reduce the wage paid to workers, as the price of output will have fallen 
and marginal physical product may fall. Workers will be paid the value of their 
marginal product, but that wage may be lower than the former exploitative 
wage.) 
In the case of an imperfectly competitive input market, the supply of 
labour is not perfectly elastic; the extreme case is that of monopsony. Again, the 
employment of labour will occur at a point where the marginal cost of labour is 
equal to marginal revenue product. However, the wage set will equal the (lower) 
supply price of the amount of labour employed, as the marginal cost curve will 
deviate from the average cost curve. Again, eliminating the imperfection in the 
input market may remove the exploitation of labour. An imposed minimum 
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wage or the application of trade union power may also eliminate this cause of 
exploitative wages. 
As part of a more general critique of the neoclassical method, Robinson 
later highlighted perceived weaknesses in the framework adopted in EIC. 
However, she remained committed to the negative strong points of the book 
(Robinson 1964, 1969). Within the orthodox framework, she had shown that 
labour exploitation is endemic within modern economies because of the 
prevalence of monopolistic and monopsonistic elements (Robinson 1969, p. 
xii). Moreover, an important role exists, in cases of monopsonistic exploitation, 
for trade unions to raise wages to bring the labour market more closely into line 
with the competitive ideal (Robinson 1964, p. 243). 
To summarise: the analyses of Pigou and Robinson with regard to 
exploitation are a generation apart. That of Pigou reflects a pre-war analytical 
framework heavily reliant on Edgeworth and Marshall in which a range of 
different tools are applied to examine the causes and consequences of 
exploitation. Despite the adoption of Pigou’s definition of exploitation and the 
explicit application of her new set of tools to Pigovian welfare issues, 
Robinson’s treatment of exploitation is radically different from Pigou’s. First, it 
is centred in a single self-contained profit-maximising firm model applied in a 
variety of market contexts. Second, Robinson’s model provides deterministic 
solutions to the degree of exploitation. Third, as market imperfections in either 
the product or the factor market can lead to exploitation, Robinson expanded 
significantly the domain within which exploitation could occur. 
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6.3  Style 
Robinson derives her major propositions on the basis of strict deduction from 
the underlying assumptions used. This is the analytical style, and EIC is to be 
seen as an important early example of this style. The machinery (or at least the 
geometry) is not hidden but is made available for all to see. 
Pigou’s text is more difficult to characterise. We have alluded to the key 
analytical devices which Pigou utilises to develop truths concerning 
exploitation. Clearly, the machinery is not completely hidden. However, in 
accordance with the Marshallian style guide the analytics, and particularly the 
mathematical grounding of these analytics, are partially suppressed. Diagrams 
and mathematical analyses are invariably presented in footnotes and 
appendixes. Indeed, the detailed mathematical appendix on the settlement and 
arbitration locii set out in the appendix to Principles and Methods of Industrial 
Peace is presented in EW in a very much abridged form, with only one relevant 
diagram (itself included in the appendix in later editions of EW) and none of the 
relevant mathematics. 
Interestingly, in his correspondence with Robinson in the lead-up to the 
publication of EIC, Pigou makes pointed reference to the style of EIC.
7 
‘Suggestions for next opus. This one having been all about 
machinery, opus II should be about more substantial real 
problems, in your handling of which the machinery, while kept in 
the background, should prove its worth in doing the job!’
8 
 264 
He also refers to the over-use of geometry. He suggests at one point, for 
example, in a letter to Richard Kahn, that it would have been more helpful if the 
‘main propositions [of EIC] had been set out in an appendix in algebra, which 
would have been very much shorter. But that’s a matter of taste.’
9 
However, the question of a divergence of style (or method?) goes 
beyond an emphasis or otherwise on machinery. What we see in Pigou is 
constant allusion to the emerging empirical literature on wage outcomes and 
standards of living undertaken by Bowley, Tawney, Rowntree and others. It is, 
of course, difficult to know whether the cited empirical literature actually 
informed the views that Pigou arrived at concerning exploitation
 or whether 
they were used to buttress positions previously arrived at, but they do provide 
some institutional and historical context for the reader to understand better those 
views. Moreover, EW contains detailed discussion of the relevant legislative 
environment in both Britain and elsewhere (Australia, New Zealand). In 
particular, Pigou displays a comprehensive knowledge of the application of both 
the 1909 Trades Boards Act and of minimum wage legislation, which came 
later. While EIC also makes frequent reference to policy, these references are 
very much of the ‘policy implications’ form rather than detailed presentation of 
specific policy proposals or critical analysis of existing policy regimes. 
6.4  The Importance of Exploitation to The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition 
Looking back on her life’s work, Robinson was very critical of the static 
neoclassical framework adopted in EIC. However, she remained attached to her 
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results concerning exploitation. In the preface to the second edition of EIC, 
Robinson indicated that: 
‘what was for me the main point, I succeeded in proving within 
the framework of the orthodox theory, that it is not true that 
wages are normally equal to the value of the marginal product of 
labour’ (Robinson 1969,
 p. xii). 
She is even more forthright in her ‘Reminiscences’ article when contrasting hers 
and Chamberlin’s work: 
‘I had been very well pleased to refute the orthodox theory of 
wages, which had stuck in my gizzard as a student, while 
Chamberlin refused to admit that his argument damaged the 
image of the market producing the optimum allocation of given 
resources between alternative uses. This ideological difference 
underlay an otherwise unnecessary controversy’ (Robinson 1978, 
p. x). 
As noted in the introduction to this paper, both Feiwel and Harcourt suggest that 
these much later views on the relative importance of exploitation to the EIC 
project were mildly time-distorted. How important, then, was the theory of 
exploitation to Robinson at the time she was engaged in developing her ideas 
and writing and publishing EIC? 
An answer to this question requires the examination of both archival 
sources and published material. The three key archival collections are those of 
Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn held at the Archive Centre, Kings College, 
 266 
Cambridge, and the Austin Robinson papers at the Faculty of Economics and 
Politics, University of Cambridge.
10 These sources provide no grounds for 
believing that Robinson was led to start the EIC project and develop the box of 
tools found there because she wanted to refute the orthodox theory of wages. 
Rather, the strong impression gained from reading the relevant papers is that, in 
the early period of the development of EIC, she was entirely engrossed in the 
new monopoly-based theory of the firm and the related set of marginalist 
techniques. 
Included in an envelope inscribed by Robinson ‘Early Stages of 
Imperfect Competition’ is an undated manuscript entitled ‘Analysis of 
Monopoly’ and annotated by Richard Kahn and Austin Robinson.
11 The 
manuscript contains a detailed analysis of the four cost curves (marginal and 
average cost, including and excluding rent), the marginal and average revenue 
curves, monopoly value, the monopoly buyer case, and optimal output in the 
presence of externalities. The analysis is largely geometric and mirrors 
corresponding treatments provided in EIC. For our purposes, what is important 
is the absence of any reference to exploitation. A comparison of this manuscript 
with  EIC suggests that the order of material presented in EIC probably 
corresponds roughly to the actual development of ideas—recall in this context 
that Robinson’s analysis of exploitation is located at the end of the text. 
Subsequent references to exploitation in the archival papers are limited. 
A letter from Gerald Shove to Robinson (JVR vii/Shove) dated 19 December 
1931 includes a brief discussion of Shove’s views on exploitation, which are 
offered in response to a query from Robinson. (The original note from Robinson 
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was presumably destroyed by Shove.)
12 In what appears as the first definitive 
outline of EIC, Robinson indicates, in an undated letter to Dennis Robertson 
(Kahn Papers (hereafter RFK), The Archive Centre, King’s College, 
Cambridge, 16/1), that she is planning to write a chapter on ‘Buyers Monopoly 
and Exploitation of Labour’ (Chapter 8 in a list of 15 chapters).
13 The letter 
from Robinson indicates that chapters on marginal and average curves, rent, and 
monopoly under increasing and decreasing returns, were well progressed. 
Subsequent outlines reveal an increasing interest in exploitation. An undated 
outline in Robinson’s handwriting held in Kahn’s papers lists a separate chapter 
for ‘Exploitation’ (chapter 17) immediately following a chapter on ‘Socially 
Desirable Output’ (RFK, 16/1). In a letter to Kahn dated 31 March (1932?) 
Robinson notes that she had ‘understood tho’ not written exploitation due to 
market imperfection’.
14 
While archival sources suggest that it was interest in the development of 
the toolbox which dominated the early stages of the writing of EIC, the question 
of the importance of the issue of exploitation to the final stages of the project 
remains open. We have already seen that early outlines of the contents of EIC 
did not provide a prominent role for the discussion of exploitation. However, 
the published version of EIC contains three chapters on exploitation. By 
implication, Robinson’s examination of exploitation must have formed a critical 
component of the final stages of writing. In a remarkable letter from Joan 
Robinson to Austin Robinson (held in the Austin Robinson collection at the 
Marshall Library) dated 11 October (1932), Robinson says: 
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‘I have found out what my book is about. It was quite a sudden 
revelation which I only had yesterday. What I have been and 
gone and done is what Piero said must be done, in his famous 
article. I have rewritten the whole theory of value beginning with 
the firm as a monopolist. I used to think I was providing tools for 
some genius in the future to use and all this time I have done the 
job myself. It’s all there already, but there’s a great deal of 
rearrangement and change of emphasis which may take time.’
15 
No direct reference is made to the issue of exploitation in the letter. What is 
clear, however, is that in the final stages of EIC, Robinson moved well away 
from her earlier interest in the development of tools and towards a view that she 
had not only developed a comprehensive coherent analytical framework but that 
she had also applied that framework herself to important policy questions. As 
the exploitation of labour represents perhaps the key application of the 
framework in the final published form of EIC, we are probably safe in assuming 
that she saw her work on exploitation, at the time of the publication of the book, 
as of fundamental importance. 
Further support for the view that the EIC results on exploitation were of 
considerable contemporaneous importance to Robinson is provided by her 
concurrent interest in Wicksteed’s marginal productivity theory of 
distribution.
16 Robinson published a review in the June 1933 number of the 
Economic Journal of the London School of Economics’ reprint of Wicksteed’s 
An Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of Distribution (Wicksteed 
[1894]1932). In this paper, she used her analysis of imperfect competition not 
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only to criticise Wicksteed’s model but also to severely attack Hicks’ discussion 
in his Theory of Wages on the exhaustion of the product. She suggests, in regard 
to Wicksteed, that he ‘was feeling his way towards a proof that unless 
competition is perfect the factors do not receive the value of their marginal 
product as wages. It was to avoid this difficulty that he took refuge in the 
assumption of perfect competition’ (Robinson 1933b, p. 304). Robinson goes on 
to remark that ‘however clumsy his attempt to solve the problem of distribution 
under imperfect competition may be, the fact that he realised its importance 
makes his point of view more sympathetic to a modern reader than that of Mr 
Hicks, who contents himself with remarking that the “further consideration of 
this point would lead us too far into the more arid regions of higher general 
theory; its relevance to the theory of distribution is remote”’. 
Robinson followed up her review of Wicksteed with a full paper 
published in the Economic Journal in 1934 entitled ‘Euler’s Theorem and the 
Problem of Distribution’. Here she provided a detailed discussion of the ways in 
which a marginal productivity theory of distribution must be altered in 
conditions of imperfect competition and monopoly. It seems implausible to 
think, therefore, that, without a recognition of the importance of her EIC results 
on exploitation nor a driving interest in dispensing with a perfect competition-
based marginal productivity theory of distribution, Robinson would have 
considered writing her two Wicksteed papers. In short, we should simply accept 
Robinson’s reminiscences of the importance of the EIC exploitation results at 
face value. 
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6.5  Postscript 
Kaldor (1934), in his review of EIC suggested that ‘of all Mrs. Robinson’s 
results, unquestionably the most valuable are to be found in Books VII-IX, 
which deal with the extension of the marginal-productivity theory of 
distribution to monopoloid situations.’
17 Kaldor was not the only contemporary 
reader to recognise the importance of Robinson’s exploitation analysis. In a 
letter to Robinson dated 10 July 1933, Hicks indicates that EIC had cleared up 
for him a confusion about the nature of exploitation (JVR vii/Hicks). He 
suggests that he is now much clearer on the distinction between an 
‘entrepreneur-monopolist, who can exploit others by restricting his demand for 
their services, and a factor-of-production-monopolist, who can only exploit by 
restricting the supply of his own.’ In a letter to Robinson on 6 October 1933, 
Harrod (JVR vii/Harrod) refers to the fact that he had withdrawn a note about 
collective bargaining from the Economic Journal on the grounds that ‘it was 
superseded or made unnecessary’ by EIC.
18 Paul Douglas in his correspondence 
with Robinson in early 1935 (JVR vii/Douglas), suggests that the introduction 
of the marginal revenue curve greatly alters the discussion of the problem of 
distribution. Douglas goes on to add that if he were re-writing his The Theory of 
Wages he would need to add a chapter, based on EIC, on the effect of monopoly 
and of imperfect competition on the shares of the factors. 
While Robinson’s exploitation analysis was met with considerable 
contemporaneous interest, it received a negative reception from Chamberlin 
(1934, 1937, 1938), who argued that under monopolistic competition all factors 
are exploited by profit-maximising firms. If this is so then the particular 
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emphasis on the exploitation of labour is unjustified: ‘the search for an exploiter 
appears as a misdirected effort arising out of the extension of a competitive 
criterion of exploitation into a field where it is rendered inappropriate by the 
presence of monopoly’ (Chamberlin 1937, p. 580).
19 As she had done 
previously, when Chamberlin’s book Monopolistic Competition was published 
(in 1933), Robinson took a keen private interest in Chamberlin’s work (as the 
letters between her and Kahn reveal) but did not engage publicly in debate. A 
copy of Chamberlin’s 1937 article ‘Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?’ 
was sent to Kaldor, who responded that he would write a reply.
20 Robinson 
suggests in a letter to Kaldor (held in the Kaldor collection at the Archive 
Centre, King’s College), dated 17 November 1937, that: 
‘I think Chamberlin’s trouble (apart from the pique which is so 
painfully obvious) is that he is alarmed at finding the anti-laissez-
faire implications of his own analysis’ (Kaldor (NK) 3/30/177). 
Her comments in her letter to Kaldor about the laissez-faire implications of 
imperfect competition analysis simply reflect her published views on the matter, 
as set out in the 1933/34 series of papers on distribution reviewed above. 
Whatever the formative influences of EIC, there can be no doubt that Robinson 
emphasised the anti-laissez-faire message of her work in the immediate post-
EIC period. Her concurrent involvement in the development of the General 
Theory simply re-enforced this message: ‘Modern developments in academic 
theory, forced by modern developments in economic life — the analysis of 
monopoly and the analysis of unemployment — have shattered the structure of 
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orthodox doctrine and destroyed the complacency with which economists were 
wont to view the workings of laissez-faire capitalism’ (Robinson 1942, p. xxii). 
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Harrod for permission to quote from the unpublished writings of Roy Harrod; and (7) 
Anthony Courakis (John Hicks’ literary executor) and the John Hicks Foundation for 
permission to quote from the unpublished writings of John Hicks. 
1 Any complete review of neoclassical exploitation theory would also make reference 
to the analysis of exploitation contained in Dobb’s (1928) Wages and Hicks’ (1932) 
The Theory of Wages. 
2 The presumption that under perfect competition workers cannot be exploited is a 
central tenet of neoclassical thought on the issue. Lange (1934-1935), in referring to the 
Pigou and Robinson analyses of exploitation, was quick to point out that ‘for the 
Socialist the worker is exploited even if he gets the full value of the marginal product’. 
This is because there still remains, in the competitive market, a flow of income to the 
owners of capital. As Lange puts it: ‘The Marxian definition of exploitation is derived 
from contrasting the personal distribution of income in a capitalist economy 
(irrespective of whether monopolistic or competitive) with that in an “einfache 
Warenproduktion” in which the worker owns his means of production’. See Elster 
(1978) for a more detailed discussion of the distinction between the (classical) Marxian 
approach to exploitation and the neoclassical. 
3 Despite the continued relevance of the Pigou and Robinson exploitation analyses to 
applied labour research (see Persky and Tsang 1974; Medoff 1976; Jones and Walsh 
1978; and Machin, Manning and Wood 1993) and the attention given by historians of 
economic thought to both Pigovian welfare analysis and to the imperfect competition 
revolution, a detailed exploration of the origins of neoclassical exploitation theory has 
yet to be undertaken. The aim of this paper is to help fill this gap in our knowledge. 
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Elsewhere, I have examined the important links between ‘first-generation’ neoclassical 
wage theory and Pigou’s treatment of exploitation, focussing on the links between 
Pigou’s theory of exploitation and Marshall’s fair wages analysis; see Flatau (1997a–
chapter 3). 
4 So much so that Pigou’s diagrammatic presentation of exploitation—which most 
clearly illustrates the demand and supply ‘machinery’ lying behind the textual analysis 
—is included in a footnote in the first edition of EW and then removed to an appendix 
in later editions. Interestingly, Pigou himself markedly and purposefully deviated from 
the ‘Pigovian ideal’ style in his Theory of Unemployment, published in 1933. 
5 On Robinson, EIC and method see Shackle (1967), Bishop (1989), Feiwel (1987), 
Harcourt (1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1995), Loasby (1991), Marcuzzo (1994) and Pasinetti 
(1987). 
6 The key difference between Pigou and the Fabians on the minimum conditions 
program was that Pigou did not accept that a uniform national minimum wage should 
be part of a minimum conditions package. 
7 This correspondence is held at the Archive Centre, Kings College, Cambridge (see 
Joan Robinson collection, hereafter JVR, vii/Pigou). Pigou provided detailed notes on a 
draft of EIC but these notes refer to the underlying structure of Robinson’s model 
rather than her treatment of exploitation. 
8 JVR vii / Pigou leaf 7. 
9 JVR vii / Pigou leaf 30a. It is clear from the archival sources that these remarks are 
directed only to stylistic concerns and not the content of EIC, for Pigou prefaces them 
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by suggesting that ‘I think Mrs R’s [Robinson’s] book’s a very fine concentrated 
intellectual effort’ (JVR vii/Pigou leaf 30a). 
10 The Austin Robinson collection at the Marshall Library is currently in the process of 
being catalogued. Marcuzzo (1996) utilises the Joan Robinson and Kahn papers to 
good effect to compare EIC with Kahn’s Kings College Fellowship dissertation on the 
economics of the short period. The origins of Robinson’s imperfect competition 
revolution and the role of Kahn in the development of The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition are further discussed by Marcuzzo (2003), published subsequent to the 
present paper. Marcuzzo (2003, p. 546) quotes a letter from Kahn to Robinson: “You 
are attributing to me very much more than I am responsible for. What I did was to read 
what you had written. Most of my attempts to do constructive work (e.g., in regard to 
Discrimination and Exploitation) ended in failure and it was almost invariably you who 
found the clue [….] My place in the scheme of things is apparently to correct errors in 
arithmetic’ (letter of 30 March 1933 in RFK Papers, 13/90/1/209-10). Marcuzzo goes 
on to note the role played by Kahn’s dissertation The Economics of the Short Period, 
together with the contributions of Sraffa in the development of a theory of the firm 
based on imperfect competition. 
11 JVR, i/3/2, Archive Centre, Kings College, Cambridge. 
12 The letters between Shove and Robinson leading up to the publication of EIC are 
sometimes acrimonious. The tension between Shove and Robinson resulted in part 
from Shove’s suggestion that Robinson’s treatment of diminishing returns was similar 
to his own (e.g. Shove to Robinson, 17 June 1932, JVR vii/Shove leaf 17). In the 
foreword to EIC, Robinson provides a fulsome acknowledgement: ‘Mr. Shove’s 
articles form the basis of my treatment of rent and of the four cost curves’ (EIC, p. 
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xiii). Shove (1933) for his part provided limited support for the EIC in his review of 
EIC. He suggests that Robinson ‘worked in close contact with others’ (p. 657) and that 
‘the general approach and, broadly speaking, the method for treatment are on 
established lines’ (p.657). Much of the technical apparatus of the EIC, Shove suggests 
is derived from Pigou, Marshall and Sraffa. 
13 The book outline contains a reference to a mathematical appendix to be written by 
Richard Kahn. Robinson also asks Robertson whether he might write a preface for the 
book. She suggests that a preface from Robertson might increase the chances of the 
book finding a publisher (clearly nothing came of this). 
14 RFK 13/90/I letter of 31 March. 
15 In a subsequent letter to Austin Robinson dated 16 October (1932) she suggests that 
‘you and Kahn and I have been teaching each other economics intensively these two 
years but it was I who saw the great light and it is my book.’ See Marcuzzo (2003) for 
further discussion of the role of Kahn in the development of EIC. 
16 The interest in Wicksteed was probably due to Keynes who, Robinson notes in a 
letter to Kahn dated 8 March 1933, had been reading Wicksteed and Clark and no 
doubt passed on a copy of Wicksteed’s An Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of 
Distribution to Robinson to review for the Economic Journal (RFK 13/90/I). 
17 Kaldor points out in his 1934 review that monopsonistic exploitation leads to 
inefficiency in the use of resources, while monopolistic exploitation does not. The 
letters from Kaldor to Robinson held in the Archive Centre at Kings College 
Cambridge reveal a difference of view between Robinson and Kaldor regarding 
Kaldor’s treatment of the difference between the two forms of exploitation, which led 
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Kaldor to provide a detailed proof of the thesis (see JVR vii/Kaldor letter dated 17 
August 1934; the proof, to my knowledge, remains unpublished). 
18 Harrod’s paper ‘A Note on Collective Bargaining’ is included in a forthcoming book 
on Harrod’s papers and correspondence edited by Daniele Besomi (subsequently 
published see Harrod [1932]2005). I thank Daniele Besomi for drawing Harrod’s work 
to my attention and providing notification of the copyright owners for unpublished 
Harrod and Hicks material. 
19 See Bloom (1940) and Bloom and Belfer (1948) for further developments of the 
Chamberlin critique. 
20 See JVR vii/Kaldor and Kaldor 3/30/177. Kaldor’s response to Chamberlin’s 1937 
article is set out in Kaldor (1938). 
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7.  Conclusion 
The origins, nature and subsequent development of the marginalist revolution 
have been the subject of considerable debate among historians of economic 
thought (Black, Coats and Goodwin 1973 remains an essential reference). The 
extent to which the advent of marginalism represented a revolution in thought (a 
break from the classical tradition), the causes and nature of the ‘multiple 
discoveries’ of the marginal utility construct, and the coherence of a single 
‘neoclassical’ tradition all remain very much open questions. However, what is 
less open to debate is that, by the early 1890s, two major traditions of 
marginalism, centred on the figures of Marshall and Jevons, had begun to take 
hold in the English-speaking world. What is equally evident is that the time was 
ripe for the further development of marginalist thinking in the field of the 
distribution of income. This thesis explores the ways in which marginalist 
accounts of distribution of income evolved in the Jevonian and Marshallian 
marginalist traditions from the 1880s through to the early 1930s. 
‘Jevons’s one great disciple’, Wicksteed, gradually extended the 
Jevonian framework in various works from the mid-1880s. His significance to 
the future development of neoclassical distribution theory lies, however, in his 
An Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of Distribution. The Essay 
represents a significant contribution for two main reasons. First, it provided a 
marginalist, production-function-grounded theory of distribution, which was 
universal in form in the sense that the same framework was equally applied to 
all factors of production. We have argued that Wicksteed’s approach was 
 280 
universalist in another sense in that he denied the possibility of alternative truths 
concerning the distribution of the product and, notwithstanding the 
qualifications on the economic man construct provided in the Common Sense, 
grounded his theory on the single principle of human behaviour; that of the 
optimising rational agent. In his presentation of a universal theory of 
distribution, Wicksteed was not alone. As we have argued, both Clark, and to a 
lesser extent, Wicksell also presented universalist, marginalist theories of 
distribution. Subsequently, a universalist marginalist theory of distribution 
became a standard feature of a more homogenous neoclassical structure in the 
middle period of the 20th century. 
The second reason why we have highlighted the little-read Essay in this 
thesis is that it displayed the formalist, mathematical mode of analysis, which 
was to be fundamental to the future development of neoclassical distribution 
theory. It assigned priority, in theory generation, to the role of internally 
consistent, mathematical reasoning. However, in so doing, Wicksteed moved 
well away from Jevonian methodological strictures because he de-emphasised 
the role of empirical investigations in helping to generate and to appraise the 
laws of distribution derived from the mathematical apparatus. Mathematical 
formalism in economics is sometimes presented as a post-WWII phenomenon. 
This proposition is correct if the point at issue is one of dating the acceptance 
and widespread adoption of formalism in the ‘mainstream’ of economics. 
However, such a dating is very much wide of the mark if the reference point is 
to the origins of formalism. 
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We have argued that the Marshallian system stands one step removed 
from Jevonian marginalism, particularly of the second-generation Wicksteed 
variety. It is certainly true that a marginal productivity account of wage 
outcomes is a feature of Marshall’s framework. Indeed, he had developed, very 
early in the piece, the mathematics of what was to become the standard 
marginal productivity theory of distribution. However, Marshall placed strict 
limits on the applicability of marginal productivity-based laws of distribution, 
allowed for a greater range of causal factors to affect wage outcomes, and put 
significant emphasis on the role of institutions and custom in affecting wage 
outcomes. Methodologically, he emphasised empirical investigations as a means 
of both uncovering the laws of distribution and subsequently corroborating 
those laws. Correspondingly, the role afforded mathematical postulates and the 
‘economic man’ construct in generating economic theories was given much less 
emphasis (indeed, often derided) by Marshall than it was to be given in the 
future trajectory of neoclassical economics. 
Wicksteed’s and Marshall’s views on distributional issues overlap more 
obviously in the normative and the ethical domain. Indeed, there appears to be a 
greater degree of commonality between Marshall on the one hand and 
Wicksteed on the other than between Marshall and Jevons in terms of normative 
propositions. The same applies to Clark. The payment of wages below the value 
of the marginal product is ‘unfair’. Such an outcome requires a labour market 
response, including through trade union action and in terms of government 
policy responses such as arbitration. However, low wages, per se, are not the 
basis for labour market policy interventions, only when they are ‘unfair’ is such 
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a policy appropriate. State remedial action (tax and expenditure policy) is 
required to raise the standard of living of those workers receiving low (but fair) 
incomes. Justice in the labour market can ultimately only be attained when low 
wage outcomes are eliminated or ameliorated. 
Marshall’s successor at Cambridge, Pigou, followed (largely) in 
Marshall’s footsteps, but his insistence on the incidence and severity of 
exploitation in the labour market marked one obvious point of departure from 
Marshall’s more measured normative position. More importantly perhaps, and 
reflecting a changing political environment, he extended the reach of the state in 
terms of a program required to raise the standard of living of poor workers. 
Despite the significant advances achieved in the 1890s in neoclassical 
distribution theory and the further development of Walrasian general 
equilibrium and Austrian neoclassical economics, there were few notable 
developments in Marshallian and Jevonian neoclassical distribution theory in 
the early part of the 20th century; an exception was Pigou’s The Economics of 
Welfare. This was the basis for Hicks’s claim, in The Theory of Wages, that 
little progress had been made in the theory of wages for over 30 to 40 years. 
Hicks himself was to disown The Theory of Wages as a juvenile piece, but while 
it lacks the rigour of his later contributions, The Theory of Wages incorporates 
that unique combination of ideas drawn from different strands of marginalism 
which marked Hicks’s later developments. 
Indeed, the list of contributions to neoclassical thought from this work is 
considerable. Hicks not only introduces the elasticity of substitution tool, but 
provides a determination of relative factor shares at the macro level, introduces 
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a typology of inventions and growth, and develops a model of strike activity, 
which was perhaps more influential than it deserved to be. He also paved the 
way for his more mature rigorous work on capital, time and expectations and so 
developed the foundations for his analysis of the dynamics of the economy. 
The series of essays close with a discussion of the theory of exploitation, 
which was given a radical new twist by Joan Robinson. In a sense, Robinson’s 
theory of exploitation was more Marshallian than Pigovian (its forerunner), for 
it was based squarely on the theory of the firm and markets, with a lineage that 
could be traced to Marshall, rather than to bargaining theory, as in Pigou’s 
model of exploitation. Robinson’s theory of the firm, of course, departed from 
Marshall’s in that it followed Sraffa’s damming critique of the representative 
firm and perfect competition. It introduced a deterministic, marginalist theory of 
exploitation based on imperfect competition. Our analysis of the archival 
sources and relevant texts lead us to accept Robinson’s own conclusion that she 
succeeded in showing, within the orthodox framework, that the exploitation of 
labour is endemic within modern economies because of the prevalence of 
monopolistic and monopsonistic elements (Robinson 1969, p. xii). 
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